Beyond Globalisation: Exploring the Limits of Globalisation in the Regional Context

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Beyond Globalisation: Exploring the Limits of Globalisation in the Regional Context
(conference proceedings)

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Department of Human Geography and Regional Development
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Why Beyond Globalisation?

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In this short introduction our aim is not to present in detail the rich and as expected diverse content of this volume. Our aim is to give an account of the "story" that lies behind why we have chosen to give it somewhat provocative title "Beyond Globalisation" and especially what has brought us to discuss the theme of globalisation in the first place. By concentrating primarily on the story "That lies behind" we are not resigning on the traditional purpose of being this introduction an introduction that is introducing the content that follows. But it will be more in a sketch of major ideas what we think we have learned. We feel obliged to introduce this volume this way because it is already fourth volume being published as an output of the conference series named Globalisation organized by our department since 2003 and no such attempt has been made yet.

The history of this conference series goes back to the beginning of 2003 when a group of scholars from the Department of Human Geography and Regional Development from the University of Ostrava announced the first Call for papers for a conference on the theme Globalisation. There were then two reasons behind for choosing exactly this theme. The first one was to join the whole academic community penetrating feeling that globalisation is the concept that best captures the rapid changes in every society around the world during the last few decades. The remarkable interest in globalisation grew metaphorically expressed almost overnight. As Robertson and Sholte in their introduction to *Encyclopedia of Globalization* observe: „The term has catapulted from obscurity to the headlines in just a few years." (Robertson and Scholte 2007). Expressed in numbers: in 1994 there were just 34 books in the Library of Congress catalog list that covered the topic of globalisation. But in ten years later the number has grown rapidly exceeding 6 500 entries (Altschiller 2007). But globalisation has become not only another highly cited word in social sciences vocabulary. It has also become what Raymond Williams[1] calls a "keyword" (Jones 2006: 1). A word around which there is gathered a considerable amount of social science thinking what it really is and how it impacts the social world.

The second reason for choosing globalisation as a major theme was that etymologically globalisation has a profoundly spatial connotation and the study of space and place is after all at the very center of every geographical department. And as Neil Brenner remarks, globalization research is permeated by geographical concepts: "e.g., ´space-time compression´, ´space of flows´, ´space of places´, ´de-territorialization´, ´glocalization´, the ´global-local nexus, ´supra-territoriality´, ´diasporas, ´translocalities´, and ´scapes´, among many other terms" (Brenner 1999). But not only that globalisation research is accompanied by geographical vocabulary, it seems on the other way round that the concept of globalization is transforming all current geographical paradigms. For example Castells talks about superseding the "space of places" by "space of flows" (Castells 2000); Sholte argues that "supraterritorial spaces based upon distanceless, borderless interactions" surpass the role of territorial and place-based socio-institutional forms (Scholte 1996) and Ruggie goes even so

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[1] A sociologist known by publishing „*Keywords: a vocabulary of culture and society*" (Williams 1976).

far to consider the territoriality and even geography itself as being dissolved by globalisation forces (Ruggie 2009).

With all these ideas in mind we began to invite the academic community in two years cycle to discuss globalisation with us. But after publishing and evaluating already the third volume of conference proceedings, that time named *Globalisation and its impact on localities* (Siwek and Baar 2008), we have realized that the theme globalisation, although varied in concrete definitions, was studied mainly somewhat one-sided: predominantly as an objective process with a different implications for the objective reality. From this point of view is globalisation taken only as a "change in the spatial organization of social, economic, political and cultural life" (Kornprobst, Pouliot et al. 2008: 3). But what about the subjective dimension of globalisation? What about the dimension that concentrates either on what people think about globalisation or on how people become conscious of the world as a whole and with what implications or how is the world-as-a-whole represented in people's minds? We somehow unintentionally forced out the second part of the today already classical Robertson's definition that globalisation as a concept refers not only to "the compression of the world" but also "to the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole" (Robertson 1992).

After realizing this major shortage of our past discussions, we decided to use the two primary instruments in our hands as conference organizers - the Call for papers and the selection of keyspeakers – to steer the conference theme beyond the study of globalisation only as an objective spatial phenomenon. We wanted to include also the study of how people interpret and react on living in an increasingly globalized world and so we published Call for papers in the following version:

Beyond Globalisation

Exploring the Limits of Globalisation in the Regional Context

September 16-17, 2009
Department of Human Geography and Regional Development, University of Ostrava, Ostrava, Czech Republic

Globalisation is one of the most frequently used words in contemporary human geography and other social sciences. Since we do not have a precise definition of this phenomenon, the 4th International Conference on Globalisation will attempt to contribute to the discussions about the nature of globalisation processes. In particular, we would like to explore the spatial, temporal, structural and conceptual limits of globalisation. The problematisation of the concept should help us better understand its complex character. The conference is divided into two sections:

1) Theory and Practice, where theoretical frameworks of globalisation shall be explored. The papers should critically examine the language of globalisation, the relationships between global spaces and local places, the everyday reproduction of globalisation, the practice of globalisation by principal actors commonly identified with globalisation processes (MNCs, INGOs, etc.), the performance of globalisation in media, carnival and public life, the transformation of identities and identity politics, and the continuing applicability and usefulness of the concept of globalisation in different contexts.

2) Regions in Transformation, where different theoretical frameworks shall be applied to selected regions. Papers submitted in this section should preferably focus on one of the

following regions: Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and the Post-Soviet Space, Middle East and Northern Africa, and the Caspian and the Black Sea region. Papers focusing on other regions may also be considered.

Concerning the choice of keyspeakers we would like to express gratitude that our invitation was accepted by three well known academic figures who have helped us to enrich our discussion by fresh perspectives and original thoughts. The first one was Derek Gregory from the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, who inspired our thinking by introducing different geographies of colonialism in his famous *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq* (Gregory 2004) and by his discussions of imaginative geographies, performance of space and political violence and war cultures. Our second invitation was accepted by Noel Catree from the University of Manchester, whose thinking about the relationship between global economy dominated by capitalism and the environment is inspired by Neo-marxian geographical paradigm. The third one invited was Petr Drulák from the Czech Institute of International Relations, whom we asked to expand and apply on globalisation his current work on metaphors as an important part of our everyday discourse.

By selecting these academics as keyspeakers we wanted to let be inspired by:

- how different cartographic projections could influence our perception of the global space (Derek Gregory and his presentation of how American military represents the danger places in Iraq with maps that resemble the images of tumors that need to be cut off and the country will be "restored to health")

- how is possible to analyze and critically reflect the fundamental causes of current global economic crises that has been presented to us from the position of power interests and political need to promote "this or that" (Noel Castree)

- how metaphor of globalisation as a "touching" influences our perception of globalization processes (Petr Drulák)

We hope that the plenary session with keyspeakers and the following discussion panels during the fourth conference in Ostrava contributed to enrichment of theoretical and methodological perspectives on globalisation and that you, the potential readers of the following 22 conference papers, will find inspiration for your further academic work and perhaps decide to join us in 2011 at the already fifth "round" of globalisation discussion.

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Key-note Speaker's Address

A 'crisis', but of what?[2]

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Abstract

The current economic crisis has generated a discussion about its fundemental causes. Five major explanations for the crisis have been put forth by different stakeholders and critics. We analyze each of the five explanations and critically reflect, from a Marxist perspective, upon the vested power interests and political consequences in promoting this or that explanation.

Key words: economic crisis, globalisation, capitalism

Introduction

This conference is called 'Beyond globalisation'. Even though no question mark was added to it, I assume it was nonetheless intended. If we ask 'Beyond globalisation?', then our attention is focussed on two issues of considerable contemporary significance. First, is 2009 the beginning of a period of major change to the global political economy? The word 'beyond' invites us to reflect on this question. Second, if the immediate past is indeed being eclipsed, then is that period best described as an era of 'globalisation'?

These will be my questions. And I want to address them by focussing on the theme of 'crisis'. I do this for a couple of reasons, one of which is fairly obvious. As we all know, by spring 2008 metaphors like 'financial firestorm', 'credit tsunami' and 'economic meltdown' became commonplace in media, political and business circles. The defaults on sub-prime mortgages in US in summer 2007 had sent the financial house of cards tumbling within a few short months. After Lehman Brothers collapsed exactly a year ago, comparisons were being made to the Wall Street Crash and the subsequent Great Depression of the 1930s. These comparisons have proven to be inaccurate, for the time being. Even so, a synchronised global recession of geographically varied seriousness has now set-in, with unemployment at almost 10% in what remains the world's largest economy, the United States. Meanwhile, countries not directly responsible for the financial crisis – such as the Czech Republic – have been forced to suffer the consequences of weakening demand for export goods and a scarcity of investment capital. In short, the after-effects of the financial crisis have spread far beyond Wall Street and the Square Mile.

The word 'crisis', of course, means 'a turning point', a 'moment of decision' and 'an unstable or critical time' – at least according to my *Oxford English Dictionary*. And this is the second reason why I focus on the theme of crisis this morning. Many agree that the 20 months subsequent to August 2007 were a period of 'crisis' – but a crisis of *what*, exactly? Financial (de)regulation, casino banking, neoliberalism …?

Commentators have fallen over themselves to answer this cardinal question, to suggest immediate solutions and to prescribe longer-term remedies. What I'd like to do this morning is quickly survey the principal crisis narratives that have appeared in everything from the mass media to academic publications over the last two years. I'll be focussing on the English language discussions, as they've occurred in daily newspapers, television news reports, think tank publications, books by financial professionals and other arenas. I range so widely because the 2007-09 'crisis' was a very *public* one: few people were unaware of it, at least in Europe, and its fall-out implicates all of us as tax-payers, employees and citizens. The era of 'globalisation' has produced its first global crisis and its first global recession. As I'll suggest below, depending on which set of knowledge producers and consumers we look at, rather *different* explanations of the recent 'crisis' and how to address its fall-out are to be found. Yet most, as we'll see, make little or no mention of 'globalisation' as a salient analytical category, and rightly so.

Interpretation 1: corrupt and greedy bankers are to blame

The speed with spring 2007 defaults on 'sub-prime' American mortgages triggered a late year global 'credit crunch' left the heads of financiers, regulators and politicians spinning. For the average citizen it was even more bewildering, or simply bemusing. Talk of leveraged borrowing, derivatives and securitised loans made little sense to the person on the street – such as the thousands of Northern Rock account holders who, in September 2007, queued to remove their savings from what they thought was a dependable high street lender. But by the new year, those with little appetite for the intricacies of high finance were thrown a gift: something recognisable to blame. Jerome Kerviel, a junior futures trader with Société Générale, was arrested in January 2008 for unauthorised dealing leading to losses of 4.9 billion Euro. But his malfeasance was as nothing compared with that of the new poster-boy for financial corruption. Bernard Madoff, a highly respected Wall Street investor, was sentenced to 150 years in prison for operating the largest Ponzi scheme in world history. His prosecutors claimed losses of $65 billion on behalf of their now mostly bankrupt clients. Madoff is to the noughties what Nick Leeson was to the nineties.

Unsurprisingly, the tabloid press and the other vox pop parts of the news media had a field-day with these cases. They served a pedagogic purpose that bookended 2008, after frenetic months when political economic leaders and the media had found it easier to describe unfolding events than explain them. Kerviel and Madoff's corruption usefully personalised the causes of a crisis that most people simply did not understand. Little matter that both men's actions were largely irrelevant to the liquidity drought that had pitched the world's 'real economy' into recession by early 2009. But the search for villains did not begin-and-end with a few 'rogue traders'. Even the most demagogic elements of the news media could not pretend that this was the nub of the problem. Instead, the spotlight was shone on a broader set of actors and a rather different cause: namely, high financiers in general ('fat cats') and their collective greed in particular.

This story-line became a common-place of the low- and middle-brow news media throughout 2008 and 2009. For instance, Britain's most popular tabloid, *TheSun*, repeatedly invoked the image of City bankers as pigs gorging themselves in troughs of money. The attribution of collective blame typically focussed on two things. First, it was suggested that pretty much the entire financial class was guilty of reckless self-aggrandizement. In Britain, the way Northern Rock's former chief executive Adam Applegarth was pilloried in the gutter press from late 2007 was emblematic of this. Once it became clear – by early 2008 – that virtually every high street and investment bank had engaged in high-risk lending practices, blaming individuals like Applegarth became rather pointless (even as it satisfied public bloodlust). The collective guilt thesis was dramatised in February 2008, when the leaders of

HBOS and Royal Bank of Scotland were cross-examined by the Treasury Select Committee of the House of Commons. The four chief bankers under the spotlight all issued a public apology for the harm their lack of proper oversight had caused. This was, evidently, a problem caused not by a few reckless financiers but by almost all of those found in banking's upper echelons.

If such apologies served to locate blame at the level of chief executives and their boards, the notion that greed was a key driver was seemingly evidenced time and again through 2008 and the early part of 2009. This brings us to the second focus of the selfish bankers storyline: the huge severance packages given to the senior financiers who had led their companies – and the wider world economy – over the cliff. The sense of public outrage about this was intensified by the extraordinary fiscal and monetary measures that public authorities worldwide put in place to rescue the financial system: this meant, in effect, that tax-payers were richly rewarding already uber-wealthy executives for their catastrophic failures. In Britain, former RBS chief Fred Goodwin became a cause celebre, with his Edinburgh home requiring a police guard once details of his exorbitant pension payment were reported in the media. In the US, the newly installed President sensed the public mood when in spring 2009 he strongly criticised those running insurer AIG for awarding lavish employee bonuses – this when the firm still required federal government funds to survive.

For all its popular appeal, it is not difficult to point out the analytical deficiencies of the 'corrupt and greedy bankers' narrative. While high finance's 'masters of the universe' must certainly take responsibility for their reckless actions, to abstract them as a group from the wider political economy serves to obscure a number of important factors. 'Greed' is not much of an explanatory category either, implying as it does some transhistorical human impulse that threatens to manifest itself in the absence of proper checks. Even so, the idea that individual corruption and collective greed together explain the recent economic crisis is undeniably powerful. Its relative simplicity makes it easy for mass audiences to understand; its focus on individuals and their wider clique taps-in to a venerable public need to identify villains; and, at the end of the day, the idea is easy for those promoting it to evidence. On top of this, it has widespread political appeal: it resonates with conservatives, liberals and social democrats alike. In Britain, for instance, New Labour has had cause to use it on occasion (no doubt to deflect attention from its own role in deregulating City finance from 1997 onwards), while the Conservatives have found it very helpful in attempts to win over potential voters in the run-up to a general election. Outside the political mainstream, Interpretation 1 can also prove strategically useful to radicals on both the Left and the Right. In normative terms, it licenses punitive action against bankers (of the sort meted out to Madoff) who must be 'reigned in' and 'held to account'. That regulators and legislators have thus far done little to punish financial high-flyers only serves to further dismay large sections of the general public. At the time of writing (September 2009), critics are pressing the Obama and Brown administrations to put Wall Street and City fat cats on a stringent diet overseen by more rigorous regulators.

Interpretation 2: 'light touch' regulation is to blame

Soon after the 'credit crunch' set-in, many in the worlds of business, politics, academia and the serious news media began to talk about financial 'regulation' – the *lack* of it, to be precise – as the principal problem. Such talk sounds dry and overly technical to the average person. But it is meat-and-drink to that significant minority of people who play very close attention to how business practice is governed by public authorities. These people include economics correspondents who ply their trade outside the populist sections of the media; business professionals in the financial sector and beyond; elected and appointed public servants tasked with the job of oversight; and social scientists based in think tanks,

foundations, economics departments and business schools. If publications like *The Economist*, the *Financial Times* and *Business Week* are anything to go by, 'regulatory failure' has become a favoured explanation among large sections of the world's political economic elite and the business commentariat. In simple terms, the argument is that too much commercial freedom was afforded to financiers large, medium and small. Former House speaker Newt Gingrich phrased it thus: the current crisis, he opined, "is a government problem, not a market problem" (Freeland 2009, 22).

This interpretation has considerable empirical warrant. The so-called 'high risk, high reward' approach to finance was indulged by regulators and law makers worldwide for over 20 years. Indeed, it was in one sense *created* by them – Clinton's repeal of the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 being a signal example. In the US and Britain, where global banking assumes huge national importance, the good times yielded colossal tax returns for central government, thousands of largely well-paid financial services jobs, and an associated 'wealth effect' as Wall Street and City employees spent their considerable earnings. But the price of success was a misplaced belief that the interests of finance capital were coincident with the public interest. Regulatory under-sight became normalised. Examples abound and have been easy for proponents of the 'under-regulation' interpretation to cite. For instance, in recent years law makers and regulators in the Anglo-American world have: removed the firewall separating high street and investment banks; allowed excessive leverage, with some banks having debt-to-equity ratios as high as 30:1; permitted the proliferation of complex financial instruments such as collateralised debt obligations and credit default swaps; sanctioned a reward structure in which finance professionals are richly rewarded for making continuous, short-term gain for their investors and shareholders; allowed 'too large to fail' banks to form through mergers and acquisitions; raised no objections to institutions that seek returns on very high risk investments; not objected to hand-in-glove relationships between credit ratings agencies, companies insuring against non-performing investments and the international banks; and sanctioned the emergence of a so-called 'shadow banking system' in which 'special investment vehicles' operated with almost no public accountability.

In the detail, the charge-sheet is very long, but it reduces to two principal claims. First, that politicians and public administrators were far too trusting in finance capital's powers of 'self-regulation', based on the so-called 'efficient markets hypothesis' (which says that financial markets produce sufficient information to continuously self-correct). The first chairman of Britain's Financial Services Authority (FSA), Sir Howard Davies, summarised this faith in the invisible hand with striking candour. "The philosophy from when I set it up", he admitted in 2008, "has been to say 'Consenting adults in private? That's their problem really'" (Wade 2008, 13). The second major charge is that gaps in regulatory oversight were allowed to develop. For instance, reflecting on the post-1997 division of labour between the Bank of England and the FSA, the Bank's deputy governor Paul Tucker said that "we left an underlap between us" (Moya 2009, 23). He was referring to the Authority's micro-regulatory focus on individual banks and the Bank's macro-regulatory focus on keeping inflation low: this meant that neither organisation was tasked with monitoring or addressing a build-up of systemic risk across the banking sector as a whole.

As with Interpretation 1 of the recent crisis, the 'light touch' regulation narrative is polyvalent in the political sense. Those who signed-up to 'self-regulating' finance from the get-go have been able offer-up *mea culpas* in its name, just as much as their critics have used it to say 'We told you so'. The difference lies in their preferred solutions. Students of J.K. Galbraith, Keynes and the American economist Hyman Minsky have called for a 'new financial architecture' whose principles and institutions would protect the public interest against the private agendas of risk-taking banks. Even some of those directly responsible for regulatory failure were, in the dark days of late 2008, given to such talk (Gordon Brown being

a prime example). In addition, realists and pragmatists in the Marxian camp and on the socialist Left see the tactical sense in beefing-up financial regulation. Among the measures suggested have been a new Glass-Steagall Act, far tougher capital adequacy requirements and accounting standards, the outlawing of 'off-balance-sheet' banking, the de-universalisation of the short-term 'shareholder value' investment model, greater consumer protection from 'predatory lending', the break-up of overly large banks, and the creation of a 'Tobin tax' on certain cross-border financial transactions. There have been many other suggestions besides. In virtually every case, the policies would have to be implemented and enforced internationally. One of the remarkable oddities of recent history is that while finance capital has been borderless, its regulation has remained largely in the hands of national bodies like the US Securities and Exchange Commission.

These muscular proposals for change have so far fallen on deaf ears. As I noted above, the normative lessons of the 'under-regulation' narrative can easily be made consistent with the aspirations of those who do not want the visible hand of the state 'interfering' too much with finance capital's operations. The new FSA banking code is a case in point. Issued in August 2009, it sets out eight principles that should govern the operation of City banks and sets new standards of information sharing and transparency. But it falls far short of the sort of meaty measures called for by proponents of a new financial architecture. Journalist John Kampfner dismissed it as "a gentle entreaty to Britain's financial services industry to behave better" (2009, 26). The reason, it has been widely suggested, is politicians' fear of City and Wall Street jobs disappearing overseas to financial centres with less stringent regulatory requirements. This, presumably, drove Alistair Darling and Tim Geithner to face-down the call of premiers Sarkozy and Merkel to control bankers' bonuses at the September G20 meeting. The policy debate that divides those otherwise persuaded by the 'regulatory failure' interpretation is thus focussed on the following question: 'how much financial regulation, of what sort, and at what geographical scale'?

Interpretation 3: 'casino finance' is to blame

Regulation requires two parties: regulators and the regulated. The third interpretation is really the flip-side of the second, and has been advanced by those who prefer, for whatever reason, to emphasise structural problems within the financial sector. This interpretation focuses on the 'rational irrationality' of banks and related private sector actors. The spotlight is here trained on how financial operators chose to exercise the freedom afforded to them by permissive regulators. Unlike the rather populist Interpretation 1, this one backgrounds greed and foregrounds a tragedy of the financial commons in which a frantic race for profit brought ruin to all. In October 2008 Congressional testimony, former Federal Reserve Bank chairman Alan Greenspan suggested these operators had 'underpriced' the systemic risk their own actions created – perhaps trying to deflect attention from his own lapses as Fed chairman during the Clinton era. Those less intimate with the world of high finance have preferred to use gambling analogies. For instance, the widely respected MP Vince Cable – Treasury spokesman for the British LibDem Party – has frequently compared modern financiers to those who frequent casinos (echoing Susan Strange, author of the prescient *Casino capitalism* [1997]).

Once again, the evidence to support this interpretation of events is not hard to seek. Given a lax regulatory environment, it's no surprise that individual financial institutions entered into a competitive battle in which 'financial innovation' was seen as a key to success. The 'originate and distribute' approach to asset-backed securities is one of many cases in point. This approach became commonplace from the early 1990s, with City and Wall Street financiers in the vanguard. Traditional banks used to offer loans from depositors' savings, and received their returns direct from clients over a period of months or years. The post-traditional

banks of the last 20 years preferred to repackage loans and divide them into tranches to be sold-on immediately to institutional investors, pension fund managers or other financial institutions. These tranches were hedged against defaults by taking out insurance, and their cost to investors varied depending on the levels of risk and reward involved. By distributing the risks of potentially non-performing loans far and wide, the originators of tranches enjoyed instant returns on their lending while minimising their own vulnerability to defaults. They also off-loaded debt, enabling them to lend more money and do more business in a seemingly virtuous spiral. The problem, however, is that they were emboldened to seek-out ever riskier lending opportunities – such as sub-prime mortgages – in the belief that any resulting problems would be diffused across the entire financial system. As it turned out, the problems *infected* the system rather than being – as per the expectation – absorbed by it.

The dysfunctionality of the originate and distribute practices pursued by banks is but one example of what, in retrospect, looks like a form of widespread madness within the financial sector. But to call it madness is too easy. According to the third interpretation of crisis, it is better seen as a case of collective irrationality wherein individual banks continued to push the envelope so long as the profits came rolling in. In Robin Blackburn's words, "if [finance capital] is unaccountable and unregulated it becomes sovereign in the capital re-allocation process, and … grab[s] the lion's share of the gains it makes possible, including anticipated gains before they have been realised" (2008, 84). An awful lot of brain power and ingenuity went into creating the family of complex financial products and practices whose names are now tainted ('over the counter trades', hedge funds etc.). And an awful lot of money was made, for financial institutions, their shareholders and their many clients. In a sense, the numerous innovations conjured-up by traders, dealers, brokers and all the rest worked. And because they worked no one bank or bond insurer or ratings agency was prepared to call time on them, even though the party had to end sometime – just as the 'roaring 20s' came to an abrupt halt by that decade's end.

As with Interpretation 2, the precise normative and policy implications of Interpretation 3 are rather varied. It licenses more-or-less intrusive regulation by public authorities, but at a minimum suggests that certain financial products and practices are far too risky to continue unabated. As Adair Turner, head of the FSA, said in August this year (much to the City's consternation): far too many financial services are 'socially useless'. As such, this interpretation resonates with those who favour rather mild or very strong reform alike. Chastened free marketers and those (Left or Right) in favour of less business-friendly regulation can relate to the casino finance narrative equally. The need for some form of 'macro-prudential regulation' of the banks has been their mantra. These banks, the argument goes, must be made more 'moral' and obliged to rediscover a sense of their proper role in sustaining both real economic activity and social stability. Like the 'light touch' regulation narrative, Interpretation 3 focuses squarely on the financial sector *per se* and its governance. This is a strength – after all, regulators and financiers must take considerable responsibility for their reckless (in)actions. But it is also a weakness – at least from the perspective of the next interpretation. For it brackets-out a whole set of absolutely critical considerations, leading Jean Pisani-Ferry and Indhira Santos to opine that "… many analysts have failed to grasp fully the character of the [recent] crisis" (2009, 9).

Interpretation 4: macro-economic imbalances are to blame

The fourth interpretation of the recent crisis aims to set finance capital in a wider economic context. As such, it folds interpretations two and three together and shows them to be but elements of a much larger story. This interpretation has been voiced by a number of individuals within the worlds of business journalism, politics and financial regulation; and it has been articulated by a number of analysts located in think tanks and universities. It is a

rather technical, big picture interpretation that most members of the general public are only dimly aware of. It speaks to grand questions of economic history and geography rather than questions of micro-finance, regulatory procedure or bankers' presumed motives. One of its more famous proponents summarises it well: "Today's credit crisis", writes Martin Wolf in *Fixing global finance*, "is a symptom of an unbalanced world economy" (2008, 5).

This interpretation's starting point is the excess liquidity sloshing around the global economy this last twenty years or so. Without this liquidity, the financial sector would not have had the raw material needed to put its various complex instruments to work. From where did this liquidity originate? Two main sources: namely, the Middle East – reaping the continued rewards of oil exports – and several Far Eastern countries, whose growth has been based to a large extent on manufacturing exports. The latter include China, still the world's fastest growing economy, and Japan, still one of the world's largest economies even after its 'lost decade' triggered by a bursting property bubble 15 years ago. Why did countries in these two regions elect to run trade surpluses? In the Middle East there was little choice: the benefits of controlling oil needed by the rest of the world guaranteed colossal revenue streams relative to levels of domestic investment and consumption. In the Far East, one must look to the economic crisis of 1997-8 and the earlier Japanese crisis. These persuaded policy makers of the need to save for a rainy day and, specifically, of the need to convert surpluses into the world's 'universal' (or 'reserve') currency, the US dollar. These measures would help stabilise the value of domestic money and insure against speculative attacks on home currencies. Though not badly affected by the 1997-8 meltdown, these lessons were learned by the Chinese too.

How was this achieved? To earn dollars several Far Eastern countries fixed the exchange rate of their domestic currencies to the dollar at a favourable level. This ensured that their exports to the US – still the world's largest economy, even in the current recession – remained affordable for American consumers. So too did their relatively cheap labour costs (Japan excepted), giving them a competitive advantage over many other overseas producers. The resulting dollar surpluses were either used to pay-off outstanding debts, hoarded, invested or lent to others. The most significant of these 'others' was the United States. After the dot.com bubble burst in the early noughties, direct foreign investment in the American economy became much less attractive. So East Asian countries (and some Middle Eastern ones) began to buy US Treasury bonds – traditionally, a reliable source of long-term income. This was (and remains) especially true of China. These bonds were issued readily by successive US administrations in need of liquidity to fund tax cuts and the high costs of government, including wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because this liquidity originated overseas, it did not raise the costs of domestic borrowing (which would've occurred had the government sourced money from US savers). Interest rates thus remained low, enabling financial institutions within and connected to Wall Street to expand their deposits and loans greatly. So it was that surpluses accumulated on one side of the world became transferred en masse to fund the US fiscal deficit, which led to cheap money for the domestic banks to spend. A good deal of this money went into US consumer borrowing and housing, so maintaining American demand for imports from Far and Middle Eastern countries.

This interpretation of the 'deep causes' of the recent crisis can be looked at from two angles. The 'savings glut' perspective blames those economies who accumulated large dollar surpluses. They are charged with obliging the US to be 'consumer of the last resort', a role it took-on to avoid global deflation. They should, the argument goes, have spent more and lent less. Successive chairmen of the Federal Reserve Bank have been notable authors of this perspective. The 'money glut' perspective looks at the coin from the other side. It points a finger at Washington DC. By running unprecedented trade deficits, the federal government is charged with living beyond its means. Maintaining the dollar's strength against a number of

currencies also made it more difficult for its export industries to earn overseas revenue, while benefiting dollar-rich Wall Street banks in their foreign ventures. In addition, the weak industrial policy of all administrations since Carter's meant a lack of strategic investment in new industries. However, Wall Street is not let off the hook. Benefitting from the low interest rates set by Alan Greenspan, the financial sector could arguably have invested in new productive activities with high export potential. Instead, a consumer credit and housing bubble was produced – sub-prime mortgages being part of this. In Britain, New Labour, the Bank of England and the City were responsible for similar policies being pursued. Indeed, the 'money glut' perspective is consistent with the idea of a 'First World debt crisis', centred on the Anglo-American zone and fuelled by Japan and numerous developing world lenders.

Clearly, the normative implications of Interpretation 4 are far-reaching and appeal to those given – by inclination or profession – to strategising about geopolitics and geoeconomics. Critics of the US, but also many within the American establishment, have argued that it can no longer live beyond its means. It must borrow less, save more, devalue its currency, invest more in value-creating business ventures, and even relinquish the right of 'seigniorage'. This is consistent with the 'money glut' perspective. One the other side, advocates of the 'savings glut' perspective argue that large trade surplus economies must (among other things), inflate their currencies, tolerate a dollar deflation, invest more at home, increase domestic wages and fund major public works in order to stimulate demand. What unites the two perspectives on Interpretation 4 is a recognition that global institutional reform is required that extends way beyond rethinking how finance per se is governed. Tinkering with the remit of the G20's new Financial Stability Board's (formerly the G7's Financial Stability Forum) is thus not nearly enough. A modern-day Bretton Woods regime has been called for – only this time, a 'global new deal' would not be organised around US hegemony, and global governance institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and a new World Financial Authority would reflect this change of circumstance. They would be democratic and pluralistic organisations dedicated to managing global affairs in the interests of numerous countries and power blocs.

Relative to all the previous interpretations of the recent financial crisis, the fourth adds a much-needed macro-economic, geopolitical and historical dimension. Its advocates consider it superior on these grounds, and there is copious evidence to support either the savings or money glut versions of the thesis. Economic nationalists can derive strategic lessons from this interpretation germane to their own country's future, while internationalists can argue for a managed transition away from US dominance. However, its complexity ensures that this interpretation lacks the popular resonance of Interpretation 1. It is an interpretation operative only among those versed in the technicalities of global political economy – the sort of people who read *The Economist,* UNCTAD reports or academic journal essays about world affairs. This also applies to the fifth and final interpretation of the 2007-09 meltdown. The difference, as we will now see, is that this next interpretation is strongly favoured by commentators on both the reformist and revolutionary wings of the Left. This is because it supplements Interpretation 4 with concepts and evidence that radicalise its already considerable normative implications.

Interpretation 5: Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism is to blame
The fifth take on the recent crisis has been put forward by several academics influenced by Marxism, but also by some outside universities who criticise neoliberalism in the name of a more socially just model of capitalism – such as Graham Turner, author of *The Credit Crunch* (2008). This interpretation has not been loudly voiced in business circles or mainstream politics, let alone the mass media. But one or two within the political economic

establishment have been prepared to lend it credence – such as the distinguished British ex-civil servant Sir Tim Lankester (2009).

The key to this interpretation is the 1970s, which is the last time the Western economies experienced a coordinated recession akin to today's. Forty years ago, the post-war Keynesian compact began to crumble. The leading capitalist economies experienced varying degrees of stagflation: weak economic growth accompanied by rising prices. The crisis proved an opportunity for 'neoliberal' thinking to enter the fray, notably in the US and UK from 1979 onwards. In the name of personal and corporate 'freedom', the neoliberal programme emphasised the need to remove 'barriers' to free trade. It replaced the Keynesian focus on demand management with a concern to keep inflation low at all costs, by controlling the money supply. As the Reagan and Thatcher administrations showed, domestically this meant destroying most of the norms and institution of post-war managed capitalism. Trade union power was assailed, many 'unproductive' industries allowed to perish, labour markets 'deregulated', wage controls removed, tax breaks given to the corporate sector, and many state activities privatised or contracted out. This domestic agenda was scaled-up to the international level in the form of what later became known as 'globalisation'. From the early 1980s, Washington pressed its allies to remove restrictions on international trade, lending and investment – with Britain an influential comrade-in-arms. The hope was that Anglo-Saxon capitalism could create new lucrative pockets of comparative economic advantage by trading in an expanded world system. But there were other reasons too. High labour costs in both countries combined with decreasing unit transportation costs and new telecommunications meant that domestic producers began to see geographic relocation and FDI as feasible strategies. In addition, even as their economies were in recession through the late 70s and early 80s, America and Britain retained their historic strength in banking and financial services. They used this to international advantage by progressively deregulating Wall Street and the City, and making them the centre of global liquidity flows. From the early 70s, both places became switching points in the world economy, re-channeling rivers of money from newly enriched oil states and 'tiger economies' to other parts of the world. The collapse of the former communist bloc and the end of Chinese isolation simply reinforced their centrality from the late 1980s onwards. The greater New York region and the south east of England duly felt the benefits, as did the national treasuries receiving tax revenues.

What were the long-term effects of the neoliberal turn in the US and Britain? According to proponents of Interpretation 5, they were less than salutary. First, both economies became far too reliant on finance, construction and retail, and failed to invest sufficiently in new ventures that could set domestic accumulation on a profitable, post-industrial path. Second, both countries' manufacturing base was eviscerated, with many home-grown producers electing to invest overseas – in Britain, Dyson (maker of vacuum cleaners) became a well known example, repeating what iconic manufacturer General Motors had been doing for years by decamping to Mexico. Thirdly, the share of national wealth accruing to working people declined relative to that of those owning or running capitalist enterprises. This has been documented by Robert Pollin (2003), Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy (2004) – among others. According to David Harvey, in *A brief history of neoliberalism* (2005), this amounts to a restoration of class power in the neoliberal heartlands, but elsewhere besides. This new wealth inequality in the US and Britain – so Interpretation 5 goes – was achieved courtesy of four things: (i) China's arrival on the world stage along with other low cost exporters kept consumer prices down and weakened demands for wage hikes; (ii) the credible threat of capital flight from the US and UK gave employers considerable power over their workforces; (iii) easy credit provided by City and Wall Street lenders, in a low interest environment, helped to conceal the fact of low wages for working class and lower middle class people (and created a false sense of personal wealth); and (iv) the defeat of the

trades unions during the 1980s and the move to 'flexible' labour markets played havoc with the organisational capacities of the (increasingly indebted) average working person.

In sum, proponents of Interpretation 5 argue that, post the 1970s crisis, neoliberal policies succeeded in delivering economic growth in a range of countries worldwide – including the two major proponents of *laissez faire* capitalism. However, because the benefits of growth were skewed grotesquely in favour of the rich, the resulting 'demand gap' found in the American and British populations was filled by saddling households with debt. Meanwhile, new working populations in China, the Far East and the former communist bloc have been made to accept low wages as the price for export-led growth. To be sure, many of these workers have been lifted out of poverty by selling their labour power. But relative to the wealth created by their collective workplace efforts, they have enjoyed meagre rewards. Unlike 40 years ago, this crisis stems in large part from the weakness of wage labour. The fact that defaults on sub-prime mortgages made to 'ninjas' lit the financial tinder indicates as much ('ninjas' is a US mortgage brokers' term for people with no income, no job and no assets).

As I said above, proponents of Interpretation 5 add some missing ingredients to an otherwise persuasive Interpretation 4. They also, as I additionally indicated, tend not be those working in or around the worlds of politics, finance and commodity production. For reformist proponents of Interpretation 5, a managed sharing of economic and political power between the US and other major players – like Russia, Japan, the EU and China – should be accompanied by measures to stimulate domestic demand worldwide. A precondition of this would be a redistribution of wealth towards ordinary workers, increased public control of key economic sectors, and a new ethic that values greater social equality over the responsibilities and freedoms of individuals. These arguments do not chime with the thinking of business, media and political elites in the major capitalist states. Revolutionary proponents of Interpretation 5 go even further, unsurprisingly. For them, the current crisis is simply one of several ways in which the ineluctable contradictions of capitalism can play-out. Here is Geoff Mann, writing in *New Left Review*: "… regulation cannot be enough … The overthrow of capital's rule is literally the only way out" (2009, 126). Such an overthrow, clearly, would require coordinated radical action globally, led by a resurgent labour movement and/or a more tightly organised 'anti-globalisation' movement. The prospects of this are, needless to say, vanishingly small. As Slavoj Zizek once said, it remains far easier to imagine the end of the world than it does the end of capitalism.

A crisis of 'globalisation'?

I've just outlined what seem to me to be the principal explanations of the recent crisis. You'll notice that I've not so far discussed 'globalisation', the theme of this conference. So, was the 2007-09 crisis a crisis of globalisation? Is the current worldwide recession an indictment of globalisation, whatever that term might mean? Well, clearly the crisis was global in scale, even though it was centred on the UK and the US in particular. This is because of the concerted attempts to remove so-called 'barriers' to trade and investment since the mid-80s. But what I think is interesting is just now *marginal* the idea of globalisation has been to recent discussions of economic turbulence. This seems true in Britain, at least. To the extent that 'globalisation' has assumed a meaningful role in the debates, it's been either as a smokescreen or as a proxy for something else. Let me explain.

In March 2008, Gordon Brown's press releases and media appearances were full of talk about a '*global* crisis' and a '*worldwide* financial crisis'. On a GM TV interview seen by millions on March 4th he said this: "globalisation means that all countries are exposed to the problems affecting the financial sector". Subsequently, he and other G8 leaders spent some weeks criticising so-called 'offshore' financial centres and tax-havens, as if they were

somehow to blame for the financial meltdown. In his March 4th speech to the US Congress this year, Brown once again repeatedly called the crisis 'global' as if this, in itself, was a sufficient characterisation of the financial calamity. It's clear to me, as I'm sure it is to you, that this was an attempt to deflect people's attention away from Brown's own culpability. When Chancellor of the Exchequer he created a system of weak regulatory oversight of City banks during the 90s and new millennium. The fact is that it was the major global investment banks that were at the vanguard of the financial meltdown, and virtually all of them were based in New York and London, not the Cayman Islands or Antigua. One should also note that Britain is ultimately responsible for several off-shore financial centres, several of which are British principalities or protectorates.

Gordon Brown aside, a few others have pointed the finger at 'globalisation' too but in less tendentious ways. For instance, writing in the London*Financial Times*, columnist Krishna Guha puts it thus: "There is", he says, "a strong case to be made that the current crisis is in the strictest sense a crisis of globalisation, fostered and transmitted by the … deep integration of very different economies". The business journalist and author Will Hutton (2009, 27) echoes this when he says that "the interdependencies that produced such growth in the good times have … the power to produce a self-reinforcing depressive vortex in bad times". Guha and Hutton are, of course, right in one sense. The reforms that began during the period of the so-called Washington Consensus certainly rendered many international borders more porous to international flows of money, commodities and people. This is why us social scientists spent so much of the 1995-2005 decade trying to define and measure 'globalisation'. However, it seems to me that Guha and Hutton are really referring to the geography of the current crisis, not its root causes – which can, in theory, assume any number of spatial forms. For my money, those causes are best described in the fourth and especially the fifth interpretation that I summarised a few minutes ago. This said, the geography *matters* of course, and if any future 'deglobalisation' is to occur, the worry is that it might take a nationalist form of the sort that it did during the 1930s. For now, it seems clear that the push to open-up borders has stalled. It is, perhaps, significant that the US and China have just recently taken a trade issue to arbitration within the WTO. The challenge for the international community is clear. How can some semblance of order and social justice be achieved in a world of uneven geographical development at a time the 20th century's hegemon is clearly in decline? We need a new globalisation project, but not one founded on principles of supposed 'free trade'.

Conclusion

"The present-day plunge into the economic abyss", writes R Taggart Murphy, "has … brought forth a smorgasbord of assertions about 'the' cause" (2009, 149). In this paper I've presented what I take to be the principal extant interpretations of the recent financial crisis. They are not mutually exclusive, but they seem to me to be relatively distinct. These interpretations have been variously promoted (and sometimes combined) by a range of commentators who, depending on their social location, speak to more-or-less sizeable, more-or-less knowledgeable audiences ranged across the spectrum of political belief. Within its own terms of intellectual reference, each interpretation has a certain efficacy. They can all be copiously evidenced and each has a normative dimension that conforms to the moral-political sentiments of different sections of the populations affected by the financial meltdown of 2007-09. They can even be combined into an omnibus explanation, supposing one can stomach something so bloated. Here, for example, is Czech Prime Minister Jan Fischer speaking at Chatman House in March 2009: "the financial crisis", he said, "resulted from an exceedingly complex interaction of market failures, global financial and monetary imbalances, inappropriate regulation, weak supervision and poor macro-prudential oversight."

However, it seems to me that such a catch-all account detracts from efforts to identify proximate and deep causes and to enumerate real policy alternatives moving forward.

Having remained studiously neutral thus far, let me now declare my own allegiances. It seems to me that while the second and third interpretations speak to the proximate causes of the recent crisis, the fourth but especially the fifth are the most telling of all. I offer this judgement not on purely cognitive grounds, as if evidence and logic alone can distinguish stronger from weaker interpretations. It is also a question of politics and values. The economic growth achieved prior to the current recession was accompanied by a systematic redistribution of wealth that greatly favoured the rich – This was no accident and it is morally unacceptable. At base, the 2007-09 crisis was a crisis of class-based neoliberalism led by the US (and secondarily Britain) – a project that ultimately failed to manage the venerable overaccumulation tendencies of capitalism.

Of course, in the wider scheme of things me or anybody else saying this matters little. In *Social justice and thecity*, his first book as a Marxist, David Harvey wisely insisted that "It's irrelevant to ask whether concepts … are 'true' or 'false'. We have to ask, rather, what it is that produces them and what they serve to produce" (1973, 298). This injunction should be taken to heart. Ultimately, the power of rival interpretations of the crisis depends both on who is advancing them and the wider appeal of their political philosophy. Given my own intellectual and political predilections, I say with regret – but not surprise – that interpretations likely to maintain the status quo are proving influential. To put this another way, the considerable intellectual power of the Marxian account of the recent economic crisis cannot, regrettably, vouchsafe its credibility or wider appeal. One of the reasons that the recent crisis has elicited relatively mild forms of public anger – despite its severity and scale – is surely because of the dominant storylines used to explain and address it. These storylines key-in to the social norms and values prevailing in many countries worldwide. With a nod to Ernst Bloch, Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings (2009, 82) phrase it like this: "Just as the re[form] … agenda may take … the wind out of the sails of domestic opposition, so proposals for a … more cooperative, multilateral international order may 'prematurely harmonize' the contradictions generated by global power structures". The moral economy created during the era of neoliberalisation has not disappeared overnight (nor will it), even in the face of a global financial crisis that has proven to be highly contagious and destructive in its effects. This is why even a simplified rendition of Interpretation 5 would not prove persuasive to many outside the epistemic community of (mostly) academics expounding it.

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Conceptualizing globalisation

Driving Forces of Globalisation

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Abstract

The paper focuses on the driving forces of the globalisation process. It introduces the concept of the driving forces of globalisation and offers their classification according to various criteria. The study formulates basic general principles of driving forces of globalisation and makes the prognosis of the possible developments of globalisation.

Key words: globalisation, driving forces of globalisation

Globalisation has become an object of research in many social sciences. Each of them employs different scientific methods and yields unique results of their analysis of this process. The main purpose of this paper is to share the results of my research on the driving forces of globalisation and to stimulate a further investigation on the issue. The following text is a very brief discussion of the main ideas.

In my analysis I understood globalisation as a process of intensification of social relations on the global scale, followed by the increase in interconnectedness and interdependence of the whole human society. The roots of this process can be traced back to the rise of the first human civilizations. Globalisation manifests itself in many spheres of social life – in the sphere of social being (economics, technology etc.) and in the sphere of social consciousness (ideology, politics, law, ethics, culture etc.). Its intensity, however, varies from one sphere to another, and its influence has different impacts on localities (Mattová 2003).

Globalisation is a dynamic process. Its dynamism is determined by the driving forces of globalisation, i.e. a complex of essential, long-running factors or agents that stimulate the process and determine its development, nature, quantity and quality, its intensity, and direction. This complex is not only a source of development, it itself constantly changes and develops; its structure, intensity, direction, and relations between its components undergo changes. The driving forces of globalisation can work independently or in the complex with other driving forces. They can influence the whole process of globalisation or particular stages of the process. An analogous driving force (or a complex of driving forces) can give rise to various manifestations of globalisation (various in the sense of different quantity, quality, intensity, direction etc.) in different spaces and times (i.e. in different economic, political, or social conditions).

During the development of human society, from the rise of the early civilisations till present, there can be observed many historical moments of intensification of social relations on the local, regional, continental or global level, followed by the increase in interconnectedness and interdependence of particular human societies (for a detailed analysis, see Mattová 2003, 37 – 50). Each of these historical moments can be analysed in detail and the particular driving force or driving forces which have stimulated them and determined its development can be searched for. Such an analysis thus results in the finding of a wide range of driving forces of globalisation.

The driving forces of globalisation can be classified and typologically arranged according to various criteria, e.g. objectiveness/subjectiveness, duration, territorial

dependence/independence, a quality of being the universal/the individual/the particular, progressiveness/regressiveness etc. For the detailed analysis and typology of driving forces of globalisation, see Table 1.

The criterion of objectiveness/subjectiveness indicates to what extent a particular driving force is dependent on consciousness of individuals or groups of people. For example, the forces of nature (climatic change, drought, bad harvest, natural catastrophes etc.), primary needs of human beings (need for food, security, shelter etc.), changes arising from activities of human beings (demographic changes) etc. are typical objective driving forces of globalisation. On the other hand the advancement of one's own interests (economic, financial, political etc.), decisions of individuals or institution that have extensive reach (decisions of politicians, representatives of transnational corporations, international organizations etc.), desire for freedom, aesthetic need, feeling of being powerless and the ability to overcome it through imagination can be mentioned as typical subjective driving forces of globalisation. In my analysis of the driving forces of globalisation it has proved that both objective and subjective driving forces have been forming the process of globalisation (from its beginning till the present stage) approximately to the same extent.

Time aspect is another possible criterion according to which the driving forces of globalisation can be typologically arranged. Considering that all driving forces of globalisation develop and change, it is interesting to analyse their duration in time. Some driving forces have been active since the beginning of the development of human society, though they have been changing in quantity, quality, intensity etc. (e.g. impact of environmental conditions, lack of mineral resources, primary and some secondary needs of human beings, advancement of one's own interests etc.). The other ones have emerged recently and did not affect the previous development (need to solve global problems, need to inform and be informed through mass media etc.). The results of my analysis show that most driving forces of globalisation have its origin in the early history of humankind.

Territorial aspects can be adopted as another criterion of the typology of the driving forces and attention can be paid to the question of dependence/independence of a driving force on territory. Not each driving force is active, or equally intensive, in all territories (e.g. need to protect against cold weather is less intensive near the equator than in the temperate zone). My analysis, however, proved that most driving forces of globalisation work independently on territory.

Progressiveness/regressiveness, another criterion which can be used to classify the driving forces of globalisation, uncovers a dialectical character of the driving forces of globalisation. In this paper progressiveness means a gradual improvement of human and environmental conditions whereas regressiveness refers to their decline. Most of the analysed driving forces can work progressively or regressively depending on various circumstances (space, time, social and political organization, direction of individual or group interests etc.), or they can even work progressively and regressively with the same intensity at the same time (e.g. considering a lack of mineral resources as a driving force of globalisation, under certain circumstances they can result in the establishment of business contacts between two or more distant areas, however under other circumstances they can escalate into a conflict). Only few factors or agents can be laid exactly on the one end of this scale. For example, aesthetic need, need for communication between societies, need to solve global problems are more progressive driving forces, on the other hand aggressive advancement of economic or political interest is a more regressive driving force. However, it is necessary to emphasize that this categorization is very relative.

Table 1. Typology of the driving forces of globalisation

Criteria / Driving forces	Objective / Subjective	Determined by time / Not determined by time	Determined by territory / Not determined by territory	General	Individual	Particular	Arising from an individual / Arising from society	Progressive / Regressive	Having impact in the sphere of economics	Having impact in the sphere of politics	Having impact in the sphere of law	Having impact in the sphere of culture	Having impact on aesthetics	Having impact on ideology	Having impact on religion	Having impact on other specific sphere
Need for food	■			■			■	■								
Need for clothing	■		■		■		■	■								
Need to live in a secure environment	■			■			■	■								
Need to increase labor productivity	■			■			■	■	■	■	■					
Aesthetic need				■			■	■				■	■			
Feeling of being powerless and ability to overcome it by means of imagination		■		■			■	■				■	■	■	■	
Change of social relations	■							■	■	■	■					
Advancement of one's own interests				■			■	■	■	■	■	■		■	■	
Need for one's own protection against external enemy	■			■			■	■	■	■	■					
Need for effective organization	■			■			■	Bureaucracy	■	■	■	■		■	■	
Lack of natural resources inevitable for further development of society	■		■		■			Business / wars	■	■	■					

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				At present	In past		Group	Rightful war/ unjust war									
Need for protection of property																	
Need to solve overpopulation																	
Internal crisis or political conflicts																	
Social attitudes																	
Spirit of enterprise of individuals, their desire for enrichment or adventure																	
Business interests																	
Desire for gaining power/desire for donquest							Group										
Natural need for searching new territories for settlement																	
Law																	
Unfavourable natural conditions																	
Ideas about integration																	
Desire for freedom																	
Desire to control the whole world																	
Need to strenghten one's own position on conquered territory							Group	Rightful war/ unjust war									
Attempt to spread an ideology							Group										
Appeal for help																	

Existance of adequate communica-tions system connecting far territories																	
Desire for spreading of ideas																	
Resistance to something																	
Desire for self-determination																	
Desire to participate in political decision-making						Group											
Desire for maximation of profit																	
Desire for social and political rights						Group											
Need to solve various problems on global level		At present	At present													Environment
Desire to inform and be informed by media						Group											
Decisions of representatives of international organizations (IMF, WTO etc.)						Group											Environment
Public opinion, decisions of electorate						Group											
Decisions of politicians																	
Decisions of representatives of transnational corporations						Group											

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Impacts caused by human activities						Group									

Key

				Placement on the scale of values						

■	Presence of the value		□	Absence of any value	text	Explanatory note	□

Driving forces can also be classified according to their influence on particular spheres of social life (economics, politics, law, culture, aesthetics, ideology, religion and others). It has proved that more driving forces shape globalisation in the spheres of economics, politics, and law than in the spheres of culture, ideology, and religion.

The study of driving forces of globalisation is inevitable because only in this way we can improve our understanding of the principles behind globalisation and forecast its further development. During my research I have discovered three principles of the driving forces of globalisation.

The driving forces of globalisation change and develop over time. One of the concomitant phenomena of this process is the transformation of the nature of some driving forces (*principle of transformation of driving forces*). For example, *the need for food*, *clothing,* and *shelter* (driving forces which are objective in their nature) were transformed into *a desire for gourmet food*, *fashion clothing*, and *decent housing* (driving forces which are subjective in their nature). This transformation was possible due to a long-lasting fulfillment of the primary needs (e.g. by producing surplus value which enabled individual to free himself from the everyday provision of food and clothing, or searching for shelter) and by means of its interconnecting with other driving force (e.g. with the *aesthetic need*, a subjective driving force of globalisation, which stimulated aesthetic feeling to be considered while preparing food, designing cloths, or arranging housing). Not all driving forces of globalisation were transformed in this way, and even those, which have been transformed, do not work in each place of our planet with the same intensity. This transformation is gradual.

The transformation of a driving force can come about in an opposite direction. If a primary need stops to be satisfied for a longer time (e.g. in the case of war, natural catastrophe etc.), a desire of an individual, as a subjective driving force of globalisation, will transform again into the primary need, as an objective driving force of globalisation.

This "subjectivization" and "objectivization" of driving forces will consequently have an impact on the nature of globalisation process. Globalisation driven by objective driving forces has a tendency towards commonality, i.e. it will come about for the welfare of the whole (which does not have to be global). Globalisation driven by subjective driving forces has a tendency towards individualism, i.e. it will be carried out in the interest of the maximization of fulfillment of individual needs and desires.

The process of globalisation is not influenced only by the principle of transformation of one driving force into another, it is also a result of antagonistic interactions of several driving forces of globalisation. Some driving forces interact in a mutual antagonism (*the principle of antagonism of the driving forces of globalisation*), e.g. the objective *need for healthy environment* comes into conflict with the regressive subjective *desire for profit* (e.g. it manifests itself in the question of the adoption and the enforcement of the Kyoto protocol), or there is a contradiction between the progressive subjective *need for a healthy diet* and the

regressive subjective *desire for profit* (e.g. it can be observed in the BSE scandal or melamine scandal).

The antagonistic interaction of driving forces can be observed in the direction of the process of globalisation. The course of globalisation is given by those driving forces, which prevail in political and economic decision-making structures of the society in a particular moment.

Another principle, typical for driving forces of globalisation, is their tendency towards gradualness and intensification (*the principle of gradualness and intensification of driving forces*), which results in a more effective organization and larger territorial sphere of activity of the process of globalisation.

Globalisation driven by the complex of its driving forces can develop in two ways. On one hand it can end in the self-destruction of humankind, if regressive subjective driving forces prevail over the progressive objective and subjective ones. On the other hand it can result in the change of the global order, if globalisation is driven by its progressive objective and subjective driving forces, the aim of which is to preserve the life on earth and organise it in such a way so that a new world order would be based on social justice and would at least satisfy primary needs for each individual. This would require a reform of global and regional international institutions as well as legislative and executive bodies of nation-states. The reform should lead to the elimination of regressive subjective driving forces in decision-making process on the global level. For example there is a need to eliminate the regressive subjective driving forces such as the *desire for profit concerning armament industry*and *desire for power*, promoting military conflicts, and to transform them into the progressive driving force *desire for peace*. This elimination of regressive subjective driving forces should be carried out by measures with global reach and obligatory character (e.g. disarmament should be accepted and applied in all countries, it should not be only partial).

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The end or a new quality of the third wave of globalisation?

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Abstract

Globalisation can be understood as a world-wide circulation of goods, information, ideas, people, and as establishing or intensifying of world-wide political and economic connections. If so, then globalisation dates back to the 15th and 16th century. Since that time there have been three periods or "waves" of globalisation: 1) 15th – 18th centuries, 2) 19th century (until 1914) and 3) since the 1980s. Each wave had its main driving forces (ideas and interests), geographical and social centers and technologies. Each period ends with a deceleration (the first wave) or retreat (the second wave) of globalisation. In the first wave the driving forces were "God", "Gold" and "Glory" and the centers were Spain and Portugal followed by the Netherlands and England, in the second wave these were respectively: "Civilisation", "Profit" (from global trading) and "Glory" (of nations or nationalism and imperialism), and England, followed and challenged by France and other European states; in the third wave: "Democracy and Free Market", "Profit" (from global circulation of money and goods) and "Glory" (of individuals – CEO and bankers, and some nations), the USA in alliance with Western Europe and Japan.

Since 2000, especially in 2008 and 2009, there are signs of weakening of the third wave of globalisation: weakening international economic and political position of the USA, the rise of new powers (China, India, Russia, Brazil, etc), retreat from some elements of the free market ideology and policy, weakening of democratic reforms in some important countries, slowing down of foreign direct investment (2009) and international trade. Whether these signs mean the end of the present wave of globalisation and a significant remodelling of the global political and economic system, or only a correction to it, is still not clear as the present recession has not ended yet and measures to overcome the economic crisis may bring about various results.

Key words: globalisation, capitalism, recession

Why the third wave? Two views on globalisation

There are two views on globalisation. According to the first one, globalisation is something special in the history of humankind, something that happened for the first time and that started in the last quarter of the 20th century. Followers of this view are usually (or were until the present crisis) of the opinion that globalisation is irreversible, because irreversible is the progress in technology and irreversible is the drive for more freedom of action, for more profits from the circulation of money and goods, etc. This view is also connected with the opinion that traditional institutions, first of all the state (nation-state), are weakening, if not disappearing, transforming into only points in the global network of interconnections and flows, in which transactional companies are the main actors[3].

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[3] The mechanism whereby the role of state becomes weaker in recent years has been subject of many analyses. Among the most outstanding see Castells, M. *The Power of Identity*.especially chapter 5 "Globalisation, Identification, and the State: A Powerless State or a NetworkState?". Castells, M. 2003. *The Power of Identity*.2-bd Edition.Blackwell Publishing.

According to the other view globalisation can be defined as a global (world-wide) spread of political, economic, informational, and personal connections, as global diffusion of information, culture, religions, believes, languages, socio-economic systems, etc, is made possible due to political circumstances and technological progress and the shaping of the global system[4]. If such a view is accepted, then globalisation started in the era of great discoveries in the 15th and 16th centuries followed by the colonisation of America by European powers, establishing world-wide commercial connections, global diffusion of Christian religion and European languages, etc. Consequently, this was what can be called "the first wave of globalisation". This wave lost its momentum in the 18th and early 19th centuries. Globalisation resumed (as the second wave of) in the first half of the 19th century and lasted until the catastrophe of the Word War in 1914. This war triggered a series of events (socialist Bolshevik revolution in Russian, the World War II, socialist revolution in China, advance of communism in many countries, decolonisation, cold war, etc) that divided the world and stopped and reversed globalisation. What happened in the 1980s and 1990s – acceleration of world trade and circulation of money, diffusion of the idea of democracy and free market, etc. is then another (the third) wave of globalisation.

Of the two views, the second one is obviously better suited to the present circumstances of global economic recession as it admits ups and downs, accelerations and decelerations or retreats of globalisation, while the first one can only describe one stage of the (last wave of) globalisation, namely its acceleration.

Waves of globalisation: changing driving forces, centers and technology; accelerations and decelerations or retreats

Each of the waves of globalisation had its driving forces (ideas, interests), its centres (countries and social groups in them) and its technology. After times of acceleration there came periods of deceleration or retreats of globalisation. An overview of driving forces, centres and technologies as well as mechanisms of acceleration and deceleration or retreats of the waves of globalisation can be instructive for an analysis of the present state of globalisation.

In the first wave of globalisation which started in the 15th century, the driving forces were "three Gs" – God, Gold, and Glory[5]. "God" meant desire to bring the true faith to pagans and infidels, and thus to save their souls. "Gold" meant the search for gold in a simplest meaning of this word: robbery of gold and other treasures in conquered lands and highly profitable trade by using force, including trading of slaves. "Glory" signifies desire to gain fame and glory for conquerors and emperors. The centers of globalisation were European countries: Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands (at the beginning as a part of the empire of the emperor Charles V, the main beneficiary of the inflow of gold from America, and since the 17th century as an independent country), and later on, since the 17th. century – England. Social strata most interested and active in this business were young poor, jobless free people ready to risk dangerous adventures as sailors and soldiers, then clergy, merchants, bankers and craftsmen, and, of course, emperors. Long overseas trips and conquests of far away lands in America and elsewhere were possible due to the advances in navigation technology (a special kind of sails, compass, maps) and fire gun.

The first wave of globalisation brought about an interconnection of European centers with the rest of the world, a specific global economic division of labour which served the

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[4]   or "world-system", as Immanuel Wallerstein calls it. See Wallerstein,I. 2004. *World-System Analysis.An Introduction.*Duke University Press.
[5]   See Landes,D. S. 2005.*The Wealth and Poverty of Nations*[*Bogactwo i nędza narodów*]. Warszawa: Muza.

interests of the European center, global circulation of people (including mixing of races), spread of information about distant lands in Europe, diffusion of Christianity and European languages (Spanish, Portuguese, English, and to a lesser extent Dutch), as well as a spread of diseases. The strongest impact of this wave of globalisation was in America, which was conquered, included to European empires as their colonies, economically exploited and to a large extent populated by Europeans. In other continents – Africa and Asia – globalisation entailed only some points in coastal areas.

In the 18th century there appeared signs of deceleration of this wave of globalisation. In the last two decades of the 18th century and first two decades of the 19th century European powers (England, Spain, Portugal) lost most of their American colonies. This meant losing the political and economic control by the European center over a large part of the world. These developments were prompted to some extent by military conflicts in Europe (Napoleonic wars). They were also the result of new ideas represented by the French revolution and by socio-demographic tendencies (exhaustion of the group of free poor adventurers and merchants ready to undertake risky ventures).

In the second wave of globalisation which started in the first half of the 19th century and got momentum in the last two decades of this century, the driving forces were Civilisation (instead of God), Profit (instead of Gold) and Glory. "Civilisation" meant the mission of bringing European civilisation, considered as the universal civilisation, to underdeveloped peoples in global peripheries (mostly in Asia and Africa)[6]. This idea is best expressed in the French notion of *mission civilisatrice*. "Profit" symbolizes desire of European powers for profits from unequal division of labour imposed on colonies and dependent countries. This lead to a search for and a conquest of new colonies and dependencies as sources of cheap raw materials and markets for European industrial products. "Glory" was glory of competing European nations. This pushed them to look for and conquer new colonies not only for economic or strategic reasons, but also to demonstrate power and greatness of nations concerned. This also entailed the imposition of their cultures and languages in the colonies. The main driving centers were the United Kingdom – first to enter the industrial revolution and the capitalist system, followed and challenged by some other European powers – France, Russia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Italy. The driving social groups were first of all the young bourgeoisie striving for quick profit, but also poor free young people ready to fight and serve in the colonial administration, in companies etc. Successes of European powers were possible due to new technologies of navigation and transport (steamboat, railway), communication (telegraph and telephone), military (machine gun) and industrial production (steam machine, electricity, heavy industries, etc.).

This second wave of globalisation extended direct or indirect political and economic power of the above mentioned European nations in Africa and Asia and promoted economic dependence in Latin America. This time Europeans penetrated not only costal areas but also vast territories in interiors of Africa and Asia. The victory of the idea of free commerce, imposed by the strongest competitor – the UK, promoted the economic integration of the whole world, its center was London and its currency was the British pound. This globalisation introduced European languages, namely English and French, in many countries of the world, mostly as local lingua franca and languages of colonial administration and local Europeanised elites. European institutions and ideas (e.g. the model of nation state together with the idea of nationalism) were imposed or were voluntarily introduced outside Europe.

This wave of globalisation abruptly ended in 1914 with the outbreak of the World War. It should be stressed that the war was not an "accident", something external to the way

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[6]   This ideology and its consequences (the feel of superiority of Europeans and white race is critically analysed by Edward Said in his famous „Orientalism" first published in 1975. Polish Edition: Said,E. W. 2005. *Orientalizm*.Poznań.

of functioning of the world and to the way of globalisation. In the 19th and early 20th century war was considered as a legitimate way of solving international problems, a way of determining international "pecking order", and the race and competition for colonies was a source of conflicts[7]. As noted earlier, the World War I triggered a series of events that destroyed the whole global order and stopped globalisation for several decades.

The third wave of globalisation started in the 1980s, with the decline of the communist system and the victory of the idea of democracy, free market and economic liberalism. The driving forces were Democracy and Free Market (instead of God and Civilisation), Profit (from financial operations and international trade) and Glory (of individuals, but also of nations). The main (and multidimensional – economic, political, military, technological, cultural) center was the United States followed or assisted by its allies: Western Europe and Japan. The main social groups pushing for globalisation were businesspeople – top managers of international companies, bankers, stock exchange brokers ("Wall Street") etc. gaining profits and satisfaction from the world-wide circulation of capital and goods, deregulation of capital markets, as well as politicians, intellectuals, and scholars considering globalisation, free market and democracy as a means of solving problems of global poverty, as a way of bringing peace, prosperity, and freedom to each country and to the whole humankind. The collapse of communism – as an alternative to democracy and free market, and the collapse of the USSR as a global rival of the USA, were considered by many decision makers and intellectuals in many countries as an evidence of the lack of alternative to the economic, social, and political system of the developed "West" and to the role of the USA as the sole global superpower. Acceleration of the speed of circulation of capital, information and goods, characteristic for this wave of globalisation, was enabled by the then progress in technology, especially in information and telecommunication technology (symbolized by the internet), and the development and diffusion of other means of transportation.

The above described general characteristics of factors of (the third wave of) globalisation were accompanied by some detailed ideas, concepts and institutions. They include, in particular, the concept of the disappearing state (nation-state) as an obstacle to the free circulation of capital and goods, the emphasis on free entrepreneurship (economic neo-liberalism), the need for a "small government" and a "sound" monetary policy (balanced national budgets, cuts in spending to avoid public deficits, etc), belief in the absolute superiority of private ownership ad in the need for privatisation etc. These ideas and concepts were codified in the 1980s in the so called "Washington consensus"[8]

This wave of globalisation reached its primetime in the decade of 1990s that can be called the "golden decade of liberalism" or "Pax Americana". Unlike the two previous waves of globalisation, this time globalisation diffused mostly in a peaceful wave, without a use of force, although the military power of the West in the cold war was not irrelevant. The main mechanisms of diffusing of globalisation was the "soft" power of the democratic and affluent "West" headed by the USA and promises of prosperity to the rest of the world if it follows the West. A role in propagating this system was also played by international institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, NATO, the EU (dominated or composed by Western countries) and the governments of the USA and other Western countries helping, persuading and convincing, if necessary and possible, reluctant countries to adopt "proper" rules of the game. This wave of

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[7]   The role of war in problem-solving in 19th and early 20th century Europe is well described by R. Kuxniar, a Polish scholar, specialist in geopolitics Kuxniar, R. 2005. *Polityka i siła. Studia strategiczne – zarys problematyki.*, Warszawa: Scholar, especially Chapter 2 *Idea i naród w służbie strategii, czyli strategii wiek dojrzały.*

[8]   A critical analysis of the Washington consensus and neo-liberal economic theory and policy can be found in J. Stiglitz; *Globalisation And Its Discontents* W. W North & Company, New York, London, 2002.

globalisation, as the others, had its "hero of the epoch". This time it was the "Davos man" – a rich, clever top CEO or banker.

After 2000 the global system and the related globalisation entered a period of turbulence. It deserves a special comment.

Deceleration (or retreat) of globalisation after 2000

Since 2000 a series of events have occurred that have changed the global economic and political system and the way of globalisation. The extent of the change is not clear yet, as the process of change is underway.

The most spectacular event was, of course, the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 in the USA. This triggered other events: the US (with its "coalition of will") attacks "rogue countries" and leads protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The financial costs of these wars contribute to the huge US budget and trading deficits, the rise of anti-Americanism world-wide (including among US allies), deterioration of the mood in the American society, etc. All these events (and others like the scandalous presidential election in 2000 in the USA) considerably weakened the "soft" as well as the economic and political power of the USA, undermined the trust in the USA as the global leader. For many observers, the USA could create global problems but it couldn't solve them. The rise of oil prices since 2003 (beginning with the war in Iraq) to mid-2008 can also be, partially, attributed to the war and thus, to 9/11 attacks.

Parallel to the declining position of the USA, other powers, first of all China, Russia, India and Brazil, and also Iran, Venezuela, etc. started (or returned as in the case of Russia) to rise as candidates for global players or challengers for the USA.

It is worth noting that these countries, especially China and Russia, not only question the political position of the USA, but also question the political and economic system launched by the USA and the West (Western-style democracy, human rights, freedom of press, transparency of business, separation of government and business, etc).

Global recession which started in the USA in early 2008 and accelerated with the collapse of Lehman Brothers bank in September 2008, and then continuing in nationalisation (in practice) of US flagship companies like GM and Chrysler, revealed both weaknesses of the US economy and, to many, compromised the neo-liberal economic ideology, Washington consensus and the whole logic behind the present global system and behind globalisation. American indebtedness revealed the US dependence on capital lenders, especially China, as well as its exposure to "sovereign funds" in hands of governments of such countries as China, Russia, Arab oil countries etc. It has turned out that American firms, contrary to previous opinions, were not sufficiently competitive, and that the low propensity for accumulation of the American society does matter. The change of mood of American consumers, i.e. the drop in demand, in turn, hit the output both home and in countries exporting to the USA causing a global slowdown. Financial scandals such as that of Madoff, public dissatisfaction around incomes and bonuses of managers and bankers, blamed for causing the crisis, compromised the "hero of the epoch" of neo-liberalism.

The economic recession decreased the amount of global foreign investment and international trade – central elements in globalisation[9]. At the same time, however, China, although affected by the drop in global demand for its products and rising unemployment, in 2009 still registered robust annual GDP growth of 8-9% unthinkable for the USA and Europe. What can be even more important, China seems to be shifting its economy to become less dependent on foreign markets and more self-sufficient undertaking large-scale investment in

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[9]   According to UNCTAD World Investment Report, foreign direct investment in 2007 amounted to 1.98 trillion dollars, while in 2008 1.7 trillion and in 2009 it is expected to fall to 1.2 trillion. After: Krysys tlumi inwestycje zagraniczne.*Gazeta Wyborcza* (accessed September 18, 2009).

infrastructure both to modernize its economy and to boost demand and satisfy people's needs. It is also taking opportunity of declining world prices and uses its huge financial reserves to purchase among other things deposits of raw material abroad[10]

To save the financial system and to boost ailing economies most developed countries in the world intervened ignoring the "sound" monetary and neo-liberal policy rules, and restrictions on state involvement in the economy (in the European Union). The resulting increase in public debt, state responsibility for economic recovery, for pension funds, for companies in needs for restructuring under state surveillance, etc, unexpectedly and dramatically increased the role of state in the economy and society.

There are also occurring important changes in international economic and political institutions. The G-20 (entailing the largest economies, both "developed" and "developing") has replaced the G-7 (or G-8) – a club of rich countries under American leadership. It is a symbolic shift of power on the global scale towards a multi-polar system. The G-20 reactivated the IMF, giving it new money, tasks and ideology. The IMF, unlike in the "golden decade" of the 1990s, is no longer a guardian of the Washington consensus, but is supplying countries in need with fresh money according to the rules of Keynesian economics. Reforms in the IMF also confirm the above mentioned decrease of influence of the USA and Europe.

Conclusion and perspectives

As history demonstrates, globalisation is not a linear process that can only go upwards, there can be periods of acceleration and deceleration and even retreats. Therefore, the present situation of deceleration (retreat) of globalisation is nothing extraordinary.

Whether the present situation means a meaningless interruption (a small stop to restore traveller's energy or to fix a car) in the way of globalisation and functioning of the world system, or a significant correction to the way of globalisation and the world system, or even a retreat from globalisation, and for how long?, is uncertain. The uncertainty results from two big developments (issues) that are still underway. These are 1) the unresolved political-military conflicts of potentially serious consequences: wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and nuclear ambitions of Iran (the Israeli-Arab conflict is also a more and more pressing issue), 2) the economic recession and its aftermaths.

Some facts are, however, sure. The first is the end of the "golden decade" of neo-liberalism (deregulation of financial markets, less power for national governments, unconditional privatisation, "sound" monetary policy for all but the USA, fabulous bonuses for bankers, American and West European experts teaching the rest of the world how to run economy, etc). The second is the declining role of the USA in the global economy and politics. The US retreat from the idea of anti-missile shield in Poland and Czechia, defeat of Chicago (and victory of the Brazilian Rio de Janeiro) in the competition for the organisation of the Olympic games in 2016, president Obama's recent declarations that the USA needs help of other powers to solve global problems, etc. can be seen as symbols of the change in the position of the USA in the global system. The third fact is the emerging (or restored) global solidarity and responsibility, represented by concerted actions of governments in dealing with the crisis; refrain, by and large, of national governments from protectionism; extraordinary help for countries in need (e.g. Iceland, Latvia); general consent in G-20 as to the ways of dealing with the crisis and reforming the IMF, etc. The latter factor demonstrates the global interdependence of countries, which is, otherwise, a result of globalisation. It gives

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[10]   See: In the time of crisis China has went out to the world to overtake deposits of oil and natural gas. The biggest Chinese oil company CNPC this year spent 46 billion dollars for this, and has received from Beijing more 30 billion for further purchases, Chiny wykupują ropę świata. *Gazeta Wyborcza* (accessed September 31, 2009).

hope that, unlike in the 1930s, the economic slowdown will not turn into a dramatic global crisis.

From the point of view of globalisation and functioning of the world system, questions are whether the USA resumes its role of the world economic driver, or, if not, if a "consortium" of new drivers led by China and inspired by a new economic ideology, can smoothly take on this role; and what will be its results on the behaviour and the well being of consumers, producers, invertors, governments, citizens, on flows of information, etc. world-wide.

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Globalisation, identity, language and culture

Globalisation and integrating European societies: the multicultural versus liberal concept

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Abstract

Presently, the constantly changing shapes of European societies are by-products of the Christian past, an upsurge of international migration, democratic rule and of liberal tradition rooted in religious tolerance. Boosting globalisation processes imposes additional challenges on European societies, striving to protect their diversity. This struggle is especially clearly visible in the case of minority communities who try to resist melting into the mainstream culture.

European countries' legal systems and cultural policies respond to these efforts in many different ways. Respecting identity politics-driven group rights seems to be the most common approach, resulting in the creation of a multicultural society. However, the outcome of respecting group rights may be remarkably contradictory to both individual rights growing out from the liberal tradition, and to the reinforced concept of integration of immigrants into host societies. This paper discusses globalisation-prompted identity politics in the context of both individual rights and integration of European societies.

Key words: globalisation, liberalism, multiculturalism, integration

Introduction

Globalisation processes have significantly changed the socio-economic and cultural image of the world. The intensification of international migration has led to an increasing ethnic and cultural diversification of societies, especially in rich destination countries. Western European states host a constantly increasing number of immigrants, and a substantial share of them originate in cultural environments that do not share common values with host societies. Diverse world and social life perceptions of people sharing the same territories leads to discordances that introduce social instability, a shrinking sense of safety and provokes heated debates about future shapes of changing societies. A need to work out a new model of integration of societies becomes more and more clear, both in the countries that already witnessed social anxieties and in those, where future economic development is likely to trigger or strengthen immigration (see Vertovec, Wessendorf 2005).

The multicultural concept of society, as a remedy to the said need, has been adopted by several Western European countries, with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands being the most apparent examples. However, not very much attention is paid to the fundamental differences between multiculturalism as an ideology and the centuries-long liberal tradition of European societies that to a significant extent was based on tradition at least partly contradictory to values that form the multicultural model of society. The main aim of the present paper is to confront the multicultural and liberal approaches to society and point out the inevitable consequences of adopting one of these models in the context of globalisation processes and integration of European societies.

Models of integration revisited

Accomplishing social integration seems to be one of the most basic assumptions adopted by European states, quite often not even formulated *explicite*, but taken for granted. Then the debate moves to the choice of a model of integration that should be employed in particular circumstances to achieve the goal that had been defined.

Monoculturalism as a model of full integration using the concept of adopting all rules of social coexistence of host society by immigrants, gained a lot of criticism to date and was rejected as improper: *"... assimilation ideology has been recognised as inconsistent with the principles forming the basis of a democratic state (...)"* (Łodziński 2007, 9). The models of the transmuting pot and the melting pot and their derivatives are perceived in Europe as purely American, therefore not appropriate for the European reality. The relatively young *Leitkultur* (reference culture) model that gained a lot of attention and discussion in Germany, where it was created (see Tibi 1998), already managed to unite opponents and gain strongly negative reputation. Many suggested that the concept became a victim of political correctness of the German political scene (Fukuyama 2006).

Therefore, the only concept that has had good press to date is multiculturalism. Already in 1991 the Council of Europe in one of its documents presented a vision of a multicultural European society defined by concepts such as social integration, equality of citizens (equal chances for immigrants were emphasized), respect for cultural differences and prohibition of discrimination of immigrants in any form. Also numerous researchers in their works appreciated this model, e.g. having described Dutch society as multicultural without being assimilative (Lijphart 2002) or creating ear-catching slogans like *many cultures, one state* (Bertossi 2007).

However, multiculturalism is not a univocally defined concept, but rather a collection of concepts derived from three main approaches. The first meaning of multiculturalism is a demographic and descriptive one, which is commonly understood as a description of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious differentiation of societies. The second has clearly ideological and normative meaning, implying state ideology concerning the maintenance of cultural diversity in a society. The last is a programme and political meaning, usually developed as a set of state policies heading towards the creation of a unified institutional system respecting cultural differences and offering equal access for all members of the society (Inglis 1996; Tiryakin 2003; Łodziński 2007).

Multicultural policies: expectations and results of implementation

The expectations towards a successful implementation of the multicultural concept are high. Kymlicka (1995) believes that it is a promising formula for social coexistence and enumerates its advantages. Among the most important there are the capacity of avoiding social and ethnic conflicts, balancing social chances of host society and immigrants, and providing the latter with a chance to maintain their culture. In general, after an interesting and concise definition by a world-famous philosopher, multiculturalism may be outlined as *"...a framework for coexistence of separate cultures rather than a transitional mechanism for integrating newcomers into the dominant culture"* (Fukuyama 2006, 14). However, when it comes to defining operational shape of multiculturalism as a formula, many questions arise. It was interestingly commented by Jan Olbrycht, a member of the European Parliament, who said that the European multiculturalism is in the stage of *"...concept creation while building process is already on",* Olbrycht 2009).

The confrontation of the high expectation towards multiculturalism with the results of multicultural policies adopted in several European states is disappointing. Impermeable city ghettos inhabited by immigrant communities, their high unemployment rates, low social position, permanent dependence on social services and disproportional criminality reveal that programmes implemented to date do not meet expectations. The Netherlands, where internal

multiculturalism was successful in the integration of people of various denominations (catholics, protestants, others) for centuries, in the last decades of the 20th century faced a shift towards external multiculturalism, connected with high inflow of immigrants, and the creation of a pillarised society, which can hardly be explained as integration (Czubiński 2009). Such situations call for a redefinition of multiculturalism as an idea, and trigger controversial, but reasonable comments like *"multiculturalism is a complex of tensions"* (Miczka 2009).

The situation in the Netherlands is to an extent similar to what has been observed in Great Britain. However, the understanding of multicultural society and approaches to this issue have changed over the last decades. This evolution has interestingly been commented by Vertovec (2005), who recognized four stages of its development. The first he called pre-multiculturalism, with much attention paid to anti-discrimination of immigrants in the public sphere. It was followed by high-multiculturalism, understood as public recognition of immigrants and support for their organizations and activities. Then anti-multiculturalism occurred on the basis of growing feeling that the cultural diversity of British society expanded too much. Post-multiculturalism, calling for alternatives to multiculturalism and for social cohesion is the latest stage (Vertovec 2005).

In almost any Western European country, and also overseas, there are plentiful examples of policies, legal regulations and social norms that promote social cohesion in various forms, although not always such label appears. Some examples of such situations have been collected in Table 1. In many cases they are directed to allow for cultural differences, usually rooted in religious differences. Quite often minority rights are protected, and immigrant communities are encouraged to participate in social, economic and political life of their host country to a larger extent. However, some of the examples shown below may also prove, that vigorous promotion of either minority or immigrant community limits their participation in the host society under the guise of protection of their customs and tradition; more or less formal acceptation of school duty violation in the UK or Germany may serve as an example. Also limitation of school choice to French-speaking schools, aimed at the protection of the French language in Quebec, prevents immigrants from entering the language mainstream in Canada.

Table 1. Examples of social cohesion manifestations in selected countries

State	Examples of social cohesion manifestations
The Netherlands	– each company hiring over 35 employees must report about its ethnic structure (since 1994) – job offers should be placed in minority-read press as well – equal treatment clause should supplement job offers – state help in language courses and vocational trainings for immigrants (since 1997)
United Kingdom	– an act enabling organisation of vocational training for underrepresented minorities (since 1974) – Northern Ireland: [1] each company hiring over 10 employees must report about its religious structure; [2] each company hiring over 250 employees must continuously monitor religious structure of its employees (since 1989) – accused immigrants from Muslim countries fall under codes of their country of origin (since 2006) – Pakistani parents are (*de facto*) allowed to send their children abroad during the schoolyear
Poland	– special electoral rights for minorities are granted – the Tatar community may bury their dead without coffins
Germany	– Muslim ritual cattle slaughter is allowed – Roma children are (*de facto*) excluded from school duty in several *Länder*
Denmark	– Kosher and Halal butchering is allowed
Canada	– in Quebec, immigrants and Francophones are not allowed to send their children to an English-speaking school
United States of America	– "cultural defense" in criminal law (presentation of cultural evidence in criminal cases where both the defendant and his victim are from the same culture) – affirmative action (university admission bonus credits)

Sources:
Eurofund.*Fair Employment Act*.http://www.eurofound.europa.eu.
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Multiculturalism and liberalism: group rights and individual rights confronted

In most cases minorities and immigrants appreciate the adoption of rights that enable them to follow their habits and traditions, and demand more, especially formal group recognition. It is quite a natural consequence of the adoption of multicultural policy, understood as a respect for multiple groups co-forming the society. This follows *communautarisme* philosophy, holding that each person belongs to a group and is shaped by its culture, therefore a society is not a group of individuals, but a set of groups. Applied *communautarisme* allows each group (community) to use its own rules as long as they fall within the limits of public law. The existence of minority groups requires protection of their group rights with the use of anti-discrimination law, often commented as positive discrimination. However, preventing group discrimination usually creates multiple social categories, where members of the mainstream group do not possess the same rights as minorities do. Hence, *"...discrimination is a tool of fighting discrimination",* as Szlachta has put it (2009). Therefore, multicultural policies emphasizing recognition of groups, clearly go

hand-in-hand with identity politics, aiming at the protection of group rights, especially in the case of groups presumeably underprivileged in certain characteristics.

All in all, multiculturalism as a policy issuing rights to groups results in the fact that different people abide by different legal codes. Ebbe and Nielsen (2009) call it *multilegalism*, developed as no equality below the law. In this context, Fukuyama (2006, 15) argues, that everybody deserves being *"...treated equally as individuals, not as members of cultural communities"*, while Laegaard (2009) poses an interesting question, whether differences of legal treatment of different members of the same society mean respect for difference or lack of respect for equality. Regardless of what is the answer to the last question, a clear contradiction between group rights and equality of citizens arises.

The legal inequality of citizens seems to be contradictory to one of the most basic provisions of the European tradition. Contemporary Europe is a product of its Christian past, democratic rule (equality and freedom of citizens) and of liberal tradition rooted in religious tolerance. Liberal concepts of society as an alternative to the monarchical-clerical concept of the state (see e.g. Jeliński 2003) were founded on the equality of citizens, equal worth and dignity of individuals, and the primacy of individual rights and personal liberty.

A confrontation of the liberal tradition, where individuals and their rights are the most important reference, with multiculturalism holding that group rights and respect for difference are primary concepts, shows that it is impossible to respect both liberalism and multiculturalism at the same time. Some researchers search for a Third Way, and it is usually found in the so called liberal culturalism. It aims at combining liberal principles of respect for individuals that are granted universal human rights (which is expected to allow equal participation) with specific rights created by the state for selected groups to allow promotion of their culture and identity and survival of minority cultures (Kymlicka 2001; Łodziński 2003). However, the most basic problems have not been solved yet. Isn't it that groups living alongside one another do not live together, but form a pillarised society that has not succeeded to date (e.g. the Dutch case)? How to protect group members against the group (e.g. how to ensure freedom of leaving the group)? How to ensure the integration of society, when groups want to protect themselves against unification, create lobbies and fight for protection of their group rights? In many cases successful group protection leads to *"overculturalization"* of groups, and later on to exclusion, homogeneity and segregation (see Kerkkanen 2008).

Setting the fundamental goals

Another important question should be posed, whether the feeling of inclusion and integration is the goal for members of immigrant communities or minority communities. Research done by Klvaňová (2009) provides interesting theoretical support for the answer, that this is not always the case. At the same time, integration of societies is widely declared as constituting one of the main goals of contemporary European states. Conducting integration against the will of those who oppose it will never be fully successful, but granting them with group rights in the name of their protection against unification means supporting their struggle against integration.

On the contrary, if integration is the goal, then individual rights should be protected. With the lapse of time, individuals gradually lose symptoms of being strangers and groups they used to belong to lose their cultural distinctiveness. Hence globalisation, at least in its uniformizing dimension (Szmyd 2006), becomes successful. Therefore, the liberal concept of society, globalisation processes and integration efforts mutually support one another, while the multicultural concept of society opposes them.

Conclusions

The liberal concept of society, founded on a profound respect for individual rights and equality under the law inevitably results in a gradual loss of cultural distinctiveness of minority groups. It leads to the integration of society along its mainstream culture and may be perceived as the success of globalisation in its uniformizing dimension. On the contrary, the multicultural concept of society, built around the protection of group rights, leads to multilegalism. It facilitates maintaining cultural distinctiveness, but finally leads to the creation of a pillarised society. Integration fails to succeed, and it may be interpreted as a failure of globalisation. Searching for a *third way* seems to be creating delusions.

Consequently, before answering the question whether we want to follow the liberal or multicultural model of society in European states, another question should be posed and answered: whether we want to accomplish well integrated, culturally relatively homogenous societies built upon centuries-old values, or whether we want to achieve relatively poorly integrated, but culturally rich societies built upon diverse values. Only after having answered this question, discussion about the adoption of the liberal or multicultural model should follow.

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Language Death versus Language Survival: A Global Perspective

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Abstract

The present-day world is marked by a significant discrepancy in the development of languages. While some languages are on a steep advance, a large number of other languages are facing rapid endangerment, in many instances resulting in death. Languages have always died off, but no historical period experienced such massive attrition. It has been estimated that approximately one half of the 6,000 languages spoken in the world today are going to disappear in the course of the 21st century. In relation to this horrifying data, it has often been argued that language extinction must be viewed as a terrible loss, and language renewal is thus beneficial and worth trying. By contrast, the discussion has also been enriched by anti-survival conceptions.

Within the framework of this contextual background, the paper attempts to contribute to the growth in linguistic awareness about the problem. Drawing on the research results of such scientific fields as, for example, sociolinguistics, geolinguistics, language ecology, and linguistic anthropology, it (1) presents the global status of the world's languages, (2) outlines the future perspective of both 'threatened' and 'strong' languages, and (3) discusses pro- and anti-survival/revitalization arguments.

Key words: globalisation, language death and survival, revitalization, international language, linguistic anthropology, sociolinguistics, geolinguistics, language ecology

Introduction

While my contribution to the conference titled *Globalisation and its impacts on localities*[11] (which was held here in Ostrava two years ago) discussed the importance of languages for preserving the identity and integrity of nations in multiethnic regions using the example of the Lakota people, my present-day talk attempts to approach the topic of language development, its rise or demise, from more general viewpoints. Drawing on the research results of such interdisciplinary fields of study as, for instance, sociolinguistics, geolinguistics, language ecology, and linguistic anthropology, the aim of the paper is three-fold. Firstly, it deals with the global status of the world's languages. Secondly, it outlines the future perspectives of both 'threatened' and 'strong' languages. Thirdly, it discusses some pro-survival and anti-survival/ revitalization arguments.

Global language loss

It has been estimated (e.g. Dixon 1997) that there are approximately 5,000–6,000 living languages in the world – it depends, of course, on how we understand languages as opposed to dialects – and that about one half of these are going to vanish in the course of the 21st century. In other words, circa 3,000 languages are going to become extinct in 1,200

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[11] Černý, M. 2008. Lakota Language Revitalization: Past, Present, and Future Prospects. In *Globalisation and Its Impact on Localities*.Ostrava: University of Ostrava. pp. 255–261.

months. As Crystal (2000, 19) aptly expresses, "that means, on average, there is a language dying off somewhere in the world every two weeks or so". According to other sources (e.g. *Ethnologue* 2005[12]), there are 51 languages (now 50; for the explanation see Conclusion) with only one speaker left: 8 (now 7) in the USA, 3 in South America, 3 in Africa, 6 in Asia, 28 in Australia, and 3 in the Pacific Ocean islands. Nearly 500 languages have fewer than 100 speakers; 1,500 languages are spoken by fewer than 1,000 speakers; over 3,000 languages have up to 10,000 speakers; and 5,000 languages have no more than 100,000 speakers. To put it yet more differently, it has been calculated that about 96% of all the world's languages are spoken by about 4% of the Globe's population.

Reasons for language loss (and/or language shift towards a stronger language, frequently English) are numerous. Besides natural disasters (earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, etc.) we should mention colonization, migration, and invasion, often resulting in cultural assimilation, or even genocide. Nevertheless, compared to language, cultural, and education policies taking place during previous centuries, today it is not common to punish people for practicing their languages; still, they continue in dying off.

In relation to this predicament, Fishman (1991) delimits four social changes affecting our languages choices: (1) demographic factors, (2) economic forces, (3) social identifiers, and (4) mass media. Moreover, Fishman (1991, 88–109) postulates a graded division of languages according to their endangerment (for details, see *Figure 1*). As the following figure suggests, Stage One languages are the least threatened, with higher levels of government and education institutions employing the language. Stage Eight languages, on the contrary, are the most seriously endangered, having only a few fluent speakers left. The remaining six stages rank between these two poles.

Figure 1 *Adaptation of Fishman's Scale for Threatened Languages*

Stage One	Used by higher levels of government and in higher education.
Stage Two	Used by local government and the mass media in the community.
Stage Three	Used in business and by employees in less specialized work areas.
Stage Four	Language is required in elementary schools.
Stage Five	Language is still very much alive and used in community.
Stage Six	Some intergenerational use of language.
Stage Seven	Only adults beyond child bearing age speak the language.
Stage Eight	Only a few elders speak the language.

To fight language disappearance and to strengthen a particular language code, Reyhner (1999, VII) suggests a series of varied interventions. With regard to the first stage, he holds the opinion that the indigenous language oral and written literature should be cultivated through dramatic presentations and publications. To reverse Stage Two, he would promote the use of the written form of the language for legal and business purposes. Stage Three might be altered through developing a specialized vocabulary for both employers and employees. Stage Four requires new indigenous language textbooks. In Stage Five a special recognition should be given to local renewal efforts through prizes and awards. Stage Six expects parents speaking the language at home, especially with the youngest generation. For Stages Seven and Eight Reyhner offers a model where fluent elders are teamed with younger learners, either in the form of so called "language nests"[13] or one-to-one.

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[12]   This material has its printed and online version. For the purposes of my paper I take the advantage of using the internet source. For details see the reference section at the end of the article.
[13]   Language nests are community centers aiming at promotion, advance, and renewal of indigenous languages. They are typical of the Maori revival initiative.

In addition, Crystal (2000, 133–144) proposes six factors that may help reverse the shift towards another language. He claims that the threatened language will progress and possibly recover if its speakers (1) increase their prestige within the dominant community; (2) increase their wealth; (3) increase their legitimate power in the eyes of the dominant community; (4) have a strong presence in the educational system; (5) can write down their language; (6) can make use of electronic technology.

Top twenty languages

While many language codes are dying off (some counts suggest that only 600 of the 6,000 languages in the world are 'safe' from the threat of extinction), some languages are on steep advance. The following two figures present the list of top twenty languages; in other words those with the most numerous community of speakers. While *Figure 2*, which is an adaptation of Comrie's calculation (see 2007, 19), bases its order on the number of native (so called L1) speakers, *Figure 3*, presenting Ostler's statistics (2007, 558), covers both L1 and L2 speakers, and, moreover, it differentiates between particular Chinese dialects (Mandarin, Wu, and Yue). That explains the discrepancy in the counts presented. Here, it is important to stress that more recent sources might offer slightly different estimates as the number of languages and their speakers experiences constant changes.

Figure 2 *Top twenty languages in terms of the number of speakers I*

List of languages	Number of speakers	List of languages	Number of speakers
1 Chinese	1,000,000,000	11 French	70,000,000
2 English	350,000,000	12 Panjabi	70,000,000
3 Spanish	250,000,000	13 Javanese	65,000,000
4 Hindi	200,000,000	14 Bihari	65,000,000
5 Arabic	150,000,000	15 Italian	60,000,000
6 Bengali	150,000,000	16 Korean	60,000,000
7 Russian	150,000,000	17 Telugu	55,000,000
8 Portuguese	135,000,000	18 Tamil	55,000,000
9 Japanese	120,000,000	19 Marathi	50,000,000
10 German	100,000,000	20 Vietnamese	50,000,000

Figure 3 *Top twenty languages in terms of the number of speakers II*

List of languages	Number of speakers	List of languages	Number of speakers
1 Chinese – Mandarin	1,052,000,000	11 Urdu	104,000,000
2 English	508,000,000	12 Korean	78,000,000
3 Hindi	487,000,000	13 Chinese – Wu	77,000,000
4 Spanish	417,000,000	14 Javanese	76,000,000
5 Russian	277,000,000	15 Telugu	75,000,000
6 Bengali	211,000,000	16 Tamil	74,000,000
7 Portuguese	191,000,000	17 Chinese – Yue	71,000,000
8 German	128,000,000	18 Marathi	71,000,000
9 French	128,000,000	19 Vietnamese	68,000,000
10 Japanese	126,000,000	20 Turkish	61,000,000

For the sake of time, let me now focus on the status of the European languages only. In the global context of the twenty most numerous languages in the world, we find seven languages having their original area in Europe: namely English, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Russian, German and Italian (I am referring to *Figure 2*). The first four languages have

enlarged their territory and population base due to overseas colonial expansion. Russian spread as a result of tsarist military campaigns. German keeps its tenth position thanks to the fact it functions as an official language in several European countries. Italian represents an exception; it has grown organically in its parent country.

Taking into consideration a combination of demographic factors (birth rate versus death rate) and changing prestige of languages under scrutiny, it appears (see Ostler 2007, 557–564) that in the following fifty years the number of German and Italian speakers may be reduced up to ten per cent, which means that Italian would disappear from the top twenty languages, and German would drop down to the end of the list. Also Russian will probably experience certain withdrawal from the more leading positions. Spanish and Portuguese do not have to worry as their native speakers in Latin America show steady natality. On the contrary, the growth of the French speaking population has stopped. However, in many ways (economic, cultural, military), France belongs among the most powerful countries in the world, and thus French is still viewed as a prestigious language.

And what about English? Well, difficult to guess. It is a language of globalisation. The United States and the United Kingdom play prominent roles in foreign and economic policy. The English language functions as a lingua franca in the world of science as well as in the world of diplomacy. Nevertheless, the history teaches us that no language has ever ruled the planet for too long; just think about Latin. If the internet should be taken as the criterion for predicting the future of English, it has been recently shown that with regard to the total capacity in internet communication English has been outnumbered by other languages 57% to 43% (see Breton 2007, 75). Importantly, as Crystal (2003, 191) maintains, there is a danger that the English language will split into various dialects, not fully intelligible to each other. The future of English is thus uncertain.

Kenan Malik's *Let them die* revisited

The fact that there is, on the one hand, a large number of languages which are facing rapid endangerment, in many instances resulting in death, and, on the other hand, there is a group of so called strong languages, some of which function even as international codes, opens broad space for contemplation whether it is worth attempting to dedicate time, energy, and money in order to save tongues which are close to extinction, or not. This controversial question seems to be of deep interest not only for representatives of relevant speech communities, but also for scholars of various specializations as well as for lay public. Naturally, opinions differ. We can distinguish either pro-survival or anti-survival/revitalization conceptions. Most generally, the pro-survival supporters argue that language death should be viewed as terrible loss, similar to the death of animal species, and language renewal is thus beneficial. By contrast, anti-survival supporters stress the fact that languages have always died off, and they campaign for language homogenization.

One of the anti-revitalization campaigners is Kenan Malik, an Indian-born British scholar, researcher and writer, the author of such bestsellers as *The Meaning of Race* (1996), *Man, Beast and Zombie* (2000), *Strange Fruit* (2008) and *From Fatwa to Jihad* (2009). In his essay *Let them die* (2000) Malik argues against language renewal theories and practices as they are presented, among others, in Crystal's *Language Death* (2000), Hagège's *Halte á la mort des langues* (2001), or Nettle & Romaine's *Vanishing Voices* (2000).

Quoting words by the Mexican historian Miguel Léon-Portilla, Malik claims that "in order to survive, a language must have a function". In addition to that, he maintains that "the whole point of a language is to enable communication, (…) and the more universally we can communicate, the more dynamic our cultures will be, because the more they will be open to new ways of thinking and doing". He attempts to refute the opinion that language and culture are interrelated, or even inseparable phenomena. He does not share the conviction that the

language we use may contribute to the manner we perceive, structure, and understand the world around us. In other words, he refuses the Sapir and Whorf's concept of language determinism and relativism.[14] To provide some evidence, Malik offers a comparison of French and English, summarizing: "The idea that French speakers view the world differently from English speakers, because they speak French, is clearly absurd." Interestingly, he also pleads against cultural pluralism, which, in his opinion, has re-expressed racial science "for the post-Holocaust world".

To confront his standpoints, there are several particularities worth mentioning. First of all, since Malik does not specify what he understands under the term *communication*, it seems that he is not aware of the variety of language functions (or, for the sake of his argumentation, he just pretends to lack the knowledge). Language communication performs not only the act of transforming information. Roman Jakobson (1960, 350–377) proposes a model, based on the Organon-Model by Karl Bühler[15], composed of six functions: (1) referential, (2) emotive, (3) conative, (4) phatic, (5) metalingual, and (6) poetic.[16]

Furthermore, in spite of the fact that language does not primarily determine the manner we think, "there are cultural differences in the semantic associations evoked by seemingly common concepts" (Kramsch 1998, 13). Put it differently, whilst the strong form of Sapir and Whorf's hypothesis cannot be accepted, its neutral version is generally taken for granted. Thus, without a shade of doubt, there is a significant level of interrelation between language, culture and thinking. French and English do not differ much because from the genealogical and typological points of view they are closely related; both belong among Indo-European languages with prevailing analytical features. However, if more "distant" languages were to be contrasted, differences in their linguistic pictures of the world would be of much more noticeable character. Following these assumptions, I have to object to Malik's statement that the universality of communication brings about the dynamism of cultures and their openness towards new modes of thinking and behaving. How can culture be more open to a new style of mental and social interaction if the specificity of such interaction is waning simultaneously with the language code within which it exists?

Unlike Malik, I glorify both multilingualism and multiculturalism. In my opinion, cultural and lingual pluralism has nothing to do with racial thinking. It does not assert that one culture or language is better than another. It is the other way round; multiculturalists praise tolerance and liberality. They respect "the other". That is also one of the reasons why they cannot stay passive when "the other" is near total collapse. Yes, languages have always passed away, but no historical period experienced such massive attrition. Of course, nobody can force a person or community of speakers to keep their mother tongue if they do not want to. Nevertheless, as research proves (cf., e.g., Šatava 2009), language revival is often wanted and often successful. And why should we care about endangered languages? Because we need diversity, because languages express identity, because languages are repositories of history, because languages contribute to the sum of human knowledge, because languages are interesting in themselves Crystal (2000, 27–67).

Names not to be forgotten

In place of a conclusion, instead of repeating the key points of what has, hopefully, been clearly delivered, let me present a few names which, in my opinion, should not be

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[14] For a more detailed introduction into the Sapir – Whorf hypothesis see, for example, Duranti (1997).

[15] Bühler distinguishes in his model three main functions of language: *representation*, *expression*, and *appeal.*

[16] Unlike Malik, Léon-Portilla definitely is aware of various language functions (especially *poetic*). See Léon-Portilla 2002.

forgotten (for details see Nettle and Romaine 2000): Ned Madrell (+ 1974), the last fluent speaker of Manx, a Celtic language spoken in the Isle of Man. Roscinda Nolasquez (+ 1987) of Pala, California, the last speaker of Cupeňo. Laura Somersal (+ 1990), the last speaker of a Native American language called Wappo. Tefvik Esenc (+ 1992), a farmer from the Turkish village of Haci Osman, the last speaker of Ubykh, a language once spoken in the northern Caucasus.Asai Take (+ 1994) from the Hokkaido village Abankohan, Japan, the last speaker of the Ainu language.Red Thundercloud (+ 1996), the last speaker of a Siouan language, Catawba. Last but not least, Marie Smith Jones, the last speaker of the Eyak language of subarctic Alaska, who passed away just a year ago (January 21st, 2008), making her mother tongue extinct. Do we really want to have this list enlarged?

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The Manifestation of Globalisation in Native Communities in Mexico

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Abstract

The papers analyzes globalisation processes in native communities in Mexico. It focuses on the questions of territory, economy, migration, tourism, informations technology and ecology. These questions we consider to be the most important in the process of globalisation, even though they represent only a sample of more numerous questions related to this process. The lack of territory signifies that there is less and less land owned by native Mexicans which means no place where they might be able to preserve their cultures. Together with overpopulation and ecological problems it pressures native Mexicans to migrate to the towns or even the USA which has a deep influence on the stability of conservative indigenous communities. The access to information and the growth of tourism in which they participate also open the communities to the outer world. Therefore they must face up to the changes which are quicker than ever before and it is hard to foretell the final impact of globalisation on native Mexican peoples.

Key words: Mexico, native communities, territory, globalisation, modernization, tourism, migration

Globalisation as a worldwide phenomenon has reached and impacted all of the societies and cultures including those traditionally very conservative ones which still can be found in every continent. In this essay we focus on native societies in Mexico. This country borders on the USA considered by many as the country in which globalisation originated and from which it expanded into the world. Mexico in general is considered to be a conservative country and in the case of the Mexican native people often living at the technological level of the nineteenth century this is even more visible. There is no doubt that globalisation would reach these people in any case but the presence of a politically and economically powerful neighbor to the north has caused a specific impact on them as a result of the specific relationship between these two different countries.

This paper focuses on the changes in native Mexican communities that were caused by the penetration by Western culture (that means the US culture) in the last decades, but above all since 1990's. Even though we do not want to affirm that there was no Western influence in Mexico before the 90's, this decade opened the country to the world more than any era before. The economic and power expansion of the USA, which became stronger after the end of the Cold War, resulted, in 1994, in the signature of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This agreement which includes Canada, USA and Mexico caused the opening of the market and facilitation of the business (import and export) among these 3 countries. In practice it means that Mexico has been flooded by cheap maize (and other products) produced by North American farmers. This situation made more difficult the position of local producers, especially of the rural peasants who represent a substantial part of the Mexican society. And because the majority of Mexican Indians are traditionally peasants and their culture is also strongly connected with the peasant lifestyle, NAFTA has a negative effect on

native communities. Of course this is not the only reason and we also must take into consideration the lack of land, overpopulation and the cancellation of the Agrarian Reform in 1992[17]. And although the communities have never been closed and static, since 1990's the pace of changes has accelerated.

Questions of territory

Mexico has a population of slightly over 100 million. 10% of the total population are indigenous people. If they want to preserve their own culture, they must face up to the culture of the mestizo majority which is under a strong influence of the West (especially of the USA). This problem is even more specific because when we are talking about the Mexican native culture we must keep in mind that there are still more than 60 native languages in this country and approximately the same number of native cultures. More than 60 Mexican minority cultures represent only 10% of the entire population of the country and on the contrary 90% of the Mexicans share the same major culture. This inequality is emphasized by the fact that there are no united Indian territories in Mexico (like the reservations in USA and Canada) and indigenous people live mostly in dispersed settlements separated from each other not only by the towns and cities (populated mostly by mestizos) but by the mestizo villages, as well. And even more, mestizo people live directly in native villages which also causes internal separation of these communities.

Currently the problem of territory is one of the most visible in native communities which have preferred collective possession of the land since pre-Hispanic times. Post-Independent era in the 19th century with liberal policy and economy which supported private ownership brought the abolition of collective ownership and native communities lost their lands for the benefit of the owners of haciendas. Post-Revolutionary Mexico renewed collective land ownership by the Agrarian Reform which created the so called *ejido* system. *Ejido* signifies an agrarian cooperative which is possessed by the community, not individuals, although in practice peasants worked the fields individually and they cooperated only in relations with the outer world. The law also forbade them to sell the land or to rent it (Cossío Vilegas et al. 1996, 1241, 1250). The cancellation of the Agrarian Reform has caused a decline of *ejido* and since the beginning of 90's it is again possible to rent or even sell collective land (with the agreement of all members of *ejido*). The neo-liberal policy which is very similar to its predecessor in the 19th century imposes a pressure by state and federal government together with multinational companies upon peasant communities to sell their land (in order to build shopping centers or to grow commercial crops). So the native people are again loosing economic bases of their existence and self-sufficiency which has a negative effect on the compactness of their communities and the preservation of their traditions. It means that if the Indians (or any native peoples in the world) want to preserve their cultures they must have a place where they can do it. Loosing their land the possibility of survival of their cultural exceptionality is getting more and more complicated.

Questions of economy and migration

The economic system of Mexican indigenous people is based on agriculture, thus it is closely connected with the problem of territory discussed above. A growing lack of land and also overpopulation has caused a gradual change of the way of gaining of livelihood and even though native communities remain traditionally peasant, not all of their inhabitants have the possibility to live from agriculture. Native communities have stopped to be self-sufficient and

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[17]   Agrarian Reform was declared after the Mexican revolution in 1917 and consists of distribution of the land among the landless peasants (both Indian and mestizo). This land was first taken from haciendas which were definitely cancelled after the revolution. Then the government distributed land from its federal reserves. This process could not be endless and the reform was stopped in 1992 (Hlúšek 2007, 40).

people have to leave their villages to find a job. Primarily they leave for near-by towns from where they return home daily. But it is significant that there are not as many possibilities to find a job in these towns as in the towns and cities lying in the economic centers of the country. For this reason they leave for big cities (Puebla, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Mexico City, etc.) where they hope to find better opportunities. But their effort is not always successful. Because of the lack of education and ignorance of Spanish they mostly get non-qualified bad paid job and many end up on the streets as beggars. In the towns the native Mexicans get in contact with the majority and its habits and culture (influenced by the West, as we have already implied). This contact is demonstrated first of all by the use of Spanish. The Indians very quickly find out that speaking their mother language disqualifies them in the labor market. Because of their native language they have a feeling of inferiority and they are ashamed of it.

The effort of creating a united Mexican nation is typical for Mexico and the idea of mexicanization has been openly or covertly present in its policy since the gaining of independence in 1821, even though this idea has never come true. One of the demonstrations of this policy is the customary marking of native languages as dialects (*dialectos*). All of them are considered to be but dialects in order for the position and role of Spanish as the language (*lengua*) of the Mexican nation to be emphasized. Therefore the Mexican majority looks at native languages often contemptuously, and searching for a job, the Indian must speak Spanish. This policy is also one of the reasons that although Mexico is under a strong influence of globalisation, its inhabitants do not speak English that much (even the young generation) and the position of English as a global and most widespread language in the world is very weak in Mexico. What English means in the global context Spanish means in the context of Mexico and most of Latin America. The secondary but expected result of this situation is the fact that children of recent immigrants to the towns, already born in the urban environment, usually do not speak the mother language of their parents but only Spanish, because they have no opportunity to learn it.

A very special case in the Mexican labor context is the migration to the USA. In Mexican conditions it is a real phenomenon and Mexican native people participate in it. But the relationship of Mexicans in general towards the USA is a bit schizophrenic. Even though they consider the USA to be something like the promised land where better life and better opportunities to find a job are waiting for them, they do not like Americans (or *gringos* as they call them) and they look at the USA only as at the source of money. Currently there are about 30 million Mexican people (including Indians) living and working especially in California, New Mexico, Texas and Arizona (but also in northern states such as Illinois or Pennsylvania) which means that practically every Mexican has a relative in the USA. They have created large Hispanic communities which are self-sufficient to such a degree that most of them even do not speak English although they spend there several years. These immigrants (most of them illegal) always keep in mind where they are from, they never want to stay abroad forever, they keep in touch with their relatives in Mexico to whom they send money and they still consider Mexico to be their motherland and paradise on Earth. Once or twice a year they return to Mexico because of feast days (mostly Easter and Christmas) which always causes chaos on the US-Mexican border. Another direct effect of this immigration in Indian communities is a depopulation of the poorest villages. Almost all of the working adult men make money in the USA and only women and children stay at home[18].

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[18]   We never forget the experience from a small and isolated village called San Gerónimo which is situated in the central part of the state of Puebla. We met there just two adult men (one of them was the owner of the local store) and when we asked him about the others, their answer was: *"Todos se fueron al norte."* (All of them left for the north). The cardinal point of the north became a synonym for the USA.

As we have already mentioned Indians (and Mexicans in general) working in the towns or abroad make an effort to come back home as often as it is possible. The return of these people is always awaited and welcome, they bring, however, with them not only money and different goods but also new opinions and perspectives, they usually criticize local conditions which they consider to be backward. Thus they disrupt traditional contexts in the villages, figuratively said, they bring globalisation right home.

Apart from migration to the towns and the USA the globalisation in the area of economy penetrates directly the indigenous communities by the force of chain stores. These corporations promote the cultivation of monocultures for the needs of market. With the vision of earnings the Indians cultivate for instance coffee, tobacco, citrus fruits or bananas[19], which they produce just for sale and therefore they are very sensitive to any unfavourable situation in the market. Therefore local and global economical crises reach every Indian community because when they cannot sell their crop or they must sell it for too low a price, they cannot buy maize, beans and other foodstuffs which might cause various problems such as indebtedness. And on the contrary, good conditions in the market lead to a certain surplus which is demonstrated by consumerism.

Questions of tourism

Mexico has always been a destination of tourists. But at the beginning of the development of global tourism as a massive phenomenon which was gradually converted into an industry Mexico stood aside of this process and the only exception was Acapulco on the Pacific coast. Since the 1990's this situation has changed and Mexico has become the fifth most visited country in the world. It offers everything what tourists are looking for, including the sea, mountains, pre-Hispanic archaeological sites, colonial towns, museums, native cultures, etc. Globalisation brought about the construction of infrastructure and development of services which are expected by visitors all over the world. Of course, the impact of tourism is visible also in native communities, because their inhabitants participate in tourism and utilise it as a source of income. There are three main items of Mexican tourism – the sea, archaeological sites and outdoor activities. Since the beginning of this century travel agencies have broadened their offer by the so called magic villages (*pueblos mágicos*) which attract tourists because of their unique position but especially because of their unique atmosphere and continuing lifestyle of native inhabitants who live there[20]. The Indians participate in the entire Mexican tourist industry and even though they work for travel agencies as guides, they mostly use tourism for selling their traditional hand-crafted products or just souvenirs. For many of them, especially for those who live close to the tourist centers, tourism represents the most important (and very often the exclusive) source of income and they do not work in agriculture anymore. Visiting archaeological localities and beaches, an unknowing tourist must have the feeling that these places are big market halls where people (Indians as well as mestizos) try to sell everything they can. And although most of the goods are just souvenirs (valueless from the historical and ethnological point of view), it is also true that because of tourists the Indians still produce their traditional hand-crafted products like bows, arrows, baskets, clothes, etc., which they do not use anymore. Mexicans like saying that their country is a country of ruins. There are still plenty of ancient localities which are not archaeologically explored and logically, they become the targets of grave robbers, who excavate them illegally and then try to sell what they find. Thus it is possible to buy really valuable objects but since it is illegal it might be dangerous not only for the sellers but for the buyers, as well.

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[19]   During our fieldwork in Santa Clara Huitziltepec in Central Puebla we found out that the people cultivate mostly coriander for the needs of the chain store called Chedraui.
[20]   For more information see http://www.sectur.gob.mx/wb/sectur/sect_Pueblos_Magicos

Global tourism and its impacts on native Mexican communities manifest themselves in other ways, too. Not only Indians go to the tourists centers to sell their products but the tourists (of course to a lesser degree) come to the native villages to see and experience traditional lifestyles. It is obvious that they can never adapt themselves completely and they bring with themselves the things they are used to use (clothes, shoes, computers, cell phones, cameras, etc.). However, the presence of the tourist in indigenous communities itself represents a certain interference.

The attitude of Indians towards tourism is not unanimous and protracted conflicts between traditionalists and modernists can be found in most villages. Modernists (mostly young people) want to utilise tourism as a source of money, for traditionalists the tourists are strangers who disrupt the harmony of society and communities and desecrate sacred places of theirs and their ancestors[21]. This conflict has been constant for a long time but now, when the tempo of changes is faster, it seems to be more apparent. It is true that tourism brings many possibilities to gain livelihood and it is also true that many traditional habits would disappear without it. Performances of folk customs are another integral part of native participation on tourism and for instance the flying men of Papantla (*voladores de Papantla*) are well known among the tourists. But it is also true that the development of tourism has opened indigenous communities to the outside world and because of it they are getting changed faster.

Questions of informations

One of the substantial parts of the process of globalisation is the development of information technologies and the associated access to information. The modernisation of Indian villages has brought also their electrification which has made possible the extension of TV even to the most isolated communities. This had made information available for most native Mexicans even though many have only a vague notion about the concrete countries from which this information comes[22]. Together with advertisements TV programs represent a powerful opponent of traditional life. People see the modern world which is considered by them to be rich and, of course, they also want to participate in the achievements which this world offers. It is normal that they compare the rich outside world with their poor situation which strengthens their feeling of inferiority. This feeling is also promoted by very popular Mexican (and Latin American in general) soap operas (*telenovelas*) which show only the rich stratum of the Hispanic society, which is represented by white people. In spite of the fact that white people form more or less 2% of the Mexican population, the majority of the actors are white and they are always very rich. Everyday contact with this distorted reality signifies that to be white means to be rich and we experienced many times the situation when a pregnant woman (both Indian and mestizo) hoped she was going to give birth to a white baby.

Apart from the TV we also must take into consideration the rapid development of the internet. During the last decade it has achieved a boom we have never seen for instance in

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[21]   Under these sacred places we understand mostly pre-Hispanic ritual centers (archaeological sites), especially if they are situated close to the current native villages (and it is mostly like that). The natives complain that even though these places were built by their ancestors, they can participate on the profits only indirectly (by selling their products). Apart from it the presence of the tourists desecrates these places which is emphasized by the organization of various performances. As an example we can mention the celebration of spring during vernal equinox in ancient Totonaco town called El Tajín in the state of Veracruz. This famous and beautiful ritual center is visited by thousands of tourists everyday. When we were there shortly before March 21st, the locality was prepared for the celebration which means that cables, lights and speakers were installed in the whole area and young Totonacos were rehearsing performances of traditional dances and songs. The Totonaco elders were complaining that it was only the performance for the tourists and it desecrated the place, young people saw in it the possibility to make some money and they did not want to loose this opportunity.

[22]   For instance they know very well about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq but mostly they do not know where these countries are situated.

Slovakia or the Czech Republic. The internet has reached in practice all villages and significantly decreased their isolation. Every village has something like an internet café or better to say a place (store, library, etc.) with public internet which is very cheap[23]. Information gained via the internet has the influence especially upon young people who use it but just this fact is important for the penetration of globalisation into the native communities.

Questions of ecology

Mexico in general has very severe environmental problems and these problems are heavily felt in Mexican native communities. Even though we do not want to consider Mexico to be a Third World country, there are couple of signs which are typical for this part of the world and which can be found in Mexico. Apart from big social differences it is also a specific attitude toward the environment. We are referring to the exploitation of Mexican natural resources by multinational companies which own water resources (like Coca-cola for instance) or exploit the forests. Deforestation is one of the biggest ecological problems of Mexico and its tempo is very quick because not only multinational companies destroy the forests but Indian and mestizo peasant do the same. The lack of land and overpopulation have created a pressure on the environment and in order to gain land peasants cut trees also on exposed slopes of the mountains which leads to water erosion and devaluation of the soil[24]. Together with industrial activity this has caused the pollution of water, soil and air. Especially water scarcity is becoming more and more visible. In some parts of the country water is disappearing (for instance Central Puebla) and in general streams, rivers and even wells are often polluted. Mexico is not only the country of ruins but also the country of garbage, although we are not glad to say it. Populated areas (towns and villages) are often dirty and this is valid also for native communities. The general extended idea of Indians as ecological people is just an illusion. They have never been that ecological and they have always thrown away things they did not need. But before, these things were made of organic material and they decomposed quickly. Now they use plastic and the environs of Indian villages are polluted by garbage.

Conclusion

Globalisation, connected with economic and cultural expansion of the West, represents a challenge and also a danger to the indigenous communities in Mexico because it promotes the process of modernisation. Conservative indigenous populations, often living on the technological level of the nineteenth century, is facing up to this process hardly because it interferes not only in the economic but also in the social and cultural spheres of Indian life. Today the natives have an access to information unknown before, they participate in tourism and they leave for the towns and the USA in search of better jobs increasingly. Such development has a negative influence on the autochthonous communities and we can expect a significant change of traditional Indian culture in the near future. However, it is hard to say if we will witness only a change or in some cases a definite extinction.

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[23]   The cheapest internet café we found charged 5 pesos per hour, the most expensive 10 pesos. It means that the price is 0,25-0,5 EUR per hour.

[24]   This can be seen on the border with Guatemala. The border is clearly visible because meanwhile the Guatemalan side is woody, the Mexican one is deforested.

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Assyrian Ethnic Identity in a Globalizing World

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Abstract

This article is focused on the manifestations and changes of the Assyrian ethnic identity especially in the 20th and the 21st century. The Assyrian nation is divided into three basic religious branches which are religiously and partially linguistically distinct from each other and which have different political ambitions. In some cases, the Assyrian identity is even discarded by some people considered Assyrians. Nowadays, intra-Assyrian rivalry is globalized because of the existence of numerous diasporas and thematic web pages around the world. The quarrels between Assyrian subgroups complicate advocating national interests and the disunity is often misused by their political opponents. The present paper attempts to explain the roots of intra-Assyrian rivalry, to present various arguments and activities of members of Assyrian groups and scholars and to reveal the political importance of Assyrian identity debate.

Key words: Assyrians, identity, globalisation, transnationalism, conflict

Introduction

In spite of the wide-spread geographical imaginations of the Middle East as an Arabic and Islamic monolith, supported by Western mass media and some Middle Eastern states' high politicians, the Middle East is quite a heterogeneous region. This region comprises numerous ethnic, national, religious, linguistic or ethno-religious groups. The relation between majorities and minorities is the major source of various conflicts in the Middle Eastern area. Most of recent armed conflicts in the Middle East had undoubtedly roots in unsolved minority problems (Maoz 1999). Suffice it to mention the impact of the Iraq-Iran war on the Assyrians living in the Middle East or the Iraqi and Turkish anti-Kurdish military actions and the civil war between quarrelling Kurdish fractions in Iraqi Kurdistan. It appears that most of post-Ottoman states have not yet evolved a national identity which would encompass their multi-ethnic societies in their entirety.

The theme of contemporary Assyrians is highly politicized and controversial, because Middle Eastern states usually consider the treatment of minorities as their internal question, deny any discrimination or deny the existence of any type of minorities in their territory. Middle Eastern states' attitude is understandable, because the question of discriminated minorities could be misused as the instrument of foreign policy made by Western powers (Kumaraswamy 2003). However, not only national states complicate Assyrian self-determination. The Assyrian nation is divided into three religious sub-groups which have different political interests. In some cases, the Assyrian ethnicity is even discarded by some people considered Assyrian which in turn is taken advantage of by age-long opponents of Assyrians.

Globalisation and identity

Globalisation is a process of the integration of economic, technological, political, social and other activities at global level. Globalisation creates connections between distant places and time and space are commmpressed due to technological advances. Some authors even speak of the end of geography (O'Brien 1992). Globalisation is not only the uniting power which attempts to create one global nation, but it also creates, protects or proliferates various identities which could be quite traditional. We can speak about the globalisation of local indigenous culture. Globalisation contributed to the erosion of identities such as citizenship and replaced them by an identity based on ethnicity, language etc. This process of erosion of national identity along with the dissemination of human rights means a threat for repressive national states pretending to be homogenous.

Since the 1990s, we can observe a global rise of emancipation activities of downtrodden national, ethnic, linguistic, religious and ethno-religious groups. Unfortunately, these activities often involved images of past suffering, injustices and political symbolism and resulted in armed clashes. From a socio-cultural perspective, globalisation builds a transnational relationship between various locales, especially because of the expansion of the mass media and the internet. These conquests of the postmodern era contributed to the de-centering of identities. An individual became more involved in the process of increasing mutuality of the world and became engaged in many dialogues, often contradictory and hardly intelligible. This has a direct impact on individual's identity (Croucher 2003).

Basic facts about Assyrians

Assyrians are an ethnically, linguistically and religiously distinct minority in the Middle Eastern region. Assyrians are the only autochtonous Middle Eastern Christian group without own state. Assyrians constitute autochtonous minorities in Iraq (600 000 Assyrians in the so-called Assyrian triangle in the north of Iraq and in Baghdad and Mosul), Syria (120 000 Assyrians in al-Jazeera district), Iran (50 000 Assyrians in the Urmiya region and in large cities) and Turkey (20 000 Assyrians in southeastern vilayets and in Istanbul). The cited numbers are estimates based on author's analysis made in 2008. The accessible censuses are usually outdated and untrustworthy, because the surveyed states pretend to be homogenous. On the other hand, churches tend to exaggerate the number of their members. Middle Eastern Assyrians inhabit the territory occupied by their age-long rivals the Kurds who do not have their own state either, but who have a stronger backing by world powers. Assyrians also live in diaspora in the USA, Sweden, Jordan, Germany, Australia, Canada, Russia and Armenia.

Assyrians are probably descended from the Arameanized and Christianized ancient Semitic Assyrians; however, for my research the feeling to be Assyrian, rather than genetic or cultural origin, is important and connects the majority of Aramean-speaking people. Assyrians have been relatively successful in resisting long-term islamization, arabization, turkization, persization, and kurdification and in keeping alive their authentic languages, religious and cultural traditions and a sense of national belonging. Assyrians speak various dialects of Neo-Aramean (all these languages are derived from old Aramean which was the lingua franca of the Middle East), nevertheless in the Middle Eastern region bilingualism is typical for the Assyrian people. In some cases Neo-Aramean dialects were replaced by the language of the majority in daily communication and in liturgy too. Nowadays, the Assyrian community, as other Middle Eastern Christian minorities, faces many hardships. The biggest problem is pressumably massive emigration to the neighbouring countries and then to the West caused by the unsatisfactory social status in Middle Eastern countries. Assyrians are often the target of discrimination, especially in post-war Iraq and surprisingly in Turkey which attempts to enter the EU.

Assyrians and their alternative names

The numerous troubles Assyrians experienced during the centuries of Islamic superiority did not unite all Assyrian subgroups (Lewis 2000). Nowadays, Assyrians are also known as Chaldeans, Syriacs or Syrians (not to be confused with the Syrian nationality), Jacobites, Nestorians, Syro-Chaldeans, Assyro-Chaldeans, Chaldo-Assyrians (with or without a hyphen) and Chaldean Assyrian Syriac people. These different names have religious, historical and doctrinal backgrounds and some of them represent only a part of the Assyrian people. The emergence of Assyrian nationalism and the revival of the name Assyrian is connected with the excavations of ancient Assyrian monuments in Mesopotamia and with the activities of the Roman Catholic, Protestant or Russian Orthodox missionaries in the 19th century. The Assyrian nationalism always stood in a direct opposition to Pan-Arabism or Pan-Turkism. There are many heated debates about the identity of the Assyrian people among Assyrians and among academics from various social sciences – no consensus has been reached on the question of whether Assyrians form one group, or if they form multiple groups of people with different identities.

I will prefer to use the name Assyrians in this article, as the Israeli orientalist Mordechai Nisan does, because this short name, in my humble opinion, embodies the collective ethnicity of Aramean-speaking Christians and includes the primary religious groups under one Assyrian nation which existed long time before Christianity (Nisan 2002). I appreciate the words of the Chaldean patriarch Mar Raphael I. Bedawid who said: 'I am Assyrian. I myself, my sect is Chaldean, but ethnically, I am Assyrian. That does not mean I should mix everything.' (Petrosian 2006, 117) On the other hand, the Chaldean American scholar Shak Hanish prefers the name Chaldean Assyrian Syriac people which does not superordinate any of Aramean-speaking groups (Hanish 2008). This term is becoming more popular and it was used in the last US census. It is obvious that Hanish as a Chaldean Catholic denies Assyrian nationalism. In 2003 the Iraqi political party ADM (Assyrian Democratic Movement) officially started to favour ChaldoAssyrian compromise term, but this term was rejected mainly by the Middle Eastern churches.

The division of Assyrians
The Assyrian nation is divided on religious grounds into three subgroups:
- Nestorians (Assyrians) – adherents of the AssyrianChurch of the East and the AncientChurch of the East
- Chaldeans – adherents of the Chaldean Catholic Church
- Syriacs – adherents of the Syriac Orthodox Church (Jacobites) and the Syriac Catholic Church

This division is based on religion which still plays an important role in Assyrians' life. Although there are some atheists among Assyrians, they are usually associated with specific communities based on the adherence to a concrete religious sect.

Syriacs and Chaldeans sometimes break the Assyrian unity and deny their Assyrian ethnicity, they do not want to be marked as Assyrians and they construct their own ethnic identities which will be closely analyzed in the following text.

Nestorians
Nestorians (Assyrians) are adherents of the dyophysitic AssyrianChurch of the East, one of the oldest Middle Eastern Churches, or adherents of the AncientChurch of the East (approximately 5 % of Nestorians) which was separated from the AssyrianChurch of the East because of the reforms of new patriarchs. The patriarchal see of the AssyrianChurch of the East is located in Morton Groove in Illinois since the 1930s, because of the massacres of Nestorians commited in interwar Iraq. The patriarchal see of the AncientChurch of the East is placed in Baghdad (Nisan 2002). In daily communication Nestorians use the language called

sureth (Assyrian or neo-Aramean). Nestorians are a coherent group which steadily declares Assyrian ethnicity, which is considered to be the heritage of the glorious Assyrian Empire, and often includes non-Nestorian groups under Assyrian ethnicity. Assyrian antiquity was also demonstrated by introducing the Assyrian calendar and the Assyrian national flag.

Nestorians are undoubtedly the most active group in supporting Assyrian nationalism (Assyrianism), Assyrian emancipation, Assyrian territorial rights and Pan-Assyrian ideas. They are also extremely active in human rights campaigns and they attempt to make public all anti-Assyrian violence. They supported the idea of an independent Assyrian state for Nestorians, Chaldeans and Syriacs after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and nowadays they initiate Assyrian autonomous tendencies in northern Iraq. Nestorians were always known as great warriors and persistent opponents of Islamic central governments. Nestorian tribal armed groups (Assyrian Levies) were used by the British to control Mesopotamia and to supress Arab and Kurdish rebelions during the Iraqi Mandate (Petrosian 2006). This Nestorian stance increased the hatred of Muslims against Nestorians which led into anti-Nestorian pogroms in the 30s of the 20th century. These massacres caused massive Nestorian emigration to the West. Afterwards, Chaldean Catholics became the largest Christian group in Iraq. For example, Saddam Hussein did not like rebellious Nestorians, but he had quite good relations with Chaldeans who defined themselves as Arabs. Nestorians were members of the INC (Iraqi National Congress), organization composed of Shia Muslim, Kurdish, Assyrian and Turkmen opposition groups with US support. Assyrianism meets resistence as the result of the confesional differences of Assyrian people. Especially Chaldeans usually fight against the idea of Assyrianism. Nestorians view disloyal Chaldeans as the traitors of the Assyrian nation, as the collaborators with Arabs or as the agents of Vatican. We should realize that Chaldeans signed an union with Rome and were separated from the AssyrianChurch of the East.

Assyrianism is politically represented by the ADM (Assyrian Democratic Movement), the BNDP (Bet-Nahrain Democratic Party) in Iraq, the ADO (Assyrian Democratic Organization, Mtakasta) in Syria and globally by the the AUA (Assyrian Universal Alliance) which is a member of the UNPO (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization). Apart from these organizations, there are many others, especially in the USA and the EU and their members lobby Western governments effectively.

Chaldeans

Chaldeans are members of the Chaldean Catholic Church which fully recognized papal authority in the 16th century. The patriarchate of the Chaldean Catholic Church is located in Baghdad. Chaldeans use the Chaldean language (Chaldean neo-Aramean), but in Arab countries they are often arabized. The term Chaldean was chosen to distinguish them from the adherents of the AssyrianChurch of the East. Chaldeans were an ancient Mesopotamic nation which destroyed the Assyrian Empire. Contemporary Chaldeans were usually more loyal to their rulers than Nestorians. The Chaldean Tarif Aziz, a Baathist, was the prime minister of Iraq and a close collaborator of Saddam Hussain (Nisan 2002). The notorious Iraqi dictator employed many Chaldeans who opposed the US led invasion to Iraq. Generally, many Chaldeans are vehement opponents of Assyrian nationalism and they identify themselves with the Chaldean nation or they describe themselves as Arab Christians. For example, Chaldeans accuse Nestorians of blasphemy because of their heightening of old Assyrian pagan heritage and traditions. Chaldean nationalism (Chaldeanism) is politically represented by the CDUP (Chaldean Democratic Union Party) in Iraq.

Syriacs

Syriacs are members of the Syriac Orthodox Church (Jacobites) or the Syriac Catholic Church. The patriarchal see of the Syriac Orthodox Church is located in Damascus and the see of the Syriac Catholic Church is located in Beirut. The Syriac ancestral language is turoyo (Syriac), but nowadays they use mostly Arabic (in Syria and Iraq) and Turkish (in Turkey). Syriacs face repressions especially in Turkey which was never a congenial home for Christians. Turkish struggles against Kurdish guerrillas persuaded many Syriacs to flee the country. Turkish Syriacs are forbidden to teach their language. Syriacs are devided over the question of identity, some of them are loyal to Assyrianism, others support the idea of the Aramean identity for all Aramean speaking people (Arameanism). Arameanism considers even Lebanese Maronites as Arameans (Aramean Democratic Organization 2009). We can also note the self-description as Arab Christians. Arameanism is politically represented by the international organizations ArDO (Aramean Democratic Organization) and SUA (Syriac Universal Alliance).

Inter-Assyrian conflicts in cyberspace

Assyrians have their own satellite television channel broadcasting from the USA, the Ashur TV, which is close to the ideas of Assyrianism. There are hundreds of websites concerning the question of the Assyrian identity, not only official web pages of Assyrian political organizations, but also various blogs, forums and chats. Communities from various parts of the world are connected by the internet and they share their opinions and identities. We can speak about digital diasporas. Assyrian emigrants are extremely active on the web where they support their oppressed brothers living in the Middle East, nevertheless it is usually a solidarity of Nestorians with Nestorians or Chaldeans with Chaldeans. Intra-Assyrian conflicts are widespread on the web where members of rival groups are viewed as traitors and propagandists.

Political consequences of Assyrian disunity

The Assyrian disunity complicates advocating interests of the Assyrian people, too many Assyrian organizations exist and attempt to push their particular interests. Nowadays, the Assyrian disunity is noticeable in Iraq where Assyrians want to establish the Assyrian autonomous area in Niniveh Plains. Assyrians often point out the example of Kurdish autonomy. The reasons for which Kurds in Iraq got the right of self-determination could be applicable for Assyrians, a distinct people which have a cohesive identity minimally as long as their Kurdish neighbours. Article 125 of the Iraqi contitution deals with *'administrative, political, cultural and educational rights of various nationalities, such as Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and all other constituents'* (Iraqi Constitution 2005). The autonomous region should be a safe haven for Christians from the entire Iraq. Nestorians support this proposal, but this plan has many opponents among Syriacs and especially Chaldeans who speak about an Assyrian ghetto. They claim that Christians should be present among the non-Christian population, fulfill religious missions and participace in interreligious dialogue. However, the Assyrian autonomous area should not be a safe home only for Christians, but also for moderate Muslims and minorities like Yezidis, Shabaks, Turkmen and Armenians. Nevertheless, the Assyrian autonomous region is still an ambitious project, although some rather concrete proposals exists. A clear Assyrian attitude and approval by the central parliament are still needed for it to come into existence.

Conclusions

Assyrians pre-date state formation in the Middle East and they overcame many hardships. Nowadays, Assyrians and their survival in Middle Eastern region are evidently endangered by their increasing emigration and persisting disunity. Assyrian subgroups have

too often opposite interests in specific affairs and they are limited by agelong hostility too. It is paradoxial that a minority nation which is a target of Islamic hostility for centuries is so fragmented although there exists some weak Pan-Assyrian solidarity. Nowadays, intra-Assyrian rivalry is enhanced by nationalist mass media and websites. There are also some unifying activities, such as the proposal for a compromise national term Chaldo-Assyrian, but they are not much successful. I suppose that the term Chaldean Assyrian Syriac people could become the solution of terminological controversies. The preservation of the Assyrian demographic integrity still belongs to the main goals of this ancient nation.

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The Chameleon`s Jinking. The Druze Political Adaptation in Lebanon

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Abstract
The paper examines the Druze political adaptation and its allegiances on the Lebanese as well as international scene. It focuses on the two paramount leaders of the Jumblatt clan who are the key representatives of the Lebanese Left.

Keywords: Jumblatt, Druze, Lebanon

Here on these mountains, sun and wind commingle.
Everything becomes silence and color.
The Shuf is a noble solitary bird
with white veils and the gestures of death.
[Shuf, abbreviated, Tuéni Nadia Lebanon Poems of Love and War]

Hereby, in order to establish a common national identity during the roaring inferno of the Lebanese civil war, Nadia Tuéni poetically describes the mountainous region of Shuf, a Druze territory and a piece of the Lebanese multisectarian mosaic imaginatively shaped in a white, yellow, blue, red and green coloured symbol of the Druze star. Allegorically, the noble solitaires could symbolize the two representatives of the Jumblatts, white veils could symbolize the ambiguity of the Druze policy and allegiancies, and the gestures of death point out the ubiquitous reflections of the everyday reality. The following paper focuses on the Druze ethnoreligious minority and its role in the Lebanese political circles.

The Druze represent about 7% of the Lebanese population and thus form the fourth largest community (Shatzmiller 2005). Their syncretic religion, an offshot of the Ismailiyya branch of Islam, encompasses elements of Zoroastrism, Pythagorianism, Christianity, Judaism and Islam. It was established in the 11th century when the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim proclaimed his divinity and considered himself an incarnation of God. The fear of persecution forced his adherents to seek a refuge in remote areas. The mountains of Lebanon were geographically determined to serve as a religious haven, although migration to Lebanon can be seen as a long process caused by various reasons. The idea of depicting Lebanon as a refuge and a haven for freedom traces its roots back to the early years of the French Mandate when the Jesuit Orientalist Lammens constructed the image of *l'asile du Liban* (Lammens in Salibi 1971, 85). As an alternative to Phoenicianism supported only by Lebanese Christians this justification of Lebanese identity was accepted by the Druzes as well as Shiites who fled from persecution also. Whereas it presumed the Sunnites as persecutors, later when Sunni Muslims from Iraq, Syria and other countries sought refuge in Lebanon this bitter sensation of being guilty has successively evaporated. Nevertheless, Sunnis still maintain a reserved attitude (Salibi 1971). The Druze are often considered as a Shi`a sect and often counted as Muslims despite their own non-Muslim identity, considering themselves Arabs especially for political reasons or of Arabic and Kurdish stock (Von Oppenheim in Abu Izzeddin 1993, 10) or Arabs grafted on mountain Arameic population (Hogarth, Bell in Abu Izzeddin 1993, 10). As Landfeld

Ostrovitz points out, various dubious theories of Druzes' origin, regardless of their significance, connecting Druzes with the Chinese, the Druids, and a lost Crusader army, together with their esoteric religion have often made their status in the Arab world somewhat controversial and sensitive (Lanfeld Ostrovitz 1983, 273). Unity, mutual security, endogamy and family clans were always pillars of survival in a threatening environment. Solidarity is based on the concept of the metempsychosis. If a Druze dies his soul appears in another body. Social mechanism of taqiyya or dissimulation teaches that telling the truth is politeness, not obligation. Thus, a white lie, what is understood to be a sign of caution, is not unethical. (Nisan 2002, 97) The concept of taqiyya, endogamy and ban on proselytizing have made them a close cohesive group loyal to their amirs and shayks and they have often opposed the regimes under which they lived. (Lazarus-Yafe in Lanfeld Ostrovitz 1983, 272-273)

The southern Lebanon mountains inhabited by the Druze population used to enjoy relative security during the medieval and modern eras. The Druze population at that time was comprised of two groups, the Qaysi and the Yemenis. In comparison with other areas the Mamluk rulers of Egypt and Syria exceptionally recognized hereditary feudal tenure in the Druze mountains to secure the loyalty of the Druze warlike chieftains. In the beginning of the 16th century when the Ottomans conquered the former Mamluk possession, the Druze were permitted to maintain their privileges under a paramount emir who was charged with the maintenance of order, dispensation of justice, and the collection and transmission of the revenue. Stability and security in southern Lebanon under the Druze emir attracted Maronite Christians from northern Lebanon to live under the emirs' protection. (Salibi 1971, 76) Fakhr ad-Din II (1585-1635), a paramount Druze historical leader from the Qaysi group, opposed the Ottoman Turks, established an emirate in Lebanon and is remembered as an enlightened ruler who brought prosperity, security, religious tolerance to Lebanon and, furthermore, maintained close links with the European aristocracy. In the 18th century the Shihabi emirs were continually trespassing on the traditional privileges of the mainly Druze chiefs. When emir Bashir II got involved in the struggle between the Egyptian Mohammad Ali Pasha who attempted to conscript them and the Ottomans, it brought about his downfall in 1840. A conflict between the Druzes and Christians brought the Lebanese emirate to its knees. The vacuum that was left brought twenty years of sectarian massacres among Druzes and Christians. The European engagement helped to establish the mutasarifiyah where governors were appointed in a rotating fashion on the basis of religious or ethnic group membership (Lanfeld Ostrovitz 1983, 273-274).

The Druzes are an important unsubstitutable element of the Lebanese history. The 1943 National Pact designed in favor of the Maronites dimished their role and bounded them by the constitution and parliamentary elections. Soon after, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) was founded in 1949 and, indeed, has served as a Druze platform in political arena. The PSP is socialist by doctrine in order to gain wider voter support but founded on religious grounds with a remarkable position of the Jumblatt family. The Jumblatts have been counted among prominent Druze families, in a society where family links are almost the most important portfolio element for any political engagement. Its roots trace back to Ali Janbalad, a Kurdish governor of Aleppo, who wanted political autonomy from the Ottoman rule. He maintained links with Fakhr al-Din II from the Druze Ma'n dynasty. Both sustained connections to Western Europe. Janbalad was backed by Tuscany and Fakhr al-Din II by the Papacy. After overthrowing the Tripoli administrator and proclaiming independence Janbalad was forced to seek a refuge in Mount Lebanon where he joined Fakhr al-Din II and married into the Druze community (Harris 2003, 106). Apart from the Jumblatts there was another traditional clan representing the Druzes on the political level - the Arslans, a land-based clan which took the anti-reformist political line and was threatened by Kamal`s revolutionary attempts. (Richani 1990b, 27)

Kamal Jumblatt (1917-1977) was a socialist idealist influenced by the European left movement. Jill Crystal (Crystal 1990, 283) characterized him as a dialectician who perceived politics as a game and revolution as a calculated adventure and played a maverick role in the political circles. Furthermore, his socialist devotion not only materialized in his socialist experiments in his home village of Moukhtara, where he introduced socially fair employment conditions in his private bookshops, but brought him to the forefront of Druze community support in the 1940s. His political claims not only opposed president El-Khoury but, moreover, took anti-system position and thus brought him closer to Palestinian interests. He built on the pillars of Arab nationalism to secure Lebanese raison d'être after gaining its independence, he attempted to introduce secularization by abolishing sectarian representation in public offices, and he promoted political freedoms, economic planning and the Gandhian philosophy of direct action. Finally, due to corruption and sectarian divisions caused by the 1943 National Pact Kamal became convinced that the system could not be reformed from inside.

Kamal, known as a feudal socialist lord (Crystal 1990, 283) was apparently dedicated to be a paramount critic of the regime. Thus, in spite of El-Khoury resignation and his replacement by Camille Chamoun, a former socialist candidate, who soon became pro-western oriented in the international ambience of superpower competition, Kamal changed sides and joined the opposition. After the 1957 election loss he played a leading role in public disturbances and militia fights of the presidential opposition which lead to the intervention of the American Marines at the presidential request. As a political compromise the army general Chehab was appointed to the presidential post where he promoted particular changes in favor of Kamal, especially curtailing traditional bosses from the government-employment process. After spending three years as a Minister of Education he failed to introduce his reform plan to put an end to the class hegemony of the capitalists over masses and sought his position in the opposition again. (Crystal 1990) The 1960s were influenced by a regional allegiance shift. The breakdown of the Syrian – Egyptian common socialistic venture and the 1967 Arab defeat produced a power imbalance which promoted Palestinian resistance used by Kamal to strengthen socialist positions. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and their activities from the Lebanese soil brought the Lebanese relative political stability (Rubin B., Rubin J.C. 2005). Kamal was appointed the minister of the interior which empowered him later to legalize several leftist political parties. Since 1970s he devoted himself to work for the PSP as a result of voter support decline. Not surprisingly, his last years were his most remarkable career period and he became a prominent leader of the Lebanese left. The PLO activities are considered as a major accelerator of the Lebanese civil war (Rubin B., Rubin J.C. 2005, 95) which was considered by Kamal as a historic opportunity to transform the Lebanese confessional system. (Jumblatt in Crystal 1990, 289)

Not surprisingly, Walid Jumblatt replaced Kamal after his assassination allegedly by Syrians who had prevented him to form the Left-PLO platform. Richani (1990, 289-290) distinguishes between two categories of critics of Kamal Jumblatt. The first group saw him as a utopian thinker, the second one warned that he wanted to blur the sectarian division and furthermore he aspired to the presidency, a post which was constitutionally performed by Christian Maronites. Druze politics can be judged as a pragmatic outcome of a culturally and religiously fragmented political system. Crow (1980) tried to identify the main features of the Lebanese political behavior. Primary, he pointed out the identification with their religious community where the religious community serves also as a social reference group. Thus, a religious community represents a nation for many Lebanese. In fact, the Druze religious community was de facto autonomous for the long period during the Ottoman rule and religious communalism characterized the Constitution of 1926 and the 1943 National Pact.

Walid eventually succeeded his father as the head of the PSP. As a prominent figure of the Lebanese National Movement Walid Jumblatt struck a coalition with the PLO and Syrians, their former foes, in reaction to regional and international conditions. (Richani 1990) Before the Israeli invasion to Lebanon in 1982 he had already consolidated his leadership within the Druze community. The Israeli invasion led to the occupation of Shuf and introduced a carrot-and-stick policy. The Israelis tried to persuade Druzes to collaborate and deployed the Christian right-wing militia in Shuf. Consequently, Jumblatt kept collaborating with Syria from which he received weapons. One year later Jumblatt launched a campaign against Gemayel's peace treaty with Israel. The Christian militia had been defeated in Shuf. Moreover, within the Druze community certain power shifts occured which strengthened Walid's position. In 1983 Majid Arslan, his political adversary, died without leaving any strong successor. Furthermore, Walid could consolidate some of the Druze economic elites to play a more supportive role and linked them with the PSP (Richani 1990b, 27). In 1983, just six years after Kamal's burial, Landfield Ostrovitz prophetized that Walid *is presently seen as a pivotal figure in the future of the country* (Landfield Ostrovitz 1983, 278). Thenceforth, he has confirmed his paramount status among Lebanese politicians.

After the civil war he tactically chose to be an ally of the Damascus dictator. This was a step that allowed him to maintain his influence and increase legitimacy in Lebanese politics (Moubayed 2000), rather than follow his father's fate. Whilst his father elegantly balanced between idealism and realism, Walid seemed to be a very realistic pragmatic in both regional and international political circles. Voicing strong opinions on pan-arabism, socialism and Israel, Walid occupied various ministerial seats during the post-war period while keeping silent about his father's death. Staying on the Damascene side during the Israeli invasion in 1982 strengthened his prominent leadership among the Druzes in Assad's eyes. Being backed by Hafez Assad thenceforth Jumblatt achieved a secure unshakable position even when the relations with the president Lahoud got worse. (Moubayed 2000) The Ta'if Accords implicating political reforms were signed in 1990 and, thus, put an end to the Lebanese civil war, changing the 1943 sectarian representations and reestablishing control of the Lebanese government over its territory through dismantling and disarming sectarian militias and redeployment of Syrian forces in Beka'a Valley. Ultimately, the Lebanese administration approved Syrian garancies of the Taif Accords by virtue of its participation in the Gulf war coalition against Iraq. The disarming of the Druze militia was not welcomed by Druze leaders but, in contrast to the Maronite General Aoun, they did not resist with arms. In the reconciliation ambience, former militia leaders, including Jumblatt, were offered ministerial portfolios in the newly established SecondRepublic under Syrian supervision (Atlas, Licklider 1999)

Shortly before the start of the new millenium, two significant events occured thatchallenged the previous status quo. The Israeli government had withdrawn its army from southern Lebanon and, thus, the only foreign deployed military forces, that continued their presence, was the Syrian army. The redeployment of non-Lebanese troops was also a subject of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 520 in1982. In June the only army persisting on the Lebanese soil was the Syrian one making its presence more targeted and continuously losing its populist raison d`être. Furthermore, the strongly ruling authoritarian Syrian president Hafez Assad died and was replaced by his son Bashar. At first glance a new moderate regime encouraged new challenges to Syrian occupation of Lebanon and questioned the continuation of Syrian military presence. Anti-Syrian voices had an economic dimension also. Syrian workers without work permits and paying no taxes significantly worsened the situation on the domestic labour market and the policy of dumping prices harmed local production (Gambill 2001). Although Walid declared his support for the Hafez Assad's successor, empowered by his victory in the September election, Jumblatt shifted the sides

pragmatically to enter into the emerging anti-Syrian coalition alongside the Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and the Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and the Maronite Patriarch Boutrous Sfeir in November 2000. The pressure on the reappraisal of Lebanese-Syrian relation was felt throughout the political spectrum, of course, without the support of the Syrian based parties. Thus, after more than 20 years spent in the pro-Syrian camp, he returned to tread in his assasinated father's steps of critics of the Syrian occupation. Moreover, Jumblatt started to support Syrian Druzes in their uprising against Bedouins which was classified as an interference into the Syrian internal affairs and Damascus put an end to his VIP position. (Moubayed 2000)

Furthermore there was a stalemate on the international scene. The failure of Syrian-Israeli negotiations brokered by the U.S. administration diminished any potential changes for Lebanon. In the ambience of frustration and anger Gibran Tueni, the Lebanese journalist, wrote an open letter for the Damascene ruler, a sharp criticism of the Syrian hegemony over Lebanon which had broken a taboo and triggered a public challenge to the regime. (Gambill 2001) The assesination of the Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, together with the other initiatives, stimulated the subsequent Cedar Revolution (Moshoah 2009 online). Internal pressure from the newly emerged March 14 Movement backed by the U.N. Resolution called for the Syrian withdrawal. After a series of murders of Syrian critics, shortly after Gibran Tueni was killed, Walid Jumblatt demanded regime change in Syria publicly. Although he continued on criticising Syria and Hezbollah, which the U.S. wanted to neutralize, Jumblatt knew he was skating on a thin ice when he denounced Hezbollah for the abduction of two Israeli soldiers. Thus, being threatened by Hassan Nasrallah he tried to be a middleman and get Hezbollah out from its isolation. After the May 2008 clashes in Beirut and Shuf and, above all, after signing the Doha Accords Jumblatt's criticism of Hezbollah has become more tacit. A few months ago one of the loudest supporters of the U.S. administration turned into an ally of the anti-American March 8 Coalition. While his discourse has started to stress Arab nationalism, before the May 2008 events he had opted for the primacy of the Lebanese entity. Such extreme repolarization shifts were neither rare nor surprising. In summer 2009 he announced his withdraval from the March 14 coalition. His rapprochement with Hezbollah supported by Syria and Iran was justified by getting Syria out of Lebanon and, nowadays, he argues that the Socialist Party must be returned to its leftist platform. His turnabout could be considered as very logical in view of the international situation. After the Damascus involvement in the American counter-terrorist operation, the U.S.were no longer interested in Syrian-U.S. confrontations. As al-Jazeera commented on him, [Jumblatt is] a political animal who knows how to get off a ship before it sinks.

Conclusions

The paper deals with the Jumblatts represented by Kamal Jumblatt and his son Walid. Kamal was a socialist idealist influenced by the European left. The more legible Kamal used to collaborated with the Syrians and his distancing from the Damascene dictator probably passed a death sentence on him. Walid has learned from his father's mistake and performed an alliance with Syria. Although he commented on his collaborative strategy as an adaptation, this collaboration has brought him a remarkable political career. In contrast to Kamal, Walid is a socialist-realist who abandons his socialist program in need. Being a weathervane of the Lebanese politics, his political success could be explained by the taqiyya's mechanism of allegiances that maintain his political importance.

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States in a globalising world

Ivory Coast - From Stability to Collapse. Failed States in Time of Globalisation

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Abstract
The number of states that can be considered as failed is growing. Such a phenomenon occured as one of the results of globalisation processes. Our paper examines the case of Ivory Coast as an example of how global changes turned a relatively prosperous country into a failed state.

Key words: democratization, failed state, globalisation, Ivory Coast

Currently, to explain conflicts in Africa that lead to the collapse of a state, the argument most frequently used is the ethnic heterogeneity of such artificially created units. In relation to that, one could expect the creation of separatist movements or movements for the integration of ethnic groups divided by a border, which, however, in Africa, is not a more frequent event than in other parts of the world. It is therefore possible to assume that the reasons for the destabilisation of African states are more complex and require a deeper analysis.

A number of countries that we find on the political map of Africa, basically as states as we know them from our European empirical experience, no longer work. Governments have not been able to secure for the population the basic functions of a state – safety, the rule of law or a functional economic system. Those states were gradually carved out between local rulers, who control their territories militarily and economically. Such a catastrophic scenario has found and is finding its realisation in a number of African countries. None of the fighting sides has been able to enforce the legitimacy of the state, so the 'government' has often controlled only the capital.

Such a development has also affected countries that, until the 1990's, were distinguished by their political stability. They also include Ivory Coast, which had been considered to be one of the most stable countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa just ten years ago. Today's situation is quite the opposite. On the basis of the last *failed states index*, published annually by the *Foreign Policy* magazine, Ivory Coast has occupied the 11th place among the countries in which the situation is the worst in terms of the stability of the state and in 2005 it was even at the first place.

For many years, Ivory Coast was considered to be a country that, according to the African standards, achieved a political and economic miracle. Like in other African countries after the declaration of their independence, also in Ivory Coast a one-party system, led by the 'founding father' Félix Houphouët-Boigny, was created and it was based on the elimination of the opposition. That seemingly secured inter-ethnic peace and stability as well. In reality,

however, it only suppressed future problems. Such regimes were supported by both sides of the bipolar global system.

In the territory of today's Ivory Coast, the French influence started to spread from the 17th century. The territory of today's Ivory Coast was constituted as a French colonial territory in March 1893. In 1904 it was included into a system of colonies, called the French West Africa. It was part of that union until 1956, when it was divided into autonomous colonial units, which also included Ivory Coast. From the French perspective, that reform was advantageous, as the smaller units were more dependent on the colonial metropolis.Ivory Coast maintained its position of the economically most significant French dependent territory in West Africa.

The local political leader F. Houphouët-Boigny, who occupied a ministerial position in the after-war French governments, was aware of that position. The economic level of the country played a significant role in the period of the disintegration of the French colonial system. Ivory Coast, under Boigny's leadership, was aware of its economic significance and tried to confirm its dominant position among the former French West African colonies also by its refusal to join the FrenchCommonwealth at the moment of gaining independence. Despite that fact, France maintained significant influence in the country, which showed not just in the mutual diplomatic relations, but also in the military presence in the colonial capital, even after the decolonization of Ivory Coast. Besides that, President Boigny, in contrast with other African leaders, did not eliminate the French presence in the country. That presence contributed to the effectiveness of the functioning of the economy, with the support of an authoritative regime and power and political monopoly (see Řehák 2003).

After the declaration of independence on 7 August 1960, France thus maintained its political, military and economic influence in Ivory Coast. A relatively large French community, consisting mostly of highly qualified experts, continued to live in the country. The government's economic strategy in the first decades of the independence focused on the modernisation of agriculture (especially of export industries), while the industrialisation (with the exception of food and wood-processing industries) was put off to a later time. The colonial economic structure, which was reflected especially in the structure of the foreign trade, was thus effectively preserved.

From the political perspective, the country was characterized by its stability, whereby it differed from other countries for more than thirty years, not just in West Africa, but also around the whole continent. That stability was provided by a system of one party – the Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (*Parti démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire,* PDCI) headed by a strong leader, as Boigny was. In the course of the development, that system successfully strengthened itself. The political stability contributed significantly to the economic development, which encouraged the government-supported immigration of the workforce from the poorer neighbouring countries, in particular from Upper Volta (later renamed to Burkina Faso). The creation of a populous immigration communitiy, however, created preconditions for the disruption of the political stability in the country.

The one-party rule, however, resisted the destabilisation of the regime until the 1990s, despite the sporadic manifestations of discontent. Despite that, it can be stated that, already at that time, preconditions for later problems were created. In particular there was non-symetrical re-distribution of state investments, which were directed preferentially to the southern parts of the country. The ethnic and confessional differences between the north and the south of the country created background for the discontent among the population in the north of Ivory Coast, which interpreted the slowing of the development of that region as a consequence of ethnic discrimination.

By the end of the 1970s, Ivory Coast maintained a stable economic growth and only in the 1980, under the effect of changes in the world prices of export commodities (especially of

cocoa), a crisis in Ivory Coast's economy and protests of the population started. A decrease in revenues from exports was also accompanied by a rise in the servicing of the debt, which significantly complicated the economic situation of the country. After 1980, Boigny's regime reacted to that development with limited democratising measures and economic reforms (diversification of agriculture, growth in investments into the previously neglected northern regions). Despite that, manifestations of the civil discontent occurred (student demonstrations in 1982), which, however, did not endanger the stability of the regime.

The attempted democratisation of Ivory Coast meant a destabilisation of the country. The first free elections took place in November 1990 and were won by until-then-governmental party PDCI, led by until-then-President Boigny. In the presidential election, he defeated the representative of the opposition, Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, who had been his political opponent since the start of the 1980s. After his death, his office was taken over by Henri Konan Bédié, who was supposed to be at the helm of the state until the next election in October 1995. He was confirmed in that position in the election. The PDCI also maintained its dominant position. The opposition boycotted the election because of the condition that only a person of Ivorian descent of his parents and with a five-year uninterrupted residence in Ivory Coast could run for presidency.

President Bédié's government was composed mainly of politicians from the southern central part of the country. Representatives of the mostly Muslim north were marginalised, which created internal political tension. In 1994, Alassane Dramane Ouattara stood in the lead of the Muslim opposition. The government, however, questioned his Ivorian origin, so he did not run as a candidate in the elections in 2000 and 2005.

In December 1999, the democratically elected President H. K. Bédié was overthrown and the National Public Salvation Committe, headed by general Robert Guéï, came to power. At the same time, France's military intervention in the development in Ivory Coast started. In October 2000, general R. Guéï, was stripped of his power after a presidential election, in which he declared himself to be the winner. After widespread demonstrations, L. K. Gbagbo, the founder of the Ivorian Popular Front (*Front populaire ivoiren,* FPI)was inaugurated into the presidential office.

In the context of the conflict in Ivory Coast it should be stressed that all three politicians (H. K. Bédié, R. Guéi and L. K. Gbagbo) belonged to the Christian community. The tension between the Christian south and the Muslim north grew gradually. The political instability was the triggering mechanism for the escalation of the conflict. The defeated candidate R. Guéï started to organise opposition against Gbagbo in his exile in Benin.

The first clashes between the government's forces, controlled by Christians, and the Muslim opposition erupted as early as in 2000. In March 2001 they were ended by an agreement between Gbagbo and Ouattara, which secured the participation of four Muslim politicians in the government. That caused discontent among some representatives of the Christian elite. In the two years that followed, two unsuccessful military coup attempts occurred. The second one, which took place in September 2002, led to a civil war. The Muslim mutineers argued it was a struggle against a dictatorship, the government pointed to the danger of the victory of Muslim fundamentalists, supported by the neighbouring Burkina Faso. The insurgents gained the main support in the north and northwest of the country, where populous domestic and immigrant Muslim communities lived.

The necessity of a peaceful solution to the complex situation in the country resulted from the danger of the internationalisation of the conflict. The Muslim mutineers were supported by the neighbouring Burkina Faso (from which most of the immigrants came) and Liberia intervened in the conflict as well. Besides that, President Gbagbo recruited mercenaries in South Africa and in France (see Kubiak 2007). On the basis of the experience

with the developments in the region of West Africa, there were concerns over the possible repetition of the Liberian or Sierra Leonean scenario.

In October 2002, President Gbagbo agreed with signing an agreement on the cessation of fighting. From November 2002, direct negotiations between the government and the insurgents from the Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast (*Mouvement patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire,* MPCI), led by Guillaume Kigbafori Soro, started in Togo. The situation, however, complicated itself by the appearance of two new anti-government armed fractions (Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (*Mouvement populaire ivoiren du Grant Ouest*) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (*Mouvement pour la justice et la paix*). The peace process culminated on 26 January 2003 by the signing of an agreement, entered into in Linas-Marcoussis, near Paris, which was based on a compromise in the form of the participation of representatives of insurgents in the government (among other things, they won the positions of the ministers of defence and interior), the awarding of full civic rights to Muslim immigrants on the basis of a change to the constitution and the observation of the truce until the presidential election, which was to take place in October 2005. On the basis of a peace agreement, the French units created a buffer zone between the hostile sides. That development implied that the splitting of the country into two parts – the south, controlled by President Gbagbo's government – and the north, controlled by the insurgents, was to be frozen for two years.

On the basis of further negotiations, on 7 July 2003, an 'End of the War' declaration was adopted, in which Gbagbo was recognized as the President and agreements from Linas-Marcoussis, signed earlier in January that year, were implemented. Within it, a project of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of refugees, which were nearing a million, was also agreed. It should be stressed that the returns to the negotiation table are related with the fact that neither of the fighting parties won a decisive prevalence over the opponent. A significant role here is also played by the fact that neither of the parts can function independently from the long-term perspective.

The optimism generated by the discussions between the hostile sides and by the signing of the piece agreements, which were supposed to stabilise the situation in the country, was not well-founded. Nor the presence of the peace forces of the UN, ECOWAS and French troops, numbering about 10,000, could secure a long-lasting peace and cooperation of the relevant political forces under the given conditions. The tension gradually escalated and led to the resumption of fighting in 2004, to which the UN reacted by the adoption of a Resolution No. 1572, which introduced sanctions against Ivory Coast. The fighting started by the government's ground offensive against the insurgents. The offensive was also supported by the government's air force, which, however, due to until-now-unclear reasons, attacked the positions of the French peace forces in the city of Bouaké on the line of the truce. The response was the destruction of the government's planes by the French forces, by which Gbagbo lost the only means of military prevalence over the insurgents.

After some pressure from the African Union, Ivory Coast's parliament granted voting rights to about 700 thousand people. But it refused to change the law on the election of the president. The Christian elite was thus determined to defend its privileged position in the country at all costs. The resolution of the conflict was therefore beyond reach and the articles of the peace agreements were not fully honoured. On 6 April 2005, an agreement on ending the hostilities was signed in Pretoria. Gbagbo agreed with Ouattara's candidacy in the presidential election. Its date, however, was postponed several times.

By the end of 2004, demobilisation of the insurgents started and their representatives started to participate on the government again. In May 2009, a date for the presidential election was set to 29 November 2009. The main candidates for the President are considered to be Gbagbo, the incumbent president and leader of the FPI; Ouattara, leader of the Rally of

the Republicans (*Rassemblement des Républicains*); and Bédié, leader of the Democratic Party of Ivory Coast – African Democratic Rally (*Parti Démocratique de la Côte d´Ivoire – Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*).

On March 2007, an agreement was signed between President Gbagbo and the insurgent leader G. K. Soro, according to which Soro will act at the position of the Prime Minister. That agreement stabilised the situation in the country. The buffer zone was removed and the government started to perform the state administration in the territory controlled by then by the insurgents. From the start of the civil war, there was, in fact, no effective administration there, the legal and social system disintegrated completely. Like in other African countries affected by a civil war, warlords, who were actually absolute rulers of their territories, prevailed in that area.

Despite that it can be stated that two fighting sides are competing for power in the country. They are supporters of President Gbagbo, who controls the army loyal to the President; then the nationalist and pro-Islamic Young Patriots (*Congrès Panafricain des Jeunes Patriotes*) youth organisation; and armed mercenaries from different countries. On the other side there is a coalition of the three mentioned rebelling movements, called the New Forces of Ivory Coast (*Forces Nouvellesde Côte d'Ivoire*), which are materially supported in particular from Burkina Faso and probably also from Gabon and Libya. The observation of the truce is supervised by peace forces, operating within the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the mission of the Economic Community of the West Africa States.

The example of Ivory Coast shows that the democratisation processes highlighted the fact that African countries have not created such a political culture that would cope with ethnic, confessional and regional differences. The one-party rule, as it was in Ivory Coast before 1990, successfully suppressed ethnic and confessional disputes. In Ivory Coast, the governing party even declared as its goal the creation of an Ivorian nation and Boigny supported such an ethnic composition of the parliament that approximately corresponded with the ethnic structure of the population of Ivory Coast. The start of new political parties, as a prerequisite of democratisation, was often connected with a political representation of certain ethnic groups or confessions. An explosion of nationalism, which was suppressed during the rule of one party, occurred.

Such a development affects in particular countries divided not just along ethnic lines but also by religion. Ivory Coast is also one of them. At the beginning of the 1990, members of more than 60 ethnic groups belonged to Animists (about 60 %), Muslims (27 %), and Christians (20 %) (Liščák 2009). There is a tension in particular between the Muslim and Christian communities. The core of the Muslim settlement is in the north of the country, while the Christians live mostly in the south, where the economic center of gravity is. In Ivory Coast there are therefore many ethnic groups. None of them, however, has the sufficient weight to gain the hegemony and none of them feels to be historically superior to others (Řehák 2003). Such a situation would create conditions for the elimination of ethnic tension. Like in Nigeria, a significant role in the demonstration of identity in Ivory Coast is played by the affiliation to a religion.

A specific feature of Ivory Coast was also the fact that the economic development in the 1960s and 70s caused large-scale immigration from surrounding countries, in particular from Burkina Faso. Immigrants (mostly agricultural workers on plantations) settled in the territory of Ivory Coast and also brought their families with them. Currently they form about a quarter of the population of Ivory Coast. That has also strengthened the size of the Muslim community, which, through the immigrants from abroad, penetrated also the south, while they form a relatively populous layer also in Abidjan.

In 1995, the term *ivoirité*, was started to be used in Ivory Coast and it refers to the cultural identity of the "genuine" Ivorians, in contrast to immigrants and their descendants as

"not genuine" Ivorians, who are thought to include especially immigrants from Burkina – the *burkinabè.* Some laws of a nationalistic character did not allow to hold positions in the state administration by the „non-genuine" Ivorians. Such tendencies are a classic example of a government diverting attention from the domestic, mainly economic, problems by supporting nationalism and pointing to an external enemy.

To explain the situation in Ivory Coast as an exclusively ethno-religious conflict, however, would be a mistake. Behind the disputes between the two religious communities stand the long-term unresolved social problems, in particular the increasing unemployment and the growth in the share of the population living below the poverty line. That phenomenon is connected with the country's economic decline, related with a drop in the word prices of cocoa and coffee as the main export commodities of Ivory Coast. The government's measures to maintain the level of the economy have led to increasing foreign indebtedness. The resulting growing differences in living standards have led to increased social tensions in the country. A significant role in the start of the conflict was played not just by political but also by economic ineptness of the political elites which continues to weaken the foundations and institutions of the state.

Besides that, the insurgents also pointed to the regional differences in the government's investments. Since the winning of independence, the south of the country has been preferred in this context. The unevenness in the distribution of income is illustrated by the fact that in the time of Boigny's government, just 25% of income was allocated to the 12 departments in the North. The rest was directed to the 12 departments in the south. The situation did not change substantially even after the democratization of the country. The differences between the north and the south therefore increased and were justly criticized, which contributed to the destabilisation of the country.

Because of that, the conflict in Ivory Coast is not exclusively an ethnic or ethno-religious. A number of inter-linked factors, which formed during the historical development of the country, contributed to its start. A very important function is played by the wider economic factors, which are secondary only apparently. In fact, it is a conflict between the north and the south, which erupted under the influence of the sharpening disputes of different characters, which had not been solved for a long time.

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The Present Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Situation in Russia

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Abstract

The significant changes Russia has undergone in its society since the nineties of the last century have also influenced its politics, economy, management and, in the end, every inhabitant of the Russian Federation. The elections of 2007 demonstrate the representation of political parties in the Russian parliament. However, they do not reflect the overall socio-political situation because, apart from parliamentary parties, the ideas of non-parliamentary subjects are also being disseminated into Russia's social life. These include the views of Eurasianists, who will be later discussed.

The topic of immediate interest is the present economic crisis with its global impact. The Russian government has taken up a set of measures so that financial flows do not come to a complete stop. Banks are under pressure because a lack of confidence in the financial sector has created big problems with liquidity for them. Industrial production is in decline, unemployment is rising, and the Russian government must react.

Key words: political parties, election, Eurasianism, financial and economic crisis, technological parks, diversification

The Geopolitical Situation

Russia is one of the key players on the political map of the world. Its politics, economy, international relations, and security issues attract the attention of specialists as well as laymen.

There is a multitude of political parties in Russia. By December 31st 2008, there were 156 registered. Each party has its own program and, according to the result of the elections, a determined number of seats and representation in the Parliament of the Russian Federation – the State Duma (Graph 1).

The present domestic political situation in Russia can be characterized as stable. The results of the parliamentary elections in December 2007 and the presidential elections in 2008 confirmed this. The political party United Russia (JR – Jedinaya Rossiya) headed by V. Putin won a constitutional majority (315 out of 450 mandates) in the parliamentary elections. V. Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation (LDPR – Liberal'no-Demokraticheskaya Partiya Rossii) and Just Russia (SpR – Spravedlivaya Rossiya), both loyal to V. Putin, are also represented in the State Duma of the Russian Federation (RF).

The main parliamentary opposition party is the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF – Komunisticheskaya Partiya Russkoi Federacii). Parties outside the parliamentary opposition, especially those with a right-wing orientation, are practically

paralysed in Russia. The 2008 election year has brought about a complete change in the presidential post in Russia. The results of the presidential elections were not particularly surprising – D. Medvedev, who had profited from the popularity of the former president, became the president, as proposed by V. Putin.

During both of his presidential terms (2000 – 2004, 2004 – 2008), V. Putin strengthened his leading position by means of creating domestic political stability, by consolidating the position of the RF on the international scene and through strong economic investors. This was aided by high oil prices and the growth of interest in foreign investors. Not only did Russia's GDP rise, but so did the net income of its inhabitants. While in 2007 the GDP per capita was 9, 072 USD, in 2008 it was already 15, 800 USD.

At present, the ideas of Eurasianism are emerging from the political, cultural and historical contexts. Eurasianism, one of the current geopolitical trends, is taken into consideration in this study. Former representatives of the Eurasianistic trend were N. S. Trubetzkoy (philologist, historian and philosopher), G. V. Vernadsky (historian), G. V. Florovsky (theologian), L. N. Gumilyov (geographer, ethnographer, historian), P. N. Savicky (philosopher and philologist) etc. The leading contemporary Eurasianists are A. G. Dugin (geopolitician), M. V. Ilyin (political scientist), I. M. Busygina (political geographer) and others.

The term "Eurasianism", "Evraziistvo" in Russian, was used for the first time in the paper "Europe and People" (1920). Its author is a Russian philologist and historian N. S. Trubetzkoy. Eurasianism began to flourish after the October Revolution in 1917, especially in the 1920's – 1930's as an ideological-philosophical movement of Russian emigrants living in Europe.

In his paper "Europe and People", Trubetzkoyalso analysed nations outside Europe and came to the conclusion that these nations judged their cultures according to European standards, despite the fact that their geographical location was not in Europe and that they did not incline towards Europe. This kind of evaluation produced feelings of inferiority and underdevelopment in non-European nations. As a result, according to Eurasianists, this situation calls for a new approach in order to overcome the sense of inferiority. Eurasianism is considered to be the means. This means that it is necessary to shape Russia into a Eurasian state, not a European one, and to even place it at the forefront of the anti-European movement. The unique and distinctive Russian culture is to become the basis for other non-European countries. Other (non-European) nations would emerge from it and therefore would not find themselves subject to European influence. According to the Eurasianists, the European culture is becoming global and imposes upon other nations material and not spiritual values.

Eurasianists support a closer relationship with Asia, especially with the historical region of Turan, which used to be the ancient name for Central Asia (Land of the Tur). The name Turan denoted Turkic and Uralic tribes and nations, extending even to the Dravidian people and cultures of various ethnic-group societies in this region. Russia formed as a unique nation intertwined with Slavic and Turan traditions. The Slavic cultural and spiritual influence was the strongest during the 13th century in the area of Kievan Rus. The invasions of Mongol Tatar tribes (Golden Horde) between the years 1238 – 1452, which were directed from the south-east to the west, did not disturb the unique culture of Russians, which formed in the Grand Duchy of Moscow and those regions that Moscow gradually subdued. This is why Eurasianists consider the "Turan factor" positive, i.e. the Russians did not fall under the spiritual and cultural influence of the Mongol Tatar tribes. On the contrary, Europeanisation during the reign of Peter I. the Great is considered negative, whereas Bolshevism[25] is viewed

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[25]   N. S. Trubetzkoy evaluates Fascism in his work Evraziistvo (1926) positively as an effort to create a counterbalance to the parliamentary-democratic system. The nationalistic and anti-democratic spirit drew Eurasianists and Fascists together.

as positive – it included folk elements based on traditions while preserving a considerable part of the empire. Therefore, it is sufficient to exchange Bolshevism for Eurasianism. Russia will then be built on the principles of Orthodoxy and isolation from Europe and its detrimental concepts.

Other important factors are space and time. They significantly influence the history and culture of a nation. Geographical location also plays an important role in creating and shaping language, ethnic, economic, and political structures. History and culture are inseparable not only from their spatial conditions, but also from time. In terms of ethnic development, Eurasianists call geographical locations "places of development" – "mestorazvitie". However, no one place of development can demand to become an example for others. As a result, every nation and culture must be judged according to specific criteria (Eurazia 2009). Another Eurasianist basic belief is therefore the synthesis of social-historical development and the environment in which this development took place.

The fundamental belief of Eurasianism is Russia's uniqueness, exceptionality, originality and distinctiveness from the perspective of its geographic location, culture and spiritual-historical potential. It is neither European nor Asian, but Eurasian, developing in its own way. These ideals are nowadays revived in the form of Neo-Eurasianism.

A. G. Dugin, the chief contemporary representative of Neo-Eurasianism, describes Russia's expansion in its historical-geographical development as a colonialist mission towards nations (Dugin 2007). In this mission, colonized nations and ethnic-groups did not have a reason to put up resistance. In the course of this expansion, Russia crossed a border from which there is no return: ethnically almost a homogenous state transformed into an empire integrating nations, ethnic-groups and religions whereas ethnic, racial, linguistic and cultural diversity found its way into the Russian-Slavicenvironment.

In the past, Russia had control over a strategically important part of the Eurasian continent – its centre (Mackinder's Heartland) took possession of the natural resources in its area, which helped it gain and consolidate its power. According to A. G. Dugin (2005a), the Russians sacrificed their ethnic-state ambitions to the benefit of the state's higher power, basically in favour of the Russian imperial idea, and Eurasia became not only a political identity of the Russian state, but also of the Russians.

Another characteristic of Eurasianism is that it should be the opposition to Atlantism. Atlantism is based on the concept of the "civilization of the sea" and after Great Britain, the title "civilization of the sea" was inherited by the USA, while the "civilization of the land" became Russia. Atlantism, i.e. the "civilization of the sea", is not possible without opposition, i.e. the "civilization of the land", represented by Russia. Since Eurasianists consider Russia to be the center and foundation of Eurasia, it should therefore stand in opposition to the "civilization of the sea". Consequently, Russia should strive to: 1. eliminate Atlantic influences, 2. renew its full sovereignty in the world in the political and economic spheres, and 3. to take action against the elite who have liberal and pro-western tendencies. In addition, Russia should try to strengthen its influence in the nearby foreign countries, i.e. in the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Eurazia 2009).

According to the Neo-Eurasianists, Eurasia is divided into: a "central" continent (Russia), or Eurasia proper, and two peripheral worlds: 1) the Asian world (China, India, Iran, Japan) and 2) the European world (the border is created by the rivers Neman – Western Bug – San – the Danube Delta). It is in these two worlds that the Eurasianists see their allies: axis 1: Moscow – Berlin, axis 2: Moscow – Tehran, axis 3: Moscow – Tokyo.

Why did the Neo-Eurasianists focus on Germany, Iran and Japan? According to them, Germany is able to rival the USA, i.e. to Atlantism, on the basis of its economic, cultural and intellectual potential, and to even defeat it in these areas. Iran is already oriented against Atlantism – against the USA. At the same time, it is anti-liberal and active geopolitically. It

insists upon the principles derived from Islam, which does not stand in the way of the Eurasianists. Its oil and natural gas supplies (3rd and 2nd place in the world, respectively) classify it as one of the "powers of oil and natural gas", which will make it independent of the resources of other countries. Furthermore, the money gained from the export of oil can strengthen the Iranian economy even more. Japan's modern technology and considerable funds make it strong. Such an alliance would, of course, suit Russia. An alliance between the partially Buddhist Japan and the Buddhist nations of Eurasia seems beneficial to the Eurasianists.

Euranianists defend the principles of a multilateral world – in their opinion, the world's future lies in the cooperation between countries and nations on the basis of four geo-economic zones:
1. Euro-African zone: states of the EU, Islamic Africa (north).
2. Asian-Pacific zone: Japan, states of South-East Asia, Australia, New Zealand.
3. Eurasian Continental zone: Russia, states of the CIS, Asian Islamic states, China, India.
4. American zone: North, Central and South America (Eurazia 2009).

Eurasianists can see Russia's further development occurring by means of the aforementioned characteristics of Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism. According to Dugin, Eurasianism is open to all who accept the supremacy of the Eurasian culture and religion, and to those, who aim to weaken and gradually eliminate the world hegemony of the USA and its Atlantic allies (Dugin 2005b).

However, the Eurasianistic school does not take into account current relations between the USA and Russia. Atlantism and liberalism is viewed very negatively, even to the extent of being Russia's enemy, and the orientation of Russia's foreign policy should aim to create Eurasia as a political reality. Eurasia is not understood only geographically, but is raised to the level of political reality. This movement has its supporters in Russia, but also its opponents and critics.

What the geopolitical future of Russia will be and what new trends and movements come into will depend, first and foremost, on the domestic and foreign political situation, but also on the understanding of historical-geographical development and culture, as well as on the views of the representatives of new geopolitical movements concerning the development of already existing ones.

The Geoeconomic Situation

At present, the whole of the world economy is going through a difficult time. The financial and economic crisis, which broke out in the USA towards the end of the year 2008, affected most of the countries in the world, including Russia. The crisis is forcing statesmen, financiers, businessmen and academics to put forth all of their strength for the revival of the economy.

At the beginning of 2009, the Russian government had to support the bank sector with financial injections and to stabilize the rubble. To prevent the collapse of the Russian economy, the government provided 1.4 billion RUB (more than 45 billion USD) from the state budget to support the measures taken in order to help fight the crisis.

In comparison with the previous year, when the Russian economy grew thanks to high oil prices and those of other commodities, in the year 2009, the economic growth slowed down considerably. The Russian economy dropped in the first quarter of 2009 by 23.3 %, in comparison with the first quarter of 2008. Due to the economic crisis, Russia experienced an abrupt fall on the stock market, the devaluation of the rubble and the fall of oil prices.

According to the estimates of the Russian Ministry of Finance, this year's state budget income will be lower by two-fifths, i.e. 6.7 billion RUB (2.1 billion USD) and expenditures should rise by 700 billion to a total of 9.7 billion RUB (3.1 billion USD).

In January 2009, the Russian Ministry of Finance anticipated a decline of GDP by 2.2 %, which is considered optimistic today. The American Investment Bank, Goldman Sachs, stated in its analysis that Russia's GDP will decline this year by 8 %, which is a pessimistic prediction. The World Bank estimates that the Russian economy will decline this year by 4.5%. This estimate is deduced from the expected average price of Russian oil for this year set at 45 USD per barrel.

Whether the calculations are pessimistic or optimistic, the Russian government must react to economic development, which changes practically every month, and it is necessary to prepare several scenarios for its development. The Russian government has already worked out the state budget for this year and president D. Medvedev suggested modernizing the Russian economy. The president has decided to take this step because entrepreneurs, despite the support of the government, cannot realise technological progress. Another problem is that investments in new technologies do not bring profit at the initial stage, which is of interest to the entrepreneurs. Profit, however, comes in the long term.

Various technological parks and centres, or economic zones, are at present only in the environs of the cities of Moscow (Moscow Industrial Region), Kazan – Volgograd (Middle Volga Industrial Region), Ufa – Chelyabinsk (Urals Industrial Region) and Novosibirsk – Tomsk – Kuznetsk (Kuznetsk Industrial Region). A Special Economic Zone has been established near the town Elabuga in Tatarstan (in Tatar Alabuga). Many such parks, centres and zones are still on paper, and only a few exist in reality. What is missing for the establishment of these parks, centres and zones is an effective labour organization, new and modern technological equipment, and good logistics, which includes e.g. means of purchasing, supplying and storing materials.

Russian enterprises (firms) invest very little into research and development, into information technology and expansion. According to OECD, they spend only 6 % from their budget expenditures, whereas in Japan it is up to 75 %, 70 % in the USA, and 25 – 60 % in the EU. Labour productivity is only a quarter of that in the USA. The problem lies more in the machinery, rather than in the labour force.

Apart from observing and trying to solve the economic crisis, Russia must also provide financial aid for the poor, so as to stop the growing social tension. The number of officially registered unemployed people was 2.35 million at the end of April. It has risen by one million since last October. The level of unemployment has risen from 7.5 % to 10.4 % for economically active people. Areas with metallurgical, mining, machine and chemical industries have the highest degree of unemployment. The economies of Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, Yaroslavl, Bryansk and Nizhniy Novgorod have been weakened the most. The Russian government would like to lower unemployment by implementing a programme, for which it has put aside 9.5 billion RUB (218.83 billion EUR). Programmes for the support of the unemployed have been approved by 77 out of 83 federal subjects of Russia. The regions of the Moscow area have already been granted 40 % of the approved sum.

The World Bank suggests that the Russian government invest at least 1 % of GDP to help improve the social situation. According to it, the government should raise unemployment benefits by 70 %, child allowance by 20 % and old-age pensions of approximately one-third of the poorest pensioners by 20 %. It should make another 0.5 % of GDP available for the support of small and middle-scale entrepreneurs. Stimulation expenditures should also focus on low budget households in order to make it easier for them to gain access to credit.

However, Russia cannot try to solve the impact of the financial and economic crisis in the same way as rich countries. It cannot afford it. If it poured funds into the economy through

loans from the Central Bank or state budget, inflation would rise very quickly. Russia wants to help its economy by means of recapitalization[26] of the financial sector, but other areas of the economy will have to manage with less. Russia plans to use the money from the Reserve Fund, which was accumulated in the past years thanks to high export prices of oil and natural gas, to compensate its deficit.

Russia's amended budget was calculated from the price of oil at 41 USD (31.97 EUR) per barrel. The price of oil gradually rose (Graph 2) and at the end of May 2009, the barrel of oil was 60.21 USD (43.43 EUR), which signalized a revival of demand. The rapid sales fluctuation of the oil price is the main obstacle for global growth and financial stability. For this reason, it is necessary to limit volatility[27] on the oil market. It is questionable whether countries which could be referred to as oil producing countries (the countries of the Persian Gulf, of OPEC, Venezuela, Nigeria and others) would agree with this.

The crisis takes on different forms in different parts of the world. In Russia, it has intensified the familiar Russian problems: weak diversification[28], the deficit of the long[29] money, a lack of qualified labour force and absence of modern technological equipment. The decline of the rubble's rate of exchange to the euro and dollar, which occurred in the past seven months, has somewhat strengthened the export of Russian products, but it is not possible to say that the majority of Russian-made products are capable of competing on the world market.

Many politicians, economists, analysts, specialists, and laymen ask themselves whether Russia could have partially or totally avoided the crisis, or its negative effects. The answer is not simple, but most probably it could not have avoided the crisis. Despite the difficult economic and social situation of the population (not only in Russia), Robert Aliber (2009), an American economist, states that "a crisis once in twenty years of prosperity is not at all bad. It is a good trade-off". The crisis is therefore beneficial, because after it cleans out the market, only the strongest and most stable enterprises survive.

Graph 1 Seats in the State Duma of the Russian Federation after Election in 2007

Seats in the State Duma of the Russian Federation after Election in 2007

315 (70 %) — United Russia (UR)
56 (12,6%) — Communist Party of RF (CPRF)
39 (8,6%) — Liberal-Democratic Party of RF (LDPR)
38 (8,4%) — Just Russia (Spravedlivaya Rossiya)
2 (0,4%) — Others

Resource: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/RS.html

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[26]   Recapitalization – exchanging the profit on capital.
[27]   Volatility – fluctuation, instability, a degree of insecurity.
[28]   Diversification – the distribution of risk into various areas of business.
[29]   Long money – money which are invested for long time

Graph 2 The development of oil prices from November 2008 to May 2009.

60.21 (25. 05. 17:30)

Resource: http://hnonline.sk/c1-37240570-ropa-nebera-dych-jej-cena-rastie
Note: The price of oil per barrel was 60.21 USD (43.43 EUR) on 25th May 2009.

Picture 1 The value of the rubble to the euro from July 2009 to June 2009.

Zmena za 1 rok: -18,4%

Resource: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/RS.html
Note: Exchange for one year was –18.4 %

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Russian Geopolitical Perceptions and Imaginations of the South Caucasus

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Abstract

The paper examines the last three hundred years of the history of the South Caucasus in the frame of Russian geopolitical conceptions. We deal with the first Russian military expeditions in 1720s, 19th century Great Game, Baku oil boom or the collapse of the Soviet Union. Then we analyze the development of the new Russian geopolitical conceptions and their implementation in practice.

Key words: Geopolitics, perception, imagination, South Caucasus, Russia, Mahan, Mackinder, Great Game, Euro-Asianism, Euro-Atlanticism

Introduction

Geopolitics belongs among the most controversial terms in political geography or in political science in general. Tomeš (in Daněk, Jehlička and Tomeš 2000) shows the history and the different conceptions of geopolitics: geopolitics as a science, as an applied science, theory, method, analysis, conception, strategy, doctrine or code and finally characterises geopolitics as a post-modern "flexible phenomenon". This corresponds with the terms "new geopolitics" (Agnew and Corbridge 1995) or "critical geopolitics". O'Tuathail and Dalby (1998) then speak about perceptions and imaginations; geopolitics according to them more than with the maps of states and borders operates with the maps of significances and representations.

Rather than some type of geographical determinism, geopolitics deals with perceptions and imaginations of space or imaginations of certain political activities. Territories have surely some strategic importance, however we have to be aware of who is describing the territory and evaluating its geography, its natural and human resources, culture, military capacities etc., and what he/she expects from the territory as well as from the description or evaluation itself.

In this paper we deal with the South Caucasus region and we will simply examine the question about the role this territory plays in Russian geopolitics and how its role has changed in the course of the last three centuries. We also summarize Russia's recent foreign policy in the South Caucasus region and evaluate it vis-à-vis two significant Russian geopolitical schools.

Mahan vs Mackinder

The first Russian military adventure in the South Caucasus occurred in 1722, when the armies of Peter the Great crossed the Caucasus and conquered the Caspian coastline including the town of Baku, assessed by Peter the Great as "the key to the Caspian" (O'Hara and Hefferman 2006, footnote 6). After Peter's death in 1725, Russians were forced to march back and they have not come back until 1783 when the king of Kartli-Kakheti Erekle II signed the Treaty of Georgievsk that put Georgia de iure under the Russian protectorate. After king Erekle's death Russians simply annexed eastern Georgia as the first "Transcaucasian"

territory. Other Georgian territories were gained subsequently: Mengrelia, Guria, Abkhazia, Svaneti, Akhaltsikhe and finally Ajara in 1878.

The eastern Transcaucasia was dominated by Persia, but in fact it was disintegrated into a number of more or less independent petty khanates. Between 1804 and 1806 most of these khanates were gained by Russia, some of them by vassal treaties similar to those of Georgievsk (Karabakh), others were conquered after heavy fighting (Baku). The Treaty of Gulistan, signed in 1813 between Russia and Iran, transferred the Talysh-Mughan khanate under the Russian jurisdiction and finally when the Iranian counterattack collapsed in 1828, according to the Turkmanchai Treaty Russia moved its frontier as south as the ArasRiver and gained the khanates of Nakhchivan and Yerevan. In 1878 Russia, according to the Berlin Treaty, which was signed with the Ottoman Empire, gained the Armenian inhabited provinces of Kars and Ardahan. The Russian move towards the south had been stopped.

However our primary interest dwells in the strategic and geopolitical imaginations that forced Russia to cross the Caucasus Mountains. At least since the times of Peter the Great, Russians had striven for what they used to call "Warm South Seas". The Baltic and Black seas harbouring the Russian fleet were ice free, however the Russian fleets could be simply blocked in the straits of Oresund, Bosphorus, Dardanelles or Gibraltar. Russia's dream was to reach the Indian Ocean where it could face Great Britain and hopefully become the world's greatest power. The Caucasus was perceived as a kind of natural barrier between the vast Eurasian steppes, already controlled by Russia, and Iran, stretching southwards to the ocean coastline. Northern parts of Iran had been actually controlled by Russia for two short periods in 1722-1735 and 1827-28.

The British intelligence officer Arthur Conolly was probably the first who called the Russo-British rivalry "Great Game" in 1830s; whilst Rudyard Kipling's novel Kim published in 1901 brought this term to fame. The British strove to stop the Russia's move towards South Seas and possibly India, however, there were only a few proxy wars and preventive military actions and the British and Russian armies never directly fought each other. In 1907 the Russo-British rivalry ended by signing a treaty assigning their spheres of influence.

One could say that the Great Game simply reflected something natural, something that is emanating from the essence of the geographical space. However, this essence is not natural or everlasting, but is created by the people who firstly perceive and imagine and then act. Indeed, the Russians and the British had different imaginations and acted according to different strategies and geopolitical conceptions. These conceptions had been formulated at the very end of the Great Game (1890 and 1904 respectively), but both powers had obviously acted according to those codes.

A. T. Mahan (1890) speaks about the sea power, which is superior to the continental power; each empire, attempting to rule the world, must at first control strategically placed straits or islands. In contrast, Sir H. J. Mackinder (1904) argues that the so-called Heartland (or Pivot Area), constituted by the core of the Euro-Asian "super continent", and containing crucial sources such as oil, coal, metal ores etc., is due to the development of railway network and land forces able to become a threat to the "marginal" crescent of Eurasia (see figure 1) and potentially become the world's superpower. Western sea forces were able to marginalize the Heartland for certain time, but now the sea power is declining. The control of the Heartland is crucial for any power attempting to rule the world, whereas the control of the Heartland is possible by limiting Heartland's access to the seas and by means of possessing Eastern Europe, the key to the Heartland.[30]

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[30] *"[T]he oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight."* (Mackinder in Sempa 2000)

Mahan (1918, 29) argues: *"The geographical position may be such as of itself to promote a concentration, or to necessitate a dispersion, of the naval forces. Here again the British Islands have an advantage over France. The position of the latter, touching the Mediterranean as well as the ocean, while it has its advantages, is on the whole a source of military weakness at sea. The eastern and western French fleets have only been able to unite after passing through the Straits of Gibraltar, in attempting which they have often risked and sometimes suffered loss."*

Figure 1: Mackinder's world

It is surprising to what extent the above-mentioned situation applied to the 19th century Russia. In order to join the Baltic and the Black Sea fleets the Russian warships had to sail through at least four narrow straits, which could really be suicidal.

If the Russians had thought as Mackinder, their geopolitical imaginations could have been totally different. Instead of the move towards the South Seas, they could focus on power deal with Germany (seen by Mackinder as a crucial ally of the Heartland) and on controlling Eastern Europe (the key to the Heartland).

Three years after releasing Mackinder's theory the Russo-British power deal in Central Asia and Middle East was reached and both powers allied against Germany as their main rival. If we evaluate the situation using the Mackinder's theory, Russians were mistaken in their move across the Caucasus to the South Seas and moreover missed the golden opportunity to ally with Germany and face the British Empire in the world scene.

From Backdoor to Prize and from Prize to Backwater and Underbelly

At the turn of the century Baku became the world's biggest oil producer. The region had transformed from the backdoor to the South Seas to the prize for the winner – which used to be Russia and some Western entrepreneurial families, such as Nobels or Rotschilds.

After the bourgeois revolution in March 1917 the South Caucasus started to move from the control of the central government and after the Bolshevik revolution the territory gained independence in the form of the Transcaucasian Federation comprised of three republics – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Only after one month of its existence, in May 1918, the federation dissolved into three independent states.

South Caucasus got rid of the Russian rule; however, it became a place of Turkish, German and British interests, focusing on Baku's oil deposits. After seizing Baku by the British general Dunsterville and its immediate loss in favour of the Turks in September 1918, the British troops finally came to the South Caucasus in November of the same year. However, after the internal power struggle between Curzon and Churchill the British left the region in August 1919 (O'Hara and Heffermann 2006), letting the Bolsheviks retake this former Russian territory. Until 1921 the Bolsheviks had consolidated almost all of the former Russian Transcaucasian Viceroyalty with the only exception of Kars and Ardahan, ceded to Kemalist Turkey.

The importance of Baku's oil as well as the Baku-BlackSea transport route diminished after the World War II. Huge oil deposits in the Persian Gulf, Western Siberia and elsewhere were discovered and South Caucasus had transformed into a backwater of the Soviet Empire; only the Qabala radar base gave the region some geopolitical importance.

However, in 1980s and 1990s the region had become an underbelly, where, together with the Baltics, the dissolution of the Soviet Union started. Four years after the first skirmishes in Armenia and Azerbaijan the whole region exploded as a powder keg and this explosion metaphorically set the whole empire in fire.

From Atlanticism to New Hegemony

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has meant substantial change in the foreign policy of its legal successor, the Russian Federation. Instead of the Soviet Foreign Ministry the Foreign Ministry of the former RussianSovietFederativeSocialistRepublic appeared as the new key player, lead by Andrei Kozyrev. This ministry constituted part of Yeltsin's power clique and on that account it implemented Yeltsin's policy of democratisation and cooperation with the West (Cornell 2001, 335).

Euro-Atlanticism became the dominant paradigm in Russian foreign policy during the first months after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It can be simply characterised by Kozyrev's statement that *"[t]he country's greatness ... is determined not by the scale of its empire but above all the level of its people's well-being"* (Kozyrev in Cornell 2001, 336) and thus Russia has to become a *"great but normal power"* (Cornell, ibid.).

The West, as well as its regional ally Turkey and rival Iran, started to penetrate the post-Soviet space immediately after the Russian withdrawal. However, the Russian withdrawal was not to last long. The so-called Euro-Asianism,[31] or neo-imperial approach, emerged in 1992/1993 and since Yeltsin's violent seizure of the Duma in October 1993 Yeltsin's administration became more dependent on the so-called *siloviki,* and the new military doctrine was issued the same year. Since then Russia speaks about the so-called "Near Abroad", the area of vital Russian interests (Cornell 2001, 340; Trenin 2009, 147, 152 or Běloševský 2007).

South Caucasus is one of the regions placed into the Near Abroad, although it was striving hard to get out from the sphere of Russian influence, namely in the cases of Azerbaijan and Georgia. The key point in Russia's striving for the control over the Near Abroad was to incorporate the South Caucasian states into the Russia-dominated CIS. It needed little effort with Armenia, but it was rather difficult with Azerbaijan and Georgia; however, neither Armenia was a reliable Russian ally at the beginning of 1990s as it used to be later. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Russians initially sided with Azerbaijan, which

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[31]   Tsygankov (2003) speaks about five schools of Russian geopolitical thinking that can be ranged from the Western-minded liberals to the ultra-nationalists as follows: Westernizers (Trenin), Geoeconomists (Kolosov), Stabilizers (Gadzhiyev), Civilizationists (Zyuganov) and Expansionists (Dugin). Euro-Asianism is more or less synonymous to Expansionism and Civilizationism; another synonyms are Euro-Atlanticists and Westernizers.

possessed a smaller threat to the dissolution of the Soviet Union than the nationalist Armenia, striving for the separation from the USSR. When the initial Armenian attempts to set up good relations with Turkey collapsed, the only Armenian choice was to rely on Russia as its most important ally. The Russian troops stayed in Armenia and allegedly were also involved in the Karabakh war (see Cornell 2001, 355-356).

Azerbaijan has lost the favour of Russia mostly during the rule of the nationalistic president Abulfez Elchibey between 1992-1993. In this time Russia probably helped to originate the Talysh and Lezgin separatism in Azerbaijan, which ceased after Elchibey's step-down in June 1993. Moreover, Elchibey's political end was a really curious one, and was evidently trumped up in Moscow. The Russian troops deployed in the city of Gyandzha withdrew, leaving behind a lot of military equipment, which fell in the hands of the pro-Russian Azeri colonel Surat Huseinov. Huseinov and his armed men marched towards Baku, forcing Elchibey to step down. Elchibey tried to save himself by allying with Heydar Aliev, a former member of the Soviet Politburo, but he failed. Aliev shared a power deal with Huseinov, the former becoming president and the latter prime minister with "extended competences". It seemed that Azerbaijan, ruled by the Aliev-Husseinov doublet, was to become a loyal Russian ally as it joined the CIS in September 1993. After that, however, Aliev refused the Moscow-led mediation in the Karabakh conflict as well as the prevalently Russian peacekeeping forces, and set up the mediations in the frame of the CSCE Minsk Group (Croissant 1998, 111). Moreover, Aliev succeeded in signing the so-called "contract of the century" with Western oil companies. Briefly after the signature of the contract Huseinov tried to overthrow Aliev, but failed in doing so, and had to flee to Moscow.

The most apparent Russian influence is evident in the politics of Georgia. This influence used to grow proportionally with the rise of Georgian anti-Russian behavior. Moreover, Georgia is perceived by Russia not only as the key to the South Caucasus, but also its Black Sea ports are, after Russia's loss of Sevastopol in Crimea, of high strategic importance.

The first Russian involvement in Georgia was probably overthrowing the president Gamsakhurdia by paramilitary forces led by Kitovani, Ioseliani and Sigua, equipped with the arms gained from the Russian military bases in Georgia (Cornell 2001, 346). The Russian involvement in the South Ossetian conflict (in 1990s) is said to be lower, but prevalently Russian peacekeeping forces guarding the Ossetian-Georgian border were placed only dozens of kilometres from the Georgian capital Tbilisi.

The more significant Russian involvement can be seen in the Abkhazian conflict, which broke out in 1992. After the initial Georgian advances and the seizure of the Abkhazian capital Sukhumi, Russian volunteers from the North Caucasus, and allegedly also Russian officers, crossed the borders and helped Abkhazians to defeat Georgian forces. As well as South Ossetia, Abkhazia became wholly dependent on Russia.

In 1993 the former Georgian president Gamsakhurdia rebelled in Mengrelia and Shevardnadze's government had to ask Russia for help, promising to join the CIS and to allow Russian military bases on its territory. Russian military assistance then helped Shevardnadze to put down the Mengrelian revolt.

Similarly to Heydar Aliev, Shevardnadze balanced between Russia and the West; nevertheless unlike Aliev he had to allow Russian military bases in the Georgian territory as well as prevalently Russian peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On the contrary Shevardnadze has been capable to join Western backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project, to close one of the Russian military bases in Vaziani in the outskirts of Tbilisi, and even to host US military advisers in Pankisi gorge. Pankisi then became the place of indirect Russian-US clash in 2002, when Russian aircrafts bombed Pankisi, accusing Georgia of sheltering Chechen rebels.

Shevardnadze's balanced policy was replaced after the Rose revolution in 2003 by Saakashvili's strong pro-Western policy. Saakashvili succeeded in closing all the Russian bases in 2007 with the exception of the Gudauta base, located in Abkhazia. His policy finally led to the brief August war with Russia, which has showed that Russia is determined and also capable to intervene in what it calls the Near Abroad. The question is what has Russia really earned in the war? It now de facto controls Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and it showed its military capacities. But Russia failed in ousting Saakashvili, and also the impact of the war on the South Caucasian states is questionable.

The real Russian success is the gaining of strategically located South Ossetia, from which Russia can watch over important Georgian transport lines including Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and Abkhazia with its ports Sukhumi, Gudauta and Ochamchira; these ports can possibly harbour Russian Black Sea fleet after the lease of the Sevastopol port in Crimea, Ukraine, will run out.

Saakashvili is still supported by the Georgian middle class, whilst the opposition is fragmented, and comprised of various political figures from pro-Western Nino Burjanadze or Irakli Alasania to openly pro-Russian politicians as Igor Giorgadze. Also, Georgian society is divided into Saakashvili's supporters and adversaries, and therefore it is highly improbable to expect a coup that can bring purely pro-Russian government.

The South Caucasian states are, after the August war, shaping new policies towards Russia. Russia has showed its strength, but it is highly improbable it will be able to repeat the August military adventure again in the nearest months. More likely is that all South Caucasian states will strive to enhance their ties with the West, and, in doing so, watch Russia carefully how it responds to their activities. What can even happen is that the August war will bring Armenia closer to the West and particularly to Turkey. The Russian military action in Georgia has been watched in Armenia embarrassedly. Georgia is crucial for the Armenian foreign trade, which would be endangered by unrest in Georgia. Moreover, Armenian society is divided into two parts, whose size is difficult to estimate. The core of the pro-Western part is comprised of people from the Diaspora who came back after 1991, and is represented by Raffi Hovhannesian's Zharangutyun party in Armenia's politics. As Armenian policy has always been very pragmatic, one cannot cut out the possibility that the August war could be one of the crucial moments helping find for Armenia a more balanced policy between Russia and the West according to the example of Shevardnadze's Georgia or Aliev's Azerbaijan.

Conclusions

We have showed that the Russian perceptions and imaginations of the South Caucasus have changed during centuries four or three times, though its behavior towards the southern neighbours has always been in a confrontational style. We claim that Russia is still caught in the trap of classical geopolitical thinking and does not reflect the discursive nature of geopolitics. As Dmitry Trenin (2009, 144) claims: "The Caucasus richly displays the stark contrast between Great Game-style confrontation policies and globalized soft power competition. Traditionally, Russian foreign and security policy has leaned toward the former, but Russia can be only successful if it learns the ways of the latter." We argue that the recent August war is a good example of this approach, and that the confrontational style of Russian foreign policy, based on Euro-Asianist or neo-imperial geopolitics can bring more losses than benefits.

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CARICOM – do integrative efforts of small states make sense?

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Abstract

Globalisation is not slowing down in the new millenium. When not able to support their international position through some valuable comparable assets, small states in particular can have problems with self-assertion. For such states one way to attain more acknowledgement is to join with others which is happening in various parts of the world and on various levels.

One example of such integrative efforts by small states is CARICOM which was formed in the 1970s and includes mainly former colonies of the United Kingdom in the Eastern Caribbean area. The aim of this analysis is to discover the extent to which the endeavor of small Eastern Caribbean states is effective and whether it contributes to their better promotion and self–assertion in international relations.

Key words: Caribbean, integration, small states

Introduction

Globalisation, generally understood as the quickening of the connection between different areas in the lives of individuals, groups, states, and economic units, was a highly modern term in the 1990's, and this process is not slowing down in the new millennium. When not able to support their international position through some valuable comparable assets, such as strategic raw materials, production or geopolitical location, small states can have problems with self-assertion. For such states, one way to attain more acknowledgment in international relations is to integrate with others, which is happening in various parts of the world and on various levels. The importance of integration is also underlined by the fact that even states playing a significant role in international relations intensify their influence through the association with other states. In Europe, for example, such associations have included the European Union, EFTA or the dissolved COMECON**.** Also there have been numerous attempts to establish a purposeful integrational coalition in Africa (Krejčí 1997, 155), for example ECOWAS in West Africa, SACU in the south, EAC in the east or COMESA – the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (El-Agraa 1999, 15-17). A purposeful integrational group has also been forming in Asia over the last 10 years in the form of ASEAN and countries in the Pacific-Asian region are joining in the free association of APEC. There are many integrational associations also in the western hemisphere. The most influential is the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), but gaining in importance is MERCOSUR in South America, and geographically in between lies the Central American Common Market - CACM.

The status of small member states of the European Union is an example of how participation in an integrational group can benefit their interests in foreign policy. Also the Visegrad cooperation between Central European countries for over ten years shows that common policy between small countries can increase their influence in foreign policy (Gubová 1999, 108). The evaluation of the Central American Common Market (CACM) (Rodlauer, Schipke 2005, 3) reveals the usefulness of coalitions as well. Regional academic

circles regard CACM, despite its slow advancement, as positive mainly because an integrational group can withstand globalisation pressures better, cope with economic regression, and negotiate with foreign partners; also investment resources can be more easily reinvested back into the region (Trinidad 2004, 81). Another example of new regionalism (Cihelková 2007, 1-25, 107) and such integrative efforts of small states is CARICOM, the Caribbean Community and Common Market, which includes mainly former colonies of the United Kingdom from the Eastern Caribbean area. The aim of this analysis is to discover the extent to which the endeavor of the small Eastern Caribbean states has been effective and whether it contributes to their better promotion and self–assertion in international relations.

Basic characteristics of the CARICOM member states

All member states of CARICOM are located in the area of the Caribbean Sea, which determines their way of life (Gubová 2007, 73-96). None of the member states is an inland state, all states have similar climates, and regarding the area and population, they belong to smaller states. Only some of the member states have important natural resources. The production of sugar, which in previous centuries determined the economy and the way of life, has become marginal and many states depend on the import of food nowadays. The majority of the states derive their largest economic benefit from tourism, and some specialize in financial services. Even if the differences in the living standards of the states are very large (relatively rich Barbados and very poor Haiti), the key problems in all of them are the social situation, unemployment and education. The majority of the member states have very similar colonial histories, in which the leading role was played by Great Britain, but France and Holland played parts also, hence the similarity of cultures, language, composition of the population and political practices. Labor forces were imported to all territories of the area in the past, mainly from Africa (Kašpar 2002, 111). The most common language in the area is English. One exception is Haiti, where French is the official language, and Surinam, where Dutch predominates, but English is also widely spread there. Aside from these languages Creole (Saint Lucia), French dialects, Hindi and Chinese are also used on some islands. In Guyana, Amero-Indian dialects are used. In Surinam, even Javanese is common as a secondary immigrational effect and also the Taki-Taki language, sometimes called Surinamese.

Geographic particularities

Member states of CARICOM are in most cases island states, and the exceptions are Surinam and Guyana on the South American mainland and Central American Belize. They have a similar number of inhabitants and not a very big area. The five member states with less than 100 000 inhabitants are Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis. The states with between 100,000 and 300 000 inhabitants are Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The states with between 300,000 and 1 million inhabitants are the Bahamas and Surinam and Guyana. More than one million people live in Haiti (7 482 000), Jamaica (2 644 600), and Trinidad and Tobago (1 290 646).

Political particularities

The majority of the member states are former colonies of Great Britain and gained their independence in the 60s – 80s of the 20th century. The only non-independent member state is Montserrat, which is still a British overseas dependency. Other exceptions are also Surinam, which was a Dutch colony, and Haiti, which acquired its independence from France as early as 1804. The political status of the member states of CARICOM reflects the important historical, as well as contemporary influence of Great Britain. The states have unicameral or bicameral parliaments elected in general elections and a limited number of

political parties and the head of the state is the governor general or president. Longevity in political office is almost a rule in many Caribbean countries. There is evidence of gender equality in two cases where women are in leading state positions – the Prime Minister of Jamaica and the Governor of Montserrat.

Contemporary political status of the member states:

- **Independent states, members of the Commonwealth** – Trinidad and Tobago (headed by a president), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (governor general), St. Kitts and Nevis (federation, governor general), Saint Lucia (governor general), Jamaica (governor general - woman), Guayana (president), Grenada (governor general), Dominica (president), Belize (governor general), Barbados (governor general), The Bahamas (governor general), Antigua and Barbuda (governor general)
- **Independent states outside the Commonwealth** - Surinam, Haiti
- **Dependant overseas territories**(Kubát, Sokol 2001, 233-235) **of Great Britain** - only Montserrat has this status from the member states, but all CARICOM associate members have it – Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Turks a Caicos Islands.

Economics

The predominant source of income in the majority of the member states is tourism and agriculture. Important agricultural products are sugar, bananas, coffee (Haiti), tobacco (Jamaica) and also the production of cane rum. Jamaica and Surinam have considerable resources of bauxite, Jamaica being the third and Surinam the fourth largest producer in the world. For Trinidad and Tobago oil and metallurgical production are very important. Some of the islands, such as The Bahamas, have been concentrating on financial services recently. The economies of some states suffer from natural catastrophes, such as hurricanes (Grenada) or volcanic activity (Montserrat) in the long term.

Also the domestic currencies deserve to be mentioned: the domestic currencies are the gourde in Haiti, the guilder in Surinam, the dollar on The Bahamas, in Belize, on Jamaica, on Trinidad and Tobago, and the gulden in Guyana. The East Caribbean dollar is used in Grenada, Saint Lucia, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent. The American dollar is used on the majority of the islands together with the domestic currency, but it is used exclusively on the British overseas dependencies, the British Virgin Islands and Turks and CaicosIsland, which have an associate status.

Basic characteristics of CARICOM
The aims of the CARICOM

The creation of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM 1973), part of which is the Carribean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA 1968), was the result of a 15 year endeavor to establish regional integration, which goes back to the foundation of the British West Indies Federation (WIF 1958). In the preamble of the Treaty of Chaguaramas (1973), which established the Caribbean Community, the aims of the community are formulated as follows:
- full employment and an increase in living standards and working conditions
- accelerated, coordinated and sustained economic development and the considerate use of natural resources
- efficient operation of common services
- functional cooperation in social, cultural, educational and technological fields a common front in relations to the external world (Treaty of Chuagaramas 1973, 2-3)

The Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME)

The CSME came into force on January 1, 2006. On this date six member states were ready to join: Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Surinam. Another six states should have been ready by June 30, 2006: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. These states came together at a meeting of the heads of state on August 7, 2006 to confirm their readiness (Caribbean Community Secretariat, CSME). According to the information from January 2007 (CARICOM Community Secretariat, CARICOM law) twelve of the above mentioned states signed and ratified the Revised Treaty about the establishment of free trade and a single market. The main elements of the CSME are the same the as in the case of the Single Market of the European Union - the free movement of goods, the free movement of (only qualified) employees, the free movement of services and the free movement of capital. However, the establishment of a customs union as an essential part of the Single Market is far in the future, as the common external tariffs and other administrative regulations have not been adjusted yet. Moreover, the revised CARICOM Treaty does not prohibit dumping even if it is considered undesirable by most of the states. The much needed standardization of products is also a problem to be dealt with, because it complicates exportation and inhibits much needed economic growth at the same time. Free movement of individuals does not exist yet. In principle, the Community does not have the free movement of services. The member states are expected to create a regional stock exchange, however, they are encountering a lot of difficulties such as ownership relations. The free movement of capital is therefore very restricted as well.

Institutional structure of the CARICOM

According to the so-called Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (Caribbean Community Secretariat, Community organs) the institutional structure of the Community closely parallels that of the European Union.

The principal Community institutions are: **the Conference of the Heads of Government**, **the Community Council of Ministers** and **the CARICOM Secretariat**. Another organ is the **Parliamentary Assembly (ACCP)**, which is, however, not directly elected. An important step was also the foundation of the **Caribbean Court of Justice.**

Conclusion

The big geopolitical players, such as the USA, the EU, China and Japan have various interests in Latin American countries. Whereas the EU sees Latin America as an area for greater self-assertion in relation to the USA, many of the Latin American countries observe the EU as a potential counterbalance to the USA (Dinan 2005, 540). For the previous ten years, the American continent had two faces, one of George W. Bush and the other of Hugo Chávez (Ehl 2006, 5) While world powers uproariously discuss the political direction of Venezuela (Pilátová 2006, 11) or Bolivia and the exploitation of their strategic resources, or the influence of Brazil, Argentina or Mexico, the voices of the states of the Caribbean area are silenced. Knowledge of the CARICOM Community is quite limited outside of the Caribbean area. For example, even though the Czech magazine International Politics dedicated its entire eighth issue in 2006 to Latin America, not a single reference to CARICOM can be found in it, despite the fact that one of the articles deals directly with the issue of integration in the region (Hrabálek 2006, 18-19). Therefore, much of this essay has been devoted to the facts related to CARICOM. The Czech ambassador to Brazil, V. Hubinger, says that "we are at the beginning of the era of a real change of the social and political image of the Latin American countries. The globalisation, which is cursed by many, seems to be the right surroundings and cure for the chronic maladies of the local societies. Integrative processes are markedly held back by economic and political nationalism, but they are irreversible" (Hubinger 2006, 9). It

is undoubtedly true also for the second oldest integrative group, CARICOM, although its gentle development can seem inefficient and slow. The perennially urgent concern that progressive globalisation, a changing geopolitical environment and the energy situation will continue to have a serious influence on the small and tiny states of the Caribbean region has been a challenge since the negotiations about the declaration of CARICOM and will continue to be in the 21st century The member states see the mutual interaction as their chance (Wickham 1998, 37-38) and the significance of the coordinated foreign relations of CARICOM with foreign partners is therefore rising (Wickham 2005, 22-34). In addition to creating solidarity among the inhabitants of the member states, the attempt to establish the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) and a coordinated foreign policy can result in a greater visibility of the region and also in a more influential position of the region in international relations. The first small achievements are starting to show (Jungbauer 2006, 15-17). This was also confirmed by the demand of the President of the Dominican Republic in March 2007, during his visit to the Secretariat of CARICOM, for closer cooperation, mainly in EU-APC relations (APC-EU Agreement 2000, 34). The decision to further coordinate foreign policy is also confirmed by one of the important decisions of the foreign ministers of member states; the so-called shared diplomatic representation, which should show in selected countries how various types of joint diplomatic representation are beneficial. The aspiration to create special conditions for small and particularly vulnerable states in the region is, according to the Secretary General of the Caribbean Community E. Carrington, the main motive for the intensification of CARICOM's integration. With all respect to the principle of equality in international relations, it would only be possible to hope that these small states could individually enforce their particular needs in international relations. Together the member states of CARICOM comprise 462 344 km² and the total number of inhabitants of the member states is 14,565,083. In comparison with truly influential integrative groups of the region, such as NAFTA or MERCOSUR, or compared with the big states of the American continent, this data is certainly not impressive. However, behind these figures we can perceive a moderately sized state, which usually can stand up for itself in international relations. The CARICOM states as described above do not have many remarkable economic comparative advantages. They are states with an attractive location, not only from the point of view of tourism, but also in regards to their strategic sea location between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The latter is particularly relevant because of the increase of the Panama Canal's capacity and its potential to be a passageway for ships that are important for the security of the USA. In this way this area, with the largest concentration of the smallest states in the world, can, as in the past, find its place in the spectrum of interests of world powers (Grenada 1983).

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Globalising the economy

Income disparities and poverty in the European Union member states[32]

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Abstract

The paper gives an outline of the issues of income disparities and poverty with a special attention being paid to the European Union member states. Individual parts of the paper deal income diversity and poverty from a theoretical perspective, income disparities in the EU-countries based on different indicators, poverty in the EU-countries based on At-risk-of-poverty rate and Human Poverty Index. The final part of the paper contains elements of typology premises of EU-countries from the point of view of income diversity and poverty.

Keywords: income disparity, poverty, European Union, social economy, European integration.

Introduction

The level of income disparity and poverty belongs to important indicators influencing the socio-economic development and other processes taking place in the social and economic realm. Facilitating rational income distribution and reducing poverty are mentioned among the main goals of public policy. It should be mentioned that such multidimensional phenomena as income disparity and poverty may be analyzed from many different perspectives, including the national and international, also within the European Union. It has to be emphasized that individual EU-countries are characterized by different income disparity and poverty levels. The objective of the paper is to compare the EU member states with regards to income disparity and poverty.

Theoretical elements regarding income disparity and poverty

It has to be mentioned within the context of considering the elements of theory regarding income disparity and poverty that exponents of social and economic sciences and politicians dealing with social and economic issues are researching the possibilities of optimizing income distribution and conditions necessary in limiting poverty and preventing its spread (Capeau and Decoster 2004; Young 2003). It is stressed that the occurrence of excessive earning differences is leading to deformation of development processes and causes social problems and conflicts (Staniek 2008, 110; Sztaudynger 2005, 68). On the other hand, placing too much emphasis on compensatory social policy and on income equalising may turn out to be acting against effectiveness and against motivation. The occurrence of income disparity may be connected with poverty described as not reaching the minimal standard of living. Poverty is a synonym of impoverishment and the opposite of welfare (Jaźwiński 2007, 32). Important public policy goals include limiting the range, depth, permanence and hereditary nature of poverty. Specialist literature contains descriptions of various kinds of

poverty. With regard to the reasons leading to impoverishment, three different kinds of poverty can be enumerated (Kabaj 2002, 14):

- random poverty, caused by random occurrences during a person's life: accidents, medical conditions, divorces, natural catastrophes etc.;
- subjective poverty caused by a lack of resourcefulness, low qualifications, reluctance to take up work, dependence on state financial aid, various social pathologies, alcoholism, drug addiction etc.;
- structural poverty caused by external economic reasons: unemployment, reduction of state aid, low wages and pensions, income polarization, high prices, elimination of subsidies.

Income disparities in the European Union member states

The level of income diversity and inequality, also in respect to comparisons in the European Union member states, can be measured taking different kinds of approaches (Förster and d'Ercole 2005), of which some are introduced further in the text.

The Gini coefficient (Podgórski 2001, 75-78) is a measure of income distribution inequality. In literature, it is stressed that this coefficient can take values from the range [0; 1]. Zero value of the coefficient indicates a full equality of income distribution, and the one value means a full concentration – a situation, where one subject only has income. An increase in the coefficient indicates an increase in inequalities of income distribution. Additionally, in other approaches some other indicators can be used; such as the rate showing a proportion of average income of the richest 20% part of society to the average income of the poorest 20% part of society. Shortly this indicator is called the income inequality rate.

Table 1 presents figures concerning income diversity in EU member states.

The figures presented in Table 1 show, among other things, that:

- EU member states with the smallest income diversification according to the Gini coefficient are: Denmark, Sweden and the Czech Republic;
- EU member states with the largest income diversification according to the Gini coefficient are: Portugal and Latvia;
- EU member states with the smallest income diversification according to the ratio of the average income of the richest 20% part of society to the average income of the poorest 20% part of society and according to the ratio of the average income of the richest 10% part of society to the average income of the poorest 10% part of society are: Czech Republic, Hungary and Finland;
- EU member states with the biggest income diversification according to the ratio of the average income of the richest 20% part of society to the average income of the poorest 20% part of society and according to the ratio of the average income of the richest 10% part of society to the average income of the poorest 10% part of society are: Portugal, Great Britain and Latvia;
- EU member states with the smallest share of the richest 20% part of society in the total income are: Slovakia, Slovenia and Denmark;
- EU member states with the largest share of the richest 20% part of society in the total income are: Portugal, Latvia and Great Britain.

Table 1. European Union member states according to income diversity

A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Austria	3.3	8.6	37.8	6.9	4.4	0.291
Belgium	3.4	8.5	41.4	8.2	4.9	0.330
Bulgaria	3.4	8.7	38.3	7.0	4.4	0.292
Cyprus	X	X	X	X	X	X
CzechRepublic	4.3	10.3	35.9	5.2	3.5	0.254
Denmark	2.6	8.3	35.8	8.1	4.3	0.247
Estonia	2.5	6.7	42.8	10.8	6.4	0.358
Finland	4.0	9.6	36.7	5.6	3.8	0.269
France	2.8	7.2	40.2	9.1	5.6	0.327
Germany	3.2	8.5	36.9	6.9	4.3	0.283
Greece	2.5	6.7	41.5	10.2	6.2	0.343
Hungary	4.0	9.5	36.5	5.5	3.8	0.269
Ireland	2.9	7.4	42.0	9.4	5.6	0.343
Italy	2.3	6.5	42.0	11.6	6.5	0.360
Latvia	2.5	6.6	44.7	11.6	6.8	0.377
Lithuania	2.7	6.8	43.2	10.4	6.3	0.360
Luxemburg	X	X	X	X	X	X
Malta	X	X	X	X	X	X
The Netherlands	2.5	7.6	38.7	9.2	5.1	0.309
Poland	3.1	7.5	42.2	8.8	5.6	0.345
Portugal	2.0	5.8	45.9	15.0	8.0	0.385
Romania	3.3	8.1	39.2	7.5	4.9	0.310
Slovakia	3.1	8.8	34.8	6.7	4.0	0.258
Slovenia	3.6	9.1	35.7	5.9	3.9	0.284
Spain	2.6	7.0	42.0	10.3	6.0	0.347
Sweden	3.6	9.1	36.6	6.2	4.0	0.250
United Kingdom	2.1	6.1	44.0	13.8	7.2	0.360

Notations: A – state name; B – share of the poorest 10% part of society in total income (in %); C – share of the poorest 20% part of society in total income (in %); D – share of the richest 20% part of society in total income (in %); E – index illustrating a ratio of average income of the richest 10% part of society to average income of the poorest 10% part of society; F – index illustrating a ratio of average income of the richest 20% part of society to average income of the poorest 20% part of society; G – Gini coefficient; X – no data available.

Source: (United Nations Development Programme 2007, 281-282).

Poverty in the European Union member states
        The poverty level in the European Union member states may be measured according to different indicators, amongst others according to At-risk-of-poverty rate and Human Poverty Index HPI.
        At-risk-of-poverty rate is used to estimate the poverty level in EU-countries. It is used amongst others by the Eurostat (Eurostat 2008, 223, 226). The indicator shows how big is the share of people whose income does not exceed 60% of the median of equivalent income within the society. Table 2 presents the indicator of the risk of poverty in EU member states in 2005 for the whole population and for selected social groups: the employed, the unemployed, retired.

Table 2. European Union member states according to At-risk-of-poverty rate

State name	Total population %	Persons employed	Unemployed	Retired
Austria	12	7	48	12
Belgium	14	4	31	18
Bulgaria	14	7	34	15
Cyprus	17	7	37	49
CzechRepublic	8	3	51	6
Denmark	12	5	26	16
Estonia	17	7	60	23
Finland	12	4	36	17
France	13	6	29	13
Germany	12	5	42	14
Greece	19	13	32	25
Hungary	12	10	48	10
Ireland	18	6	47	30
Italy	18	9	44	16
Latvia	19	9	59	24
Lithuania	19	10	63	17
Luxemburg	11	9	46	6
Malta	13	5	48	17
The Netherlands	9	6	27	5
Poland	18	14	46	11
Portugal	18	12	28	25
Romania	X	X	X	X
Slovakia	12	9	39	7
Slovenia	12	5	25	17
Spain	19	10	35	25
Sweden	9	5	26	10
United Kingdom	15	8	50	28
EU-25	15	8	40	16

Source: (Eurostat 2008, 223).

The data presented in table 2 lead to a conclusion that the EU member states with the lowest risk-of-poverty indicator for the whole population include the CzechRepublic, the Netherlands and Sweden. EU-countries characterized by the highest poverty include Spain, Greece, Lithuania and Latvia. Taking into consideration the employed part of the population, the lowest level of the risk of poverty is present in the CzechRepublic, Belgium and Finland. The EU-countries with the biggest share of poverty-stricken members of the employed group include Poland, Greece and Portugal. Whereas with regard to the group of pensioners it can be said that the lowest poverty indicator is characteristic for the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the Czech Republic.

Human Poverty Index HPI, called also the Social Poverty Index, determines the level of population poverty with regards to various aspects of social life. This index is used by the United Nations, including also the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), for international comparisons in the field of social poverty (United Nations Development Programme 2007, 241, 357). It is presented in two versions, separately for the developing countries (HPI-1) and for developed countries, OECD, Central and Eastern Europe (HPI-2). For the calculation of HPI-2 the following measures are used: in the area of health conditions and lifespan the percentage of people, who live to be sixty; in the area of educational

achievements the percentage of people, who are illiterates in the sense of functional illiteracy described as a lack of reading and communicating ability; in the area of living standards and marginalisation the percentage of people living below the poverty income line, set at the level of 50% of median line of the personal income at disposal; in the area of participation in social development the long-term unemployment rate (12 months or longer). In Table 3 the EU states are presented according to HPI-2 for year 2007.

Table 3. European Union member states according to the Human Poverty Index

A	B	C	D	E	F
Austria	8.8	16.4	1.3	7.7	11.1
Belgium	9.3	18.4	4.6	8.0	12.4
Bulgaria	15.9	X	X	X	X
CzechRepublic	11.6	X	3.9	4.9	X
Denmark	10.3	9.6	0.8	5.6	8.2
Estonia	21.4	X	X	12.4	X
Finland	9.4	10.4	1.8	5.4	8.1
France	8.9	16.4	4.1	7.3	11.2
Germany	8.6	14.4	5.8	8.4	10.3
Greece	8.2	X	4.9	14.3	X
Hungary	17.9	X	3.4	6.7	X
Ireland	8.7	22.6	1.5	16.2	16.0
Italy	7.7	47.0	3.4	12.7	29.8
Latvia	19.8	X	X	X	X
Lithuania	20.0	X	X	X	X
Luxemburg	9.2	16.4	1.2	6.0	11.1
Malta	7.6	X	X	X	X
The Netherlands	8.3	10.5	1.8	7.3	8.1
Poland	14.5	X	7.0	8.6	X
Portugal	9.5	X	3.8	X	X
Romania	17.7	X	X	8.1	X
Slovakia	14.6	X	9.7	7.0	X
Slovenia	10.8	X	X	8.2	X
Spain	7.7	16.4	2.2	14.2	12.5
Sweden	6.7	7.5	1.1	6.5	6.3
United Kingdom	8.7	21.8	1.2	12.5	14.8

Notations: A − state name; B − probability of not living to be 60 at the moment of birth (in %); C − a percentage of people who are functional illiterates in age between 16-65 years; D − long-term unemployment rate; E − a percentage of people living below the income poverty line set at a level of 50% of the personal income at disposal; F − Human Poverty Index HPI-2; X − no data available.

Note: Cyprus is shown in HPI-1 ranking.

Source: (United Nations Development Programme 2007, 241).

The data presented in table 3 lead to the conclusion that EU member states with the lowest level of human poverty include Sweden, the Netherlands and Finland. Among the EU-countries of the lowest human poverty level are the 'old' member states. What may prove interesting is the study of the high level of functional illiteracy in Italy, Ireland and United Kingdom. The United Nations did not manage to collect complete data about all EU member

states. It seems also that Cyprus should be considered in HPI-2 ranking together with the other new member states of the EU.

Conclusions

The paper gives an outline of the issues of income disparity and poverty in the European Union member states. The introductory discussion includes an acquaintance with the basics of theory regarding income disparity and poverty. The second part of the study contains an analysis of income disparities in EU-countries based on selected indicators. The smallest income diversification on a national scale according to Gini coefficient is characteristic for Denmark, Sweden and CzechRepublic. In turn, in the third part of the paper poverty in EU-countries has been analysed according to At-risk-of-poverty rate and Human Poverty Index. It has to be stressed that a rational socio-economic policy should include the aspiration to improve the variables included in these poverty indicators. The EU member states with the lowest poverty level according to the At-risk-of-poverty rate are: CzechRepublic, the Netherlands and Sweden.

Taking into account the conducted deliberations all EU member states can be divided into four groups:

- countries characterized by a lower than EU-average income disparity and lower than EU-average poverty level;
- countries characterized by a higher than EU-average income disparity and lower than EU-average poverty level;
- countries characterized by a lower than EU-average income disparity and higher than EU-average poverty level;
- countries characterized by a higher than EU-average income disparity and higher than EU-average poverty level.

The CzechRepublic is an example of a country belonging to the fist group and Latvia presents an example of the fourth group.

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Work or consumption – indicators of one's place in the society

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Abstract

This paper initially introduces different theories of work. First, it discusses the traditional Protestant work ethic shaped in the period of industrialism. M. Weber indicated that certain movements within Protestantism promoted the rational maximalization of profit.Second, the evolution of the aforementioned ethics in the post-industrial society is depicted. The communicative ethos of work which occurs within the current society of Western Europe is presented. The next problem discussed in this paper is the theory of "the end of the work era" and the satisfaction of the society related to this. Ethics of work will be forced out of the lives of societies as well as individuals. After all is considered, the author would like to evaluate whether work is currently the only indicator of one's place in the society or if consumption also plays a role, and if so, to what degree.

Key words: work theory, ethics of work, industrialization

Introduction

For many years numerous authors have argued that work will no longer be an indicator of one's place in the society. These conceptions indicate that given the current level of economic growth of the Western World only around 20% of the available labour force is sufficient enough to produce the goods and services that humanity needs (Rifkin 2001, Martin and Schumann 2000). What then would happen with the rest of the people capable of working? Would they be sentenced to a lifetime of unemployment, since until now work, in our minds, has indicated one's place in the society? Would consumption replace work as some people would wish? (Bauman 2006)

In this paper the author will first discuss the sources of the work ethic in the capitalist society, then indicate changes of this ethic which take place in the Western European society, and finally express her own opinion regarding the role of consumption in the contemporary world.

1. The traditional work ethic

In the history of mankind, work has not always been positively perceived. In classical antiquity, work was the obligation of slaves and metics while any free citizen could perform communal services and practice philosophy (Platon 1958, Arystoteles 1960, Pszczołowski 1966).

The traditional ethic of work is closely associated with the Industrial Age. The Industrial Age was characterized by rational activity. It shaped entrepreneurs who were fulfilling their obligations by scrupulous work in their profession. M. Weber, who studied influence of Protestantism on the work ethos, indicated that some movements within Protestantism provided stimulations convenient for the rational maximalization of profit. In particular it referred to Calvinism (Weber 1994). Every man strives to prove his value through work. Workers were encouraged to accept life in which work was not only their existential but also their moral obligation. Any form of living based on the valuation of work was seen as

higher than not working. The desired ethic of work was characterized by the following attributes: reliability, punctuality, discipline, frugality, sobriety, obedience and devotion to work.

The period of The Great Depression in the 1930's, when work was a very rare commodity, went a long way in further defining the ethic of work. A high ethic of work ruled until the late 1960's due to several reasons. After the Second World War the world economy, especially the European economy, transformed and significantly influenced the ethic of work. Europe, after the period of rebuilding, went into a stage of unprecedented development which lasted for a quarter of a century. Help provided by the Marshall Plan made the rebuilding of Western Europe's (especially Germany's) economic potential faster and went a long way towards the economic growth of the 1950's (Ciamaga 1990, 117-120). Investments in the entire Western Europe reached a high level, new technologies were implemented in production quickly, and work efficiency increased significantly.

The next reason for the continuing high ethic of work was the fact that labourers working in the 1950's and 60's felt their material status' improving. They could afford goods formerly reserved for the rich. A democratization of goods with a symbolic meaning (radio, television, refrigerator, car) occurred (Beck 2002, 117-120). The certainty of employment as well as many social benefits led many to characterize the first post-war generation as having a high ethic of work.

The possibility of acquiring goods through work for the generation that went through a difficult period of war and the Interwar Period of unemployment resulted in work being of high value. Several factors, listed below, influenced the reinforcement of the traditional ethic of work which was the ethic of workers.

- Most of all, the fast economic growth which was related to the high demand for labour.
- Secondly, work satisfaction and material gratification provided by work.
- Thirdly, the memory of the period of poverty, unemployment and famine

2. Transformations of the ethic of work

The aforementioned ethic of work was useful in the society of The Industrial Age. Gradually, in the 1960's and early 70's, structural transformations in the European economy occurred. Employment in the service sector grew, the percentage of industrial workers decreased and the percentage of white collar workers increased. Innovations created a post-Industrial society.

Simultaneously, with old industries (heavy industry and machine industry) dying off, the professional structure transformed. German sociologists described transformations in the mining communities of Ruhr (Tillman 1996, 253-254). Those communities differed professionally. There was no more need for the profession of miner to be passed down from a generation to a generation. The youth were not very keen on choosing such professions, as more attractive possibilities were available. The majority of the society converted from a professionally homogeneous to a heterogeneous society. Economic growth as well as the demand for different types of work forced the transformation of the ethic of work.

One more factor that added to the transformation was a generational change and connected with it changes in the system of values. The meaning of free time changed (Inglehart 1977, Kmieciak 1976). This process started in the 1970's, when the generation brought up in wealthy countries, without experiencing the period of unemployment and war, entered the labor market.

German sociologists studying attitudes towards work in the 1970's and 1980's could clearly notice that among the young generation, the percentage of people who feel that their favourite part of the day falls in the time when they are at work decreased and also that the

percentage of people who feel that their favourite time of day is when they do not work increased (Kmieciak 1976, 71). That was a confirmation of the thesis that the young generation, having a different system of values, is entering the labour market. Such a thesis on "The Silent Revolution" was stated by R. Inglehart (Inglehart 1977). Based on A. Maslow's hierarchy of needs, R. Inglehart stated that people tend to satisfy their basis needs first and only then their higher needs. Both environmental circumstances and experiences of the past influence people (socialization thesis) (Inglehart 1977, Inglehart and Basanez and Moreno 1998, 1-23). From these conceptions R. Inglehart concludes that the younger generation will tend to choose immaterial values due to the fact that they were brought up in a society of wealth and therefore take material values for granted. The older generation which during the period socialization experienced poverty and different shortcomings will put material values before immaterial ones. How would these conceptions influence the ethic of work?

Some authors indicate the fact that a weakening of the bourgeois system of values occurs. Symptoms of this process are:
a) Decreased orientation towards professional achievements;
b) The collapse of the ethic of work;
c) Orientation rather towards the quality of life than towards high income (ambivalent attitude towards material gains);
d) Increased meaning of free time in comparison with work;
e) The limiting of traditional standards and tutorial practice for the benefit of the democratic egalitarian orientations (Noelle-Neumann and Strumpel 1984, Ray 1997).

According to sociologists, this process of transformation means abandoning the traditional ethic of work which was characterized by vocation, obligation, discipline, punctuality, order and obedience. These values give way to hedonistic consumption as well as individual values. The young generation, in the opinion of sociologists, do not think as much about personal fulfillment through work as they do about free time. In their free time they socialize and spend time practicing their hobbies. Work is a necessity, as there is a need for obtaining the resources required for living, work, however, is not the most important value in life (Inglehart and Basanez and Moreno 1998, Mariański 1994, 75-76).

Other sociologists also indicate that we really are witnessing a transformation of the attitude towards work (Schmidtchen 1996, Riffault 1998). On the one hand the abandonment of the traditional ethic of work is occurring and puritan values connected with personal development through work are losing their meaning. Work has not lost its meaning, however it is no longer treated as the most important value of life. It is as important as other values e.g. free time and high consumption (Inglehart and Basanez and Moreno 1998, Mariański 1994). The same conclusions were reached by Polish and foreign researchers studying systems of values of European societies within the framework of EVS (European Value Studies). According to Inglehart's theory, in post-materialistic societies e.g. Holland, work is becoming a more and more important element in the life of citizens (Jasińska-Kania and Marody 2002). People start searching for possibilities in order to fulfil their personalities outside of work. A more important role in life is played by the development of one's interests, while at work, attributes different than its certainty take priority. Sociologists call such an ethic of work "communicative", characterized by the preference of team work, information feedback, openness and empathy. Work would have been a value, but the employee wants to realize his passions and interests through work. This new ethic can be found especially among better educated people and in professions with a higher prestige (Schmitchen 1996, Riffault 1998, Mariański 1994).

Along with the transformation of work values and its place in the system of values among the young generation, activities in free time are becoming more important. Work is

starting to have only an instrumental character for those people who do not have the possibilities of finding the meaning of life in it.

3. The end of the world of work

Since the mid 1980's, visions and predictions of the "end of work" era and "society of risk" have appeared. This risk means that there will no longer be a certainty of employment. The authors of the aforementioned theories who are observing the economic and social transformations are western sociologists and political scientists such as U. Beck, E. Luttwak, H.P. Martin, H. Schumann, and J. Rifkin (Martin and Schumann 2000, Rifkin 2001, Beck 2002, Rifkin 2003). These theories indicate that certain processes occurring in the world's economy are permanent and one of them is a systematic decrease of the significance of the workplace.

This decrease concerned traditional entrepreneurs since the mid 1950's. At the same time, the service sector was developing. However it appears that workplaces were only created up to a certain point in time. In the mid 1970's, transformations in the influence of the Scientific Revolution on the shaping of the world's economic structure appeared. They can easily be connected with the appearance of microprocessor technology. First, they strongly influenced the manufacturing industry and also services. Companies wanting to adjust to the demands of the market and keep up with competitors had to make use of newer technologies. According to J. Rifkin, companies all over the world are discovering innumerable ways of re-engineering in order to cut down on production time and reduce labor cost (Martin and Schumann 2000, Luttwak 2000, Rifkin 2001, Beck 2002, Rifkin 2003, Bauman 2006).

The greatest invention in this cost reduction chain was the computer. Computers increasingly deliver all the necessary information and help coordinate the running of activities in the economic process, eliminating retailers, clerks, lorry drivers, warehouse workers and office workers. New information and telecommunication technologies eliminate workplace on each level of the hierarchy. Not only lower level workers are losing their employment, as the reduction of workplace also concerns middle- and high level employees. This causes the flattening of the management tier and saves time and money (Rifkin 2001). Educated and well qualified employees can make decisions quicker than their managers, who are a distance off. Automotive plants count on tripling their profits by cutting labour cost in half. It is estimated that one robot can replace four people and could also, by working 24 hours a day, pay itself off after one year (Rifkin 2001). Would these people find work in the service sector? It is not that easy, as permanent workplaces in the services are also being reduced. The implementation of cash machines, non-cash transactions caused a lower demand for work in the services. New information and telecommunication technologies also eliminate permanent office work. Wire-less faxes, modems and laptops allow for working in any place, also at home. It is estimated that the number of such mobile employees increased by 20%. However the majority is being dismissed (Rifkin 2001).

Considering the above, some scientists started speculating on which direction the labour marked was heading. Would there not be a need for workers anymore? Would a large amount of people be left without resources for living and would work along with its ethic no longer be needed?

The answer was given by U. Beck, among others, who states that in the current society there are many "zombie" institutions (relicts) that are in fact dead but are still functioning. The "zombie" institutions are family, household or social class (Martin and Schumann 2000). The most burdensome institution is the institution of full employment. One should comprehend that a reversed modernization of the work society is taking place. There exists a permanent exchange between technological innovation, based on knowledge, and its products which winds the spiral of development in the society of knowledge. The author expects that

people will be capable of adapting their personal life plans such as mobility, self-reliance and saving up for their old-age (Beck 2000, Beck 2002). The system of risk is characteristic and determines economic behavior under the circumstances of the free market and open competition world-wide. Attributes of this work according to U. Beck are:

- The employer should have an easier access to the dismissal of employees.
- Redistribution of risk which is being transferred from the government to the individual (health insurance and retirement fund).
- Risk that education and knowledge, gathered in the early years, would not be sufficient at an older age (Beck 2002).

More and more work relations will be deregulated and contracted for a short period of time. Z. Bauman, who defines the transformations of the ethic of work arrived at the same conclusion (Bauman 2006). The ethic of work, according to Z. Bauman, will only concern those who are employed under a contract for an undefined period of time while the rest of the employees will only be a reserve workforce ("routine employees") that will change employers depending on the needs of both sides. There will be a gradual process of work losing its central position. The ethic of work will be discarded from both the social and individual space. According to the author, the future of the society, in which there will be too little work for everyone and for those who would be employed, work will be related to self-development and pleasure (Bauman 2006).

4. Does consumption indicate one's place in the society?

What would then define one's position in the society? Work would be the source of satisfaction and a symbol of prestige for only some members of the society. Would consumption then replace the role of work for the rest of employees as some authors suggest? (Bell 1998, Rifkin 2003, Bauman 2006)

Z. Bauman sets forth that consumption will replace work as an indicator of one's position is the society. All things are changeable and unstable within a consumption society. The most important is a prospering business as well as the ability to consume. The role that work used to have, combined with personal motives, social integration and systemic reproduction, is currently played by consumption (Bauman 2006, 59). Consumption indicates one's social position. In the consumption society, "normal life" is a life of consumers, absorbed by making choices among a variety of different goods and services. That gives the opportunity to experience an array of different sensations and to take part in a vanity fair (Bauman 2006, 77). Consumption takes place individually in order to show off goods and services which give a sense of fulfilment and prestige. Since the society of consumption provides a possibility of choices, their members fall within the frames of choices. Money and wealth are important; however, their importance declines when they no longer provide consumers with a choice.

The ethic of work, according to Z. Bauman, is being replaced by the aesthetics of consumption (Bauman 2006, 65). The ethic of work considers a well fulfilled duty as the most important while the aesthetics of consumption does so with sophisticated experience. This experience should not be postponed, but realized immediately as any delay would result in a wasted opportunity.

For the rest of the employees, working in a flexible market, there are no such possibilities. A devotion to one's profession or to the workplace is seen in a negative light. As Z. Bauman states, it can lead to an emotional catastrophe. It also concerns people, who thus far have not been in danger, as the threat of unemployment now also reaches the middle class (Martin and Schumann 2000, 197-220).

Could one agree with the aforementioned thesis? Does consumption indicate one's place in the society? It appears that even though the processes are heading in that direction in

the labour market, the replacement of work, as a factor indicating one's place in the society, cannot be certain. It results from several factors:

First, work will be an indicator of one's place in the society for the first group of employees. In this regard one could agree with Bauman that for those people, work is a meaning of their lives, source of success and they fulfil their personalities through work. They have money for consumption but very often not enough time to do so. Consumption also indicates their place in the society through their access to luxury goods and services which they can afford.

Second, work for the "reserved army of employees" can also be a subject of pride and will indicate their place in society. In order to perform this type of work, one should also gain the appropriate education in order to identify in the future with one's profession. There are professions that require years of specialist studies (e.g. Doctor, Engineer) and these people are also difficult to replace by those who have different qualifications. Work connected with those qualifications will therefore indicate their place in society.

Third, in highly developed countries with a high living standard, consumption plays a more and more important role due to high incomes. As Bauman states consumption requires time, therefore those employees who make enough money are not keen on performing more than the required minimum. They choose to spend their free time on consumption where they can realize their passions. Consumption indicates one's place in the society, as it is directly linked to the amount one spends on goods. But to be able to consume, one must first gain money for consumption. Therefore both work and consumption play important roles in highly developed societies.

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Development as a global challenge

Globalisation, vulnerability, poverty and human limits

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Abstract

Globalisation has led to the increase in vulnerability and poverty of human populations. Vulnerability and poverty present limits to the globalisation process. By addressing vulnerability and poverty at the very local level we could help to form new links between people and promote the formation of more sustainable and resilient communities.

Key words: globalisation, vulnerability, human development, poverty

1. Introduction

There are almost as many definitions of globalisation as there are authors involved in the subject. Globalisation, according to Ulrich Beck (Beck 2007) is a process, in which the national states lose their sovereignty because of their membership in international and supra-national organizations, their orientations, identities and networks. Globalisation is an irreversible process presented by the huge international market, the information revolution, and the universal advocacy of human rights, global cultural industry, and polycentric international politics with the impact on the everyday life of people.

Global pollution, trans-cultural conflicts, natural disasters – anything that happens anywhere on the globe is not fixed to a particular place – it influences the life of people all over the world. Globalisation is the clash of local cultures. Robertson (1992) speaks about glocalisation. McCorquadele and Fairbrother (Pinstrup-Andersen and Sandoe 2007) define globalisation as "an economic, political, social and ideological phenomenon, which carries with it unanticipated, often contradictory and polarizing consequences." In the same article Falk distinguishes "globalisation-from–above" as the collaboration between leading states and the main agencies of capital formation and "globalisation-from-below" as popular participation at local levels, the building of civil societies and the enhancement of international non-governmental organizations. There are many faces of globalisation: economic, social, cultural, politic, ecological, etc. The only thing which really joins all definitions and faces of globalisation is the overall interdependence and the occurrence of unexpected impacts, especially the negative impacts which illustrate the possible limits in this global process.

Limits, themselves, always include hidden messages or challenges and hide the temptation to overcome them. It is clear that there are limits to globalisation. But these limits are warnings rather than challenges. In 2003 James C. Bennet asked whether globalisation has any limits and the answer was – yes, there are many: at least public health, security issues, airline industry and fear of terrorism. "The more globalisation, the less democracy." The decision process in the international organizations is not democratic; which really represents more than a serious limit (Dahrendorf 2007).

It is true that globalisation on one side enables the contact between people from different parts of the world, but on the other side, it builds barriers between people. Globalisation led to a new emphasis on the local, but the emphasis is not positive. It is the local level that individuals suffer from hunger – one of the worst globalisation impacts.

Globalisation connects and also splits. It could form trans-cultural neighborhoods, while it can break local ones. Global and local mean two sides of one coin while one side does not see the other. Globalisation means a new distribution of wellness - global richness and local poverty. Globalisation causes rich to become even richer and the poor to become even more poor. (Zygmunt Bauman in Beck 1997).

Poverty is the unfortunate effect which is very often connected with vulnerability, another phenomenon which cannot be omitted when speaking about the unfortunate effects of globalisation. "Recent research indicates that greater numbers of people are more vulnerable to natural hazards than ever before, due, in part, to increases in population, but, more so, to their location in dangerous areas". (Quarantelli in Hilhorst and Bankoff 2004, 21), which only confirms the abovementioned. Globalisation is a very complex process, due to the interdependency of all actors, activities and impacts; it is very difficult but still important to separate, measure and explore. Liberalization coming hand in hand with the process of globalisation disturbs old tribal, cultural, and religious structures, and the world loses its pillars (Dahrendorf 2007).

2. Two limits to explore

This paper would like to explore two impacts or limits of globalisation: vulnerability and poverty. I would like to show that by addressing vulnerability and poverty at the very local level we could help to form new links between people and promote the formation of more sustainable and resilient communities. I would also like to compare different approaches on how to handle these severe impacts of globalisation in order to highlight that the local level models of social work are often more effective from the long term perspective.

2.1. Globalisation and vulnerability

Vulnerability is a more accurate concept than poverty in understanding the processes and impacts of "underdevelopment". It is also more forward-looking concept and hence more appropriate for policy-making than poverty (Bankoff, Frerks, Hilhorst 2004).

What enhances the vulnerability of different communities? What does vulnerability mean? What makes people vulnerable? The answer is, on the one side, poverty, resource depletion and marginalization, and on the other diversity of risks, generated by the interplay between local and global processes. Social inequality causes an unequal exposure to risk by making some people more prone to disaster than others. For billions of people the nature of their vulnerability is changing and intensifying, while their ability to cope has diminished (Bankoff, Frerks, Hillhorst 2004).

These coping strategies are very often damaged by large-scale projects such as big dams, land conversion, hydropower dams (very often called as development aggression). In a fast changing environment, local people find that traditional coping strategies are no longer effective. The level of vulnerability is in very close dependency with the capacities of the society to absorb shock and to recover. The higher the capacities, the lower is the vulnerability of the society.

There are many triggers involved in globalisation, which could start the process of increasing vulnerability of different communities and specific inhabited spaces. Over 95 per cent (Bankoff, Frerks, Hillhorst 2004) of all deaths from natural hazards occur in developing nations where a billion people or so now live in the world's rapidly expanding shanty towns. This population is disproportionately more at risk from natural hazard and has increasingly been identified. People lose their natural coping mechanisms, leaving homes where they were once able to protect themselves. When coming into cities, they very often start to live in slums in very tight proximity with other people, with completely new habits and new way of livelihood. Taking all these statements into account we could say that globalisation destroys

communities and societies and produces new sorts of vulnerability and poverty. The number of people affected by natural disaster is doubling within10 years rising from 78 million in 1992 to 170 million in 2001. All indication suggest that the magnitude and frequency of natural hazards have increased in recent decades and are likely to intensify in the foreseeable future (Bankoff, Frerks, Hillhorst 2004).

2.2. Globalisation and poverty

Poverty has been termed as the most significant problem confronting the modern world. We all know the figures reflecting the gravity and scale of poverty in the world as the most serious moral issue of our time: 1, 1 billion people or 28% of the global population are absolutely poor, living on less than 1 USD a day (Pinstrup-Andersen and Sandoe 2007, 131). Poverty is a very complex concept to define; there could be major forms identified: income poverty, human or quality of life poverty, basic needs poverty and capability poverty (Cox, Pawar 2006).

It would not be fair and even true to insist that poverty is growing and that globalisation is to blame (regardless of the fact that it would be difficult to measure it). On the contrary, there has been some reduction in the proportion of the global population, living on less than USD 1 a day from 28% in 1990 to 21% in 2001, in absolute terms the number declined from 1.22 billion only to 1.09 billion (Pinstrup-Andersen and Sandoe 2007, 131).

Ann Harrison (Harrison 2006) shows in her article that the poor could benefit from globalisation if all policies and institutions were in place. In addition, there does not exist a direct evidence to show a relationship between globalisation and poverty. In fact globalisation means first of all economic integration of states and economic integration always helps the economy of the state. According to Harrison there are many countries or many local communities left out. The reasons could be their own inability, their own unwillingness, or cultural and religious obstacles. Harrison confirms that globalisation produces winners as well as losers. Inequality between states has decreased while inside states it has increased (Pinstrup-Andersen and Sandoe 2007, 131).

The aforementioned suggests that there are strong links between globalisation and inequality. Inequality increases (somehow hidden) without the change of poverty rate. It means that the poor are even more poor, poverty is more individualized. "Poverty can decline while inequality increases" (Majid 2003) "especially in the situations of exclusion, the possible adverse effects on growth and inequality may be such that they adversely impact and dominate efforts to reduce poverty." We could say that inequality is a very important phenomenon, representing something as an inter–component between globalisation and poverty. Distribution of poverty started to be very important. In this case, all statistical numbers seem to be only trash. The UNDP report from 2003 confirms that globalisation benefits less the poor people within countries: the impact of globalisation on internal poverty relates to both developing and industrial countries. We could say that the more poverty is "hidden", the more severely it affects individuals and communities.

3.Sense of responsibility

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent a global partnership that has grown from the commitments and targets established at the world summits of the 1990s. They incorporate all necessary steps which have to be done so that the majority of mankind lives in dignity after 2015. It includes the well known targets regarding reducing poverty, illiteracy, gender inequity, various mortal diseases etc.

"Looking ahead to 2015 and beyond, there is no question that we can achieve the overarching goal: we can put an end to poverty. In almost all instances, experience has demonstrated the

validity of earlier agreements on the way forward; in other words, we know what to do. But it requires an unswerving, collective, long-term effort."
(United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon 2008)

This is really the highest expression of responsibility which is supported by governments of all UN nations, especially by those of the "rich" part of the world.

States, international institutions, international community

Many people that are coping to survive in war, disasters, or long term starving not only have each other to lean on, but find additional relief in the protection, food and basic care provided by international aid. The world of international aid is very complicated. The actors are first of all people stricken by war, disasters, people who are starving and suffering from diseases, but also helping individuals and organizations in the field, in direct contact with the victims. Beyond this there are organizations who organize the aid as for instance international non-governmental organization, United Nations, different agencies, which work for states who finance the international development cooperation, DG8, World Bank, World Summits, tax payers, philanthropist and last, but not least, individual donors.

Humanitarian assistance

Every society has safety nets for its own needy, while the western society expresses its interest to help yet others by the message of humanitarism: "to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found." The desire to assist people in need is old. It has its roots in Christianity 2000 years ago. The history of modern humanitarian aid lasts 150 years. We can say that only globalisation made possible that humanitarian relief had been realized in the way we could see it now. Aid is an integrated part of everyday realities of crises and post crises situations. Humanitarian relief is called very often emergency relief. The reason for changing the terminology for emergency is that there is the experience that the aid has to cover the basic needs of people and has to be very fast and effective in order to help the people to recover and adopt to a new livelihood.

Reconstruction

Once the emergency is over, more aid comes in order to rebuild the society. This phase or kind of aid has to help the people to build new houses and establish some livelihood. This part of aid is very sensitive one. It is very difficult to recognize, when the people want to start their "new lives". It differs very much, and is very much dependent on the kind of suffering the people went through. This kind of aid is directed at building capacities and prevention works in order to diminish vulnerability. Sometimes it is very difficult to distinguish it from development (but even from the emergency phase – especially after the war conflicts).

Development aid and cooperation

In the development cooperation, there are "big players" engaged. Development aid is realized by big organizations, in long-term perspectives, almost often by money from the governments or international or trans-national organizations. The amount of money invested into development aid is enormous. Until 2005 2.3 trillion USD had been invested (Easterly 2006, 165). There are at least 5 main reasons why development aid is realized: ethics (corresponding to responsibility), security, economics, environment and politics. The instruments on how to realize development vary from political decisions on the highest global level (as decisions of G8) and cooperation with states to the work of small organizations doing social work and supporting cooperation on the level of local communities.

International Social Work

Development on the local level can be seen as international social work (Cox, Pawar 2006). The above mentioned evidence confirms that relying on trade or foreign investment alone is not enough. International social work (ISW) is a long term effort of different development organizations who work at the grass roots level, in synergy with local communities enhancing and supporting their local capacities and decreasing their vulnerabilities. The work of ISW is not limited only by the cooperation with local communities; but also with specific population as migrants and minorities. One of the most important roles that ISW plays is in the reconciliation and peace-building process. The main role of ISW is working with vulnerable, excluded groups and communities with the main task: reduce the poverty and enhance human dignity.

The international social work approach understands its work from 4 main perspectives: global, ecological, social development and human rights. The instruments the ISW uses are community work, empowerment of communities, different sorts of participatory approaches, and community support: basic literacy courses, primary school education, basic health care, adult education, basic training, and people's capacity building, awareness-raising and empowerment, local income-generation programs, credit schemes and people's banks, community-based welfare programs, self-help groups and promotion of self-reliance, collective responses to specific situations, leadership development, local organization and institution promotion and capacity building, linking local organizations to government agencies and international structures, comprehensive community development programs (Cox, Pawar 2006, 143).

4. Approaches and values

Once the disaster happens in a vulnerable country, a very fast response is needed. According to local conditions which depend on intensity of the disaster, the coping capacity of concerned population and the activity of the government in charge, international relief is offered. It is true that emergency or humanitarian relief has saved many lives and reduced human suffering during the emergency situation while delivering water, sanitation, shelter, health care and food. Nevertheless – in order to be as fast as possible – there are mistakes done – many of them are evitable. The time pressure is very often also caused by impatient donors (regardless of whom they are) who want to see results. That is why local population is omitted, the aid is offered regardless of local capacities and coping mechanisms. The other problem is to recognize the end of emergencies, because agencies are part of the field actors that together constitute the reality in the emergency and post – emergency situation. Assistance in reconstruction and humanitarian aid are both criticized for their inability to adjust to local realities of emergency and post emergency. This differs very much if reconstruction is done after a war or a simple disaster. Most crises are combined crises with wars or ethnic conflicts; the emergency situation with violence continues together with the reconstruction (Bankoff, Frerks and Hillhorst 2004). Another problem of this kind resulting from the long term delivery of basic goods could be creating dependencies and supporting the exchange of food for guns, not to mention the creation of other inequalities as well as envy among people. In addition to this, the speed of action sometimes makes transparent accounting impossible (Princová 2008).

Although the distinction between relief and reconstruction is sometimes hard to recognize, it is necessary to start with the reconstruction phase as soon as possible. This phase, as seen above has very much to do with prevention programs and building local capacities. We speak about developmental relief, where the principle of participation is strongly required. The complementary LRRD approach is applied as much as possible

because it brings into life the continuous help to the population through prevention programs in order to lower the vulnerability and increase the capacity of the population.

Another approach is the human rights approach implemented by human rights organizations, which expanded their mandate for promoting economical, social and cultural rights. Focusing only on civil and political rights does not cover the most serious areas of human suffering. These organizations advocate for instance justice in organizing collective resources in the society (Bell, Coicaud 2008).

Easterly (2006) divides the world of international aid into the world of "planners" and the world of "seekers". In the context of this lecture we could say that "big players" are "planners" and the developmental relief and international social work people are "seekers".

5. Conclusion

There is not a direct link between globalisation and poverty. It is more appropriate to speak about links between poverty and inequality. Is inequality our limit? If we want to reduce inequality, does it mean that the equality is a goal? Is it the means or the goal? Equality is not embedded in all religions or accepted by all cultures. It is a multidimensional concept, not possible to be a universal principle, because we were born in different societies, and we grow up in different cultures. In addition, a minimal degree of individualism and universalism in the society is important. Erik Thorbecke (in Pinstrup-Andersen and Sandoe 2007) expresses the hypothesis that the communities and societies with cooperative behaviors lived better than those who did not accept this principle. He concludes that cooperative behaviors seem to be more natural. The cooperative behaviors are required and appreciated by all actors – local people as well as the helpers, who eventually come:

"There are great reservoirs of affection, resourcefulness and compassion among the poor, which make lives tolerable, when they might otherwise be unbearable… it is impossible to overestimate the spontaneous generosity and the accummulated wisdom of people who have, amazingly not been embittered by the troubles and losses they have sustained"(Seabrook 2007, 66).

Cooperative behaviors could help to diminish the extremes in poverty and in exclusion. The skills and methods of international social work could help to overcome limits of "big plans" of "big planers" – politicians, and international institutions, which do decrease poverty but they cannot see the hidden effects of growing extreme poverty and exclusion because they are for them invisible. "Development must be about people and therefore focus on building people capacities" (Amartya Sen in Pinstrup-Andersen and Sandoe 2007).

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The Limits of Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation in War-torn Separatist Regions (A Case Study of Abkhazia)

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Abstract

Throughout the Cold War, the international donor community had confined their effort in conflict situations primarily to humanitarian aid and ideologically motivated development cooperation. Donors were not prepared to deal with the multiple and complex challenges of post-conflict reconstruction, which came with the end of the cold war and were connected with the processes of globalisation. After a period of violent conflict, war-torn societies face many challenges. In many cases they lack the financial, institutional and human resources to solve the problems bounded with post-conflict reconstruction. External actors are asked to play a more active role in assisting countries emerging from conflicts, but there are legal, budgetary and ethical limits of humanitarian aid and development cooperation. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate on the case study of Abkhazia, that the classical paradigm of linear cycle of post-conflict reconstruction via the fluent transformation from a short term humanitarian aid to a longer term development cooperation, simply can not function in separatist regions.

Key words: humanitarian aid, Abchazia, separatism

1. Introduction

The plan for the European post-war recovery was introduced by George Marshall in 1947. During the next four years the USA invested into the infrastructure, social and economic system of the continent, which was heavily affected by the events of the Second World War, roughly 13 billion USD. Rapid recovery of the living standard of pre-war European citizens was mainly accomplished by massive humanitarian aid and deliberate investments. This outstanding success led to the call for Marshall Plan's equivalent in regions that had gone through an armed conflict. It is necessary to say that the conditions of Europe at the end of 1940s were markedly different from the conditions in countries ravaged by armed conflicts today. Admittedly, European infrastructure was heavily disrupted, but institutional environment and know-how necessary for the absorption of aid remained unscathed. In addition Western Europe was the crucial ally of the United States in the fight against the spread of communism. With the end of the Cold War this ideological motivation disappeared and donor countries today weigh all the pros and cons as to whom provide the economic, political and moral support.

Besides conventional humanitarian aid that aims to stabilize the situation immediately after the war in the worst affected areas through material supplies, donor countries are not willing enough to provide long-term programs into regions of conflict on the grounds of the high probability of new violence escalation. If only for this reason it is clear that area-wide programs of post-conflict recovery similar to the Marshall Plan are not practicable at the beginning of the 21st century.

It is thus the aim of the international community to support the development of war-affected regions through more specifically oriented recovery programs traditionally including

humanitarian aid and development cooperation. These two approaches have their own theoretical starting points, and legal, budgetary and ethical limits. In this paper we examine the potential of each approach for separatist regions, since their position in the area of development cooperation is considerably different from that of other regions without separatist tendencies. Their uniqueness will be shown on the case study of Abkhazia. The theoretical starting points will be described on the basis of secondary literature dealing with post-conflict reconstruction; consequently we apply this theory to the analysis of the results of foreign development activities during the post-war recovery of Abkhazia.

2. From war to post-conflict reconstruction

War permeates the history of human civilization from the dawn of mankind and thus has taken various shapes; it is thus not easy to find a universal definition. For the purpose of this paper, which is primarily not concerned with war itself but rather with post-war reconstruction, it will be sufficient to define war as the most violent form of social conflict during which more than 1000 inhabitants die due to direct armed attack among two and more sides, at least one of them being organized state.[33] As for the intensity, war is here perceived as the last and the highest stage of conflict.

Conflicts are often classified into three stages: pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict. The crucial engagement of development organizations arrives mostly in the last stage, for which the post-conflict reconstruction became the accepted usage in the development terminology. This idea calculates with a linear cycle of post-conflict reconstruction from humanitarian aid to development cooperation. Since today it is the predominant approach to the development of war-affected regions, we will apply these crucial stages on the post-conflict reconstruction of Abkhazia.

3. Conflict in Abkhazia and its consequences

Abkhazia is a small republic on the eastern coast of the Black Sea[34], where the disputes between Abkhazians and Georgians grew into an armed conflict at the beginning of the 1990s. The results were 15 000 casualties, a population decrease from 525 000 to today's 160 000 inhabitants[35], more than 300 000 refugees and a completely devastated infrastructure. Abkhazians took control over the whole territory of historical Abkhazia, and declared sovereignty and independence from Georgia. On the official level the war was ended by the April 1994 peace agreements. Although signed sixteen years ago, the two key questions, without which no sustainable peace can take place – the political status of Abkhazia and the conditions for the return of refugees – were not yet solved. Economic vulnerability is to a great extent the result of political instability, population decrease, closed borders and embargo and manifested itself in the collapse of the VAT and the lack of personnel in the most important economic sectors (agriculture and tourism). It is possible to say that a palpable tension between Abkhazians and Georgians persists in the ethnic, political and economic domain till today. Though arms were laid down, the conflict continues. For such a conflict the term Frozen Conflict became an accepted usage.

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[33]   Though the methodology and the approach to the study of conflicts are different at the Heidelberg Institute (HIIK) and Uppsala Project (UCDP), the two main approaches in conflict research, this basic definition is common to both of them

[34]   It is a separatist region with a surface area covering 8 600 km². Georgia insists on the autonomous status of Abkhazia inside the Georgian state structures, Abkhazia is demanding full independence based on the right of nations for self-determination.

[35]   When the last population census took place in Abkhazia in 1989, the number was 525 000. The after-war numbers of inhabitants vary from source to source since they are based on estimates. The number 160 000 comes from estimates done by the observer mission UNOMIG under the patronage of the UN, which took place at the end of 1998. It is the most frequently stated and relatively broadly accepted estimate.

3.1 Persistent need for humanitarian aid in Abkhazia

Humanitarian aid is aiming at providing assistance during war and immediately after its ending, specifically focusing on hardship reduction. Furthermore it should offer an opportunity for reaching worthy life conditions for war-affected people.

After the war, relations between Abkhazians and Georgians remain very strained, and cases of mutual cooperation are very scarce. As a consequence, together with very low budget outlay of Abkhazia, the living standards of the Abkhazian population are still very low and their improvement depends to a great degree on foreign interventions. The most important among them is humanitarian aid, which has long tradition in Abkhazia. Organizations like the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have been engaged in Abkhazia from the beginning of the war. Almost one third of the Abkhazian population depended on their aid during 1990s and even in 2006 these organizations still provided the humanitarian aid for 20 000 people. In addition, funds like UNIFEM, WFP and ECHO earmark from the end of 1990s every year the amount of 2 million € on safeguarding food self-sufficiency (OCHA: Interim report on Abkhazian events, 2003, 5).

Activities of these organizations are therefore to this day quite indispensable, nevertheless it is clear they are not, and will not, be sufficient. Food self-sufficiency should be connected with a basic reconstruction of the agricultural infrastructure, but international organizations fund such projects only in the three southern-most Abkhazian regions (Gali, Ochamchira and Tkvarcheli)[36], where stabilization and development are based on Georgian support. Since Georgia has not guaranteed in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper the support of agricultural infrastructure in entire Abkhazia, but only in the aforementioned three southern regions, the recovery of the agricultural infrastructure in other regions cannot come about. Donors policy goes hand in hand with the statements of the EU, USA and UN leaders, who declare unequivocal support for Georgian territorial integrity. This example shows that even if humanitarian activities would correspond to the primarily minimalist concept and aid would be provided only on the basis of core humanitarian principles: independence, objectivity and neutrality, aid cannot be in war-affected region entirely apolitical. Thus humanitarian organizations have to still engage in this area even when it is more than fifteen years after the war and emergency aid is usually described as short term in nature.

3.2 Development Cooperation in Constraints of Donor Countries Foreign Policy

The initial phase of aid, essential for securing population's survival and safety, is followed by the phase of subsequent economic and social development. In the linear cycle of post-conflict reconstruction through external intervention, this type of aid is represented by development cooperation.

At the beginning of 1990s the system of development cooperation was oriented on donor possibilities, therefore donors provided aid within their policies and at their own discretion. A change in the understanding of development cooperation appeared in 1996, when the Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) issued the document "Shaping the 21st Century". This document for the first time stressed the need for a forward orientation of the aid on the grounds of recipient's requirements, which is in effect still today. This means that every country accepting development aid must have The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The government of the receiving country should, after a broad public debate, introduce its macroeconomic, structural and social policies, that would lead to economic growth and poverty reduction. Foreign donors would proceed in their activities into the defined sectors and regions only on the grounds of the PRSP. In other words, foreign donors should provide

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[36] Before war an overwhelming majority of the population in these regions was comprised of Georgians and the planned return of refugees is to begin actually in those districts.

their aid only to those sectors and regions which are stated as priorities in the PRSP of the receiving country. In the case of Abkhazia donors should provide development cooperation only on the basis of the PRSP issued by the Georgian government.

The first Georgian PRSP from June 2003 dealt with development possibilities of Abkhazia, but all planned activities were to be realized only after its political status would be solved. The development vision for Abkhazia was to promote the political goals of the Georgian government. The economic blockade of Abkhazia from the Russian Federation already did not work and among the leaders of the Georgian parliament and in the government the prevailing idea was that economic sanctions will not be efficient and that it will be necessary to approach the Abkhazian problem more actively. This approach was expressed by the establishment of the Department of Conflict Resolution in April 2004. One of its goals was the coordination of development activities with foreign donors in Abkhazia. The Department authorized the realization of development projects in Abkhazia even before the political issues concerning its status were solved. All aid was territorially limited to the Gali region and was to be used for the repatriation of Georgian refugees and the reconstruction of infrastructure connected with their return (building of schools, reconstruction of houses, clarification of property relations, seed material and fertilisers supply, water main construction and so on). The new development program was immediately supported from abroad by a united initiative of the European Union, UNDP, USAID, WB and the Swiss development agency.

In 2006 the PRSP was revised. Aside from the Gali region, development activities were extended to the adjacent Ochamchira and Tkvarcheli regions. As for the Georgian side, the projects are controlled by the government and its departments. The realization is provided by Abkhazian non-profit organizations. For the course of the project they are responsible to the donor agency. These projects include the construction of four hospitals, the creation of a registry of returning refugees, programs for their psychosocial stabilization, the opening of a legal aid office for the retroactive acquisition of property, and small projects for employment in the private sector. (Georgia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Progress Report 2006, 78-79).

Multilateral development agencies provide in addition to financial backing also the necessary know-how. The European Commission, the United Nations Development (UNDP) and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) provide nearly 4 million € every year for the socio-economic recovery of Abkhazia. In relation to these activities another million € is provided by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and less than one million € by the ECD-Decentralized Cooperation Program (Georgia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Progress Report 2006, 61). Although the Georgian government declares the stabilization of Abkhazia as one of its main priorities, the financial reality is not corresponding with this declaration. In the last ten years Georgia has received a total of 130 – 230 million € every year, of which Abkhazia has access to only 6 million €. (Monitoring Resource Flows To Fragile States 2007, 66). The efforts of foreign development organizations take into account the Georgian PRSP entirely and realize its activities exclusively in the specified sectors and above mentioned regions, that have a potential to accept larger amount of refugees of Georgian nationality. All development cooperation in Abkhazia leads unequivocally to the formation of adequate conditions for the return of refugees and to safeguarding their subsequent safety. Development strategy defined in the PRSP proves to eliminate in practice very successfully the development activities that could serve the economic development of the separatist region and thus contribute to the political support of the local separatist regime. Another possible explanation of the absence of development projects in the rest of the Abkhazian territory is the fact that for bilateral donors development

intervention is an integral part of their foreign policy that unambiguously supports the preservation of the Georgian territorial integrity.

Conclusion

Humanitarian aid should lead to the most effective restoration of dignified living conditions of local inhabitants. With a low rate of public expenditure in separatist regions the activity of humanitarian organizations is necessary not only to reduce hardships for inhabitants after war, but at the same time to serve at least to a partial infrastructure recovery. In spite of that humanitarian aid from its very nature should not lead to profound structural changes. If there were such ambitions, humanitarian organizations would have to struggle to abide by their code of independence, impartiality and neutrality. In separatist regions it is hard to remain apolitical even in cases, in which humanitarian organizations have only minimalist goals. In situation of ethnic conflict aid must flow equitably to all ethnic groups. In Abkhazia, humanitarian organizations engaged in the Gali region have, on the grounds of supporting only Georgian refugees, damaged their reputation in the rest of Abkhazia.

Development cooperation has its limits in post-conflict reconstruction as well. While in other post-war regions there usually are legitimate authorities that international development organizations can regard as partners, in separatist regions the situation is different. Since all potential bilateral donors from states associated in the OECD/DAC implicitly accept the principle of Georgian territorial integrity and the principle of partnership and aid orientation based on recipient´s needs, it is not possible for them to realize almost any development projects in Abkhazia. These principles provide Georgia with effective instruments for the suspension of foreign development interventions activities in their separatist regions. Development cooperation thus in those particular cases cannot be conducive to economic and social development in some regions. Since selection of priority countries for development cooperation is moreover an integral part of foreign policy of all donor countries associated in the OECD/DAC, the political issues in those cases are superior to development issues.

Not even after fifteen years from signing the Moscow Peace Treaty did the efforts of the international community lead to political peace that would guarantee Abkhazia a chance for economic and social development. If it is not possible to reach sustainable peace in the top-down process, the only chance for development of separatist regions through foreign development interventions is via bottom-up processes. These include a broad engagement of local civic society through the so-called peace-building. This can happen through soft projects funded mainly by non-profit organizations with the aim to build up and support civic society. If there is no political will to settle a conflict in a separatist region, no economic and social development can take place within the paradigm of the linear cycle of post-conflict reconstruction through transition from humanitarian aid to development cooperation.

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Transnational Development Agency of Migrants: Problematic Aspects of Research on Remittances

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Abstract

The globalisation debate is predominantly dealing with the intensity of the phenomenon and its influences upon the societal, political and economic structures. The neo-liberal perspective of globalisation highlights the spread of a unified global economic system and its increasing influence upon the state. This mono-causal explanation of globalisation unevenly emphasizes the economic background of global processes – including migration. In this sense migrants are seen purely as a labour force, motivated by a desire to increase their income and lower economic risks. The rational analysis of migrant behaviour is also applied upon their remitting activities which are predominantly researched in the quantitative categories of volume or share of GDP.

This paper joins the critique of the economy-based quantitative approach which is seen as overly simplifying. It provides the analysis of prevailing scientific investigation on the issues of migration and remittances and introduces alternative qualitative research methods involving the social aspects of remitting such as motivation, targeting or networks of cooperation. In this way the potential for understanding the developmental consequences of remittances is extended; enabling wider understanding of the complex networks created in the processes of global migration.

Key words: economic theories of globalisation, migration, transnationalism, remittances, social remittances, development

Introduction

There are different views on the intensity, scale, causes and periodization of globalisation. The differences are caused mainly by a disagreement about the causes of globalisation which divides the scientists into a "mono-causal" versus a "multi-causal" group. In this way D. Held distinguishes two mono-causal theses of globalisation which he labels as "hyperglobalizers" and "sceptics". Although they have completely opposite views on the current stage of globalizing processes and their progress, both of these theories set the economy as the central cause and decisive force of globalisation. They claim the global (for sceptics, international) system and its various consequences are primarily originating through the economic processes – namely the spread of a global economic system based on the free movement of capital, goods and labour (Held et al. 1995).

In this way globalisation processes are dependent upon the emergence of transnational networks of production, trade, finances and labour in the integrated global market. The hyperglobalizers claim that there emerge transnational channels of economic ties which are effectively influencing both the regional and supranational levels of life. The national states are unable to enforce further their sovereignty upon the economic and consequent social and political processes within their borders. As S. Strange summarizes: "…the impersonal forces of world markets, integrated over the postwar period more by private enterprise in finance, industry and trade than by the cooperative decisions of governments, are now more powerful

than the states to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong. Where states were once the masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states. And the declining authority of states is reflected in a growing diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations, and to local and regional bodies …" (Strange 1996, 4). Thus transnational companies are able to influence state policies, spatialization of workforce or location of income. International organizations enforce neo-liberal re-structuralization of markets through development strategies and other measures.

The globalisation theory labelled as sceptical is predominantly reacting to the hyperglobalisation thesis by claiming that what is seen as a transformative globalisation process is in fact state-controlled interaction among the national economies which ensures the continuation of economic liberalization. The opposition to the hyperglobalist understanding of globalisation is based on the historical analysis and statistical comparison of flows of trade, investment and labour which proves that the economic interdependence is on comparable levels as in the 19th century (Hirst and Thompson 1999, 19 – 61). The globalisation rhetoric is then seen mainly as a tool for the implementation of the neo-liberal economic strategies.

Understanding Migration in the Context of Globalisation

Disregarding these serious antagonisms in understanding globalisation, both hyperglobalizers and sceptics see the phenomenon as caused predominantly by the spread of a unified global economy based on the free movement of finance, goods and workforce. However such a purely economic explanation of globalisation is criticized by many researchers who point to the fact that the global processes are differentiated and influenced by various activities of economic, social, political or ecological character. In sum, globalisation is of multi-causal character and therefore needs to be researched through interdisciplinary approaches (Albrow 1996). The criticized drawbacks of the economy-based research approach can be seen on the issue of transnational networks emerging through global migration.

Migration is seen as one of the crucial aspects of globalisation, increasing in intensity and variability. The consequential transnational networks emerging between the migrants and those left behind are further intensified by the modern communication technologies. These have an important role in the time-space compression; the decreasing importance of space and distance which is one of the major characteristics of globalisation. Globalisation is therefore a necessary part and also further outcome of the whole process as it enables flows of ideas, money, people and goods as well as provides means of contact, communication, transportation etc (Castles 2004).

The global character of migration leads to considering this phenomenon as a system creating a network of connections between areas of origin and destination and their mutual transformation. The migrant is therefore seen as an individual embedded in certain networks and cultural systems which are transferred during the process of migration (Skeldon 1997; Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002). Therefore, though the research is usually concentrating on the transfers from the host country to the country of origin we should be aware of the continuity of the migrant experience which is oriented in the opposite way and influences the outcomes of such transfers. The complex view on migration is expressed by H. De Haan: "Population movements are not economistic reactions to push and pull factors, but patterns of migration are determined by social and cultural institutions embedded in local customs and ideologies" (De Haan 1999, 9).

Drawbacks of Economic Theories of Migration

The transnational networks created by migrants are therefore of complex character; influenced by communities themselves as well as by the state policies on migration and integration in the sending, receiving and transit countries, the integrated global communication technologies and many other factors. In this way transnational networks form an important part of the globalisation process.

The simplifying economic explanations thus neglect the social processes linking the countries of origin and destination and the various forms of engagement between them (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002). This complexity is therefore ignored by both the hyperglobalizers and sceptics who restrict the migratory patterns to simple economically motivated, rational decisions of increasing profit and decreasing risks. Migrants are in this sense labelled as labour force; part of the global economy shifted around on the base of supply and demand, push and pull factors and needs of the markets. Such are the driving forces of migration identified by theories of migration based in the economic thinking (Massey et al. 1993). Migrants are seen as passively responding to forces of global economy with the only interest of increasing financial profit of their own or their nearest family members. Therefore the mono-causal economic understanding of globalisation simplifies the emerging transnational networks to financial and material transfers between migrants and their home countries.

The importance of these transfers lies in their developmental potential which is the main reason behind the booming research on this issue. There are various ways in which migration and development are linked. A lot of discussion centres on whether migration is the result of development or the other way round. Given the complex connection of these two phenomena the simplifying economic approach to them brings biased results. The example could be the sudden political interest in the provision of development aid as the increasing development levels of some countries were seen as a way of stopping the migration flows from them. However especially from the short and mid term point of view this approach proves to be misleading as it is based on the wrong assumption that poverty breeds migration while it neglects the stimulative effects of socio-economic development on migration (Skeldon 1997, 2008; De Haas 2007).

The migrants' transfers labelled as remittances are defined as earnings and material resources transferred by international migrants or refugees to recipients in their country of origin (THP and UNESCO 2008). Therefore the scientific literature understands remittances predominantly as financial or material outcomes of migrants' economic activity transferred to country of origin where they are used for increasing the levels of development (Skeldon 2008). In this way remittances are nowadays recognized as an additional source of various forms of developmental resources. However this approach shows the signs of the economy-based mono-causal simplification of the remitting processes. The research of this phenomenon is mainly undertaken by quantitative methods. Already these analyses (including comparison to volumes of ODA and shares of GDP) have proven the positive outcomes of remittances like the increase in economic growth, standards of living, competitiveness and social capital (Maimbo and Ratha 2005; Mansoor and Quillin 2007). Many official bodies take these outcomes of remitting for granted and there is a threat that the individual or community agency will substitute the work and initiative which should be on the agenda of both developing and developed countries' governments (Uribe and Buss 2008). The matter is further unbalanced as there are serious drawbacks in the institutional and societal structures which prevent the effective use of provided aid.

Therefore the economic assessment of remittances as a developmental tool puts a disproportional amount of responsibility on a proportionally small group of migrants without providing them with adequate recognition and assistance. Concentration on negative effects of migration (e.g. brain drain) and blaming the migrants themselves for the lack of development

can be thus analysed as tactical approach of drawing the attention from the actual drawbacks of the political, economic and aid structures (Skeldon 2008; Newland 2009).

The criticism of remittances also aims at the lack of control, the creation of dependency, and the unequal distribution and consumption use. This attitude omits the fact that remittances are just one part of a complex socio-economic system; their income can therefore release other resources which would be otherwise linked to primary consumption. The analysis of their influences should therefore look further than just at the direct outcomes as there are often secondary ones which are still socially desirable (Skeldon 1997; Carling 2005; Ozden and Schiff 2006). Criticism of remitting also seems to be based on the presumption that there can be one universal solution to the problem of underdevelopment. Remittances can have both positive and negative impacts; however if they are effectively combined with other channels of development cooperation, they should be seen as an important contribution to the development scheme.

An Alternative Concept of Social Remittances
The system of social remittances has not been paid much attention so far. In general social remittances share many characteristics with financial remittances: the issue of motivation, influence of existing socio-economic and political networks in both home and host countries and especially the need for an open and flexible system of cooperation; all of which have a critical impact upon the sustainability of the outcomes of the remitting agency.

The main difference therefore lies in going beyond the simplistic optics viewing migrants as market driven economic actors. The actual reality of migration is a complex and dynamic process driven by a mix of social, political and economic motivations. Therefore explaining migration in the context of free market is at least biased as there are present both individual and collective motivations, influences and outcomes (Skeldon 1997; Castles 2000). Concentration on financial remittances also omits all other forms in which migrants may contribute to development of their home countries. The perspective of social remitting enables us to pay attention to activities going beyond material and financial transfers (though their importance is not at all contested by this paper).

In an attempt to grasp the complex image of remitting reality a pilot research on social remitting activities of migrants was undertaken in Ireland in the period of February to March 2009 by the Immigrant Council of Ireland; an independent non-governmental organization that promotes the rights of migrants through information, legal advice, advocacy, lobbying, research and training work. The research was based on a set of basic presumptions:
-   positive impact of social remittances on development;
-   active role of migrants in the development process; variability of strategies of movement, transfer and co-operation between their places of origin and destination;
-   complexity of migration-led development, going beyond purely economic understanding and analysis (Castles 2000);
-   determination of form, scale and volume of activities of the migrant by his/her status in both sending and receiving society, level of social integration and ability to reach for available sources of assistance and cooperation in legal, financial, social and community processes and networks (Libercier and Schneider 1996; Skeldon 1997; ICI 2008);

The inclusive definition of social remittances was created, recognizing them as material and nonmaterial transfers such as skills, know-how, knowledge, techniques, methods and values used for and by the wider community exceeding the family relationships; submitted by individuals or groups of international migrants or refugees and used in various forms of collective projects with the motivation of giving back to the community and improving its welfare (THP and UNESCO 2008; ICI 2009). Such understanding of remitting activities

makes possible a much wider approach to the issue and its complex analysis, including the social aspects of the transnational networks.

The qualitative approach was accepted as the research so far was concentrating mainly on the hard migration data and volumes of the remittance flows. Aiming on the unexplored topic of social remitting the qualitative methodology of semi-structured interviews was used to allow appropriate narrative space for the interviewees. The qualitative research aiming on individual experience also enabled deeper insight into the topic of social remittances, their variety and processes connected to them. The use of qualitative methods for research also enables us to grasp the non-quantitative character of social remittances (Libercier and Schneider 1996).

Based on the basic presumptions the research identified the actual forms of social remitting and their organization, motivation and networks of cooperation as the main aspects of migrants' agency. The final analysis has proven the immense development potential of the social remitting projects as these posses the main characteristics of currently appraised post-developmental approach to aid delivery. The migrants concentrate on creating and supporting community-based, sustainable and small scale projects aiming on the establishment of alternative power channels enabling the empowerment of local communities otherwise neglected by the state or ODA structures. Leaving aside this potential, the migrants themselves do not label their activities as specifically developmental. This fact might be connected with their motivation for the activity as the pilot research identified motivations varying from religious reasons to philanthropy. Rather than to development as such the migrants connect their remitting agency primarily to their beliefs, need of giving back to their native community or will to further spread the spirit of voluntarism and use gained experience.

Other important data, which would be otherwise neglected by the quantitative analysis, regarded the issue of available networks of cooperation in both the host and home country. The countries of origin and especially the local communities are quite opened to participation in migrant-led projects, although there might arise an opposition to programs promoting cultural change (e. g. the empowerment of women). On the other hand the migrants have higher chances to be effectively active in states which otherwise isolate themselves from international development cooperation (e. g. Algeria) or where the official development and state structures are prone to corruption (e.g. Pakistan, Zimbabwe).

The case of Ireland showed that even the developed, democratic countries, where the migrants and refugees head to and from where they later organize the remitting projects, have severe problems with an effective incorporation of these activities to own developmental structures. The migrants have to deal with issues of trust and create a "good reputation" on a long term basis before they are recognized as actors in the development sector. This fact is connected to the prevailing negative imagery of migrants in the media and the public opinion as they are often labelled as passive recipients of state social welfare and their variable social activities are predominantly neglected. Their negative imagery can be also linked to the overall passive imagery of developing countries receiving the development aid without own initiative. The migrants are thus seen as representatives of these countries and the generalized prejudices lead to discrimination against their activities.

Conclusions

The goal of this paper was to highlight the insufficiency of the economy-based theories for investigation of the complex reality of social, economic, political, cultural and environmental factors of the phenomenon of globalisation and their consequences on the individual, state and transnational levels. The emergence of alternative approaches notwithstanding, they prevail in research on the global issues which leads to the omission of

many aspects of the transnational reality. Although the qualitative, interdisciplinary approaches are supported by globalisation theorists, their development and application in research is still rather complicated as the new approaches need to be further tested and prove their validity.

An example of such alternative research approach is the concentration on the social aspect of remitting agency of migrants. The pilot research on social remittances proved that further research on the issue can help to replace the economic view on migrants by the one recognizing their personal agency, intellectual, manual and organizational skills, experience and expertise. Further research may therefore achieve the full recognition of migrants as agents of development and gain access to their abilities and experiences to various development bodies. Such approaches should be supported by the need of grasping the complexity of migrant agency which in many ways possesses the currently proposed characteristics of post-development tactics of self-empowerment led by the developing communities themselves. Therefore the social remittances provide a chance of creating alternative to ODA structures struck by inefficiency, administrative costs and bureaucracy.

Overall it is clear that the processes linking migration and development are complex and highly influenced by all the actors included; this fact should be reflected by any further research. In this way it is possible to reflect that though the transnational networks seem to be influenced by various policies and structures they are still created and changed by the individuals.

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Regions and cities, virtual and real

Globalised Aestheticisation of Urban Decay

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Abstract

In relation to landscape, Antoine Picon argues that we are on the eve of an aesthetic re-enchantment of the world (Picon 2000). Contemporary landscape – and this is a global trait – is predominantly technological, manufactured, and hybrid. Not only its physical features but also our understanding of it has changed dramatically in the past few decades. I would like to devote my paper to developing some considerations about this anxious landscape cluttered with the rusty scraps of technological past, about the obsolete in urban landscape, or, about urban decay.

I am especially interested in the re-enchantment of urban decay within contemporary technological landscape. It has recently been brought about by scholars, artists and others who like spending their time exploring the anxious and scrappy urban landscape. In the paper, I use their accounts and imaginary of the landscape in order to sketch out the emerging ways of aestheticisation or emotional response to such places. Since the interest as well as urban exploration movement is global, this leads me to draw some considerations about landscape as an emerging specific global experience. Landscape is not only globalised on a material level – as a locus and product of production-consumption cycles – but it is becoming so also on an experiential level.

In his article on contemporary urban landscape architecture historian Antoine Picon argues that landscape has profoundly changed in the last few decades and that what we need is to attune to the newly emerged aesthetics (Picon 2000). In this paper, I would like to develop further some of Picon's insights regarding this emerged landscape and the aesthetics that goes hand in hand with it. I am specifically interested in the urban decay, those obsolete, rusty and scrappy bits and pieces scattered around drawing our immediate attention to the past of contemporary landscape that has become predominantly technological, manufactured, and hybrid, governed by the city and reshaped and reworked according to its needs and tastes.

Keywords: landscape, urban decay, urban exploration, globalisation

Contemporary landscape and urban decay

Since the industrial revolution, it is the city that "constitutes the most primary landscape, the one we have directly before our eyes," the one that is no more rural and pastoral but rather technological, fractal, disturbing and seemingly boundless, sprawling into its surroundings and absorbing them (Picon 2000, 67). Contemporary landscape is predominantly functional, technological and lousy with an over-abundance of aesthetic stimuli. This essential and explicit functionality of urban landscape grounded in technology and expressed by the aesthetic over-abundance of intentions and stimuli goes hand in hand with the process of "accelerated aging", when the objects suddenly cease to serve the function they were designed for and become obsolete.

Regarding Western landscape tradition grounded in pictorial framing, detachment of spectator and a kind of peacefulness of contemplating mind, the anti-landscape character of contemporary landscape Picon speaks about can be seen as leading to the very anxiety he

identifies as one of its key characteristics. What Picon suggests, however, is that we are maybe at the eve of a re-enchantment of our seemingly anaesthetic yet aesthetically over-abundant world (Picon 2000).

In what follows, I will concentrate on the obsolete in the landscape that I provisionally call urban decay and by means of that I will try to support my belief that there has been a kind of aesthetic attunement to the anxious landscape emerging. However, considering its background and objects, this taste for urban decay is not as detached from Western landscape tradition as it could seem.

I will analyse this emerging attunement or at least the aesthetically informed interest on three levels. I believe we can observe it within academia and hence I will at first summarise some of the works done by academics on urban decay. Then I will move on to those who actively seek to experience the urban decay and I will analyse the accounts of experiencing it. This will lead to how urban decay has been (visually) represented, which is the third and most complex level I will plunge into. Since the taste for urban decay seems to be global, all the three levels will help me to draw some reflections on the nature of globalisation, which will also take me back to where I started – to the contemporary landscape and its nature.

Urban decay analysed …

Regarding social science, strange and marginal spaces have become more and more a central topic since de Certeau (1984) and Lefebvre (1991). While deCerteau inspires analyses to concentrate on the everydayness and practice, tactics and strategies, Lefebvre turned the attention to the opaqueness of space, to the very fact that space (and representation of space) reveals as well as hides (Jansson and Lagerkvist 2009, 3). Since then strange spaces of any kind have been used to unravel politics as well as poetics of space, probably because their "strangeness" helps the hidden to become visible. Gandy (2005) for example shows how a strand in geography has recently turned to cyborg as a metaphor for hybridity of space and by means of it approached the city.

Urban decay represents an example of strange as well as hybrid space and as such, although termed differently, has been analysed in various studies employing diverse approaches and accentuating different facets. Thus Gandy (2006) uses Los AngelesRiver, concreted river basin weaving unnoticed through the backstage of LA, in order to discuss the encounter of nature with modernist urban planning, while Williams (2004) discusses the redevelopment of the Albert Dock in Liverpool in order to analyse material changes brought to the city by de-industrialization and globalised capital.

Tim Edensor on the other hand examines industrial ruins with respect to sensory experience and argues that such marginal spaces are far richer than common urban space (Edensor 2007). He also asserts that the disordered materiality of industrial ruins cannot be confined within a single narrative of the past and that it opens up possibilities for alternative, more personal and less ordered histories (Edensor 2005a). Employing the metaphor of ghost that haunts in different manners the ruined spaces, he also argues that such spaces are more vibrant and less regulated, opened to more playful approach and thus thanks to unregulated multiple material affordances represents a spatial counterpart to the urban space (Edensor 2005b, 2005c). For example Trigg approaches urban decay similarly when he asserts that we are attracted to it because of its aesthetic qualities, by the "embroidery of decay" (Trigg 2004 quoted in Armstrong 2006).

Spectral metaphors of ghost and haunting have been used on a more general level by authors like Pile (2005) or Holloway and Kneale (2008) in order to capture the geographical (urban) world in a livelier and more enchanted manner since they believe it to be more enchanted and less generalised than it appears in academic texts. The metaphor of a ghost

draws on the Freudian notion of uncanny describing the potential to experience the familiar becoming unfamiliar (Vidler 1992, 7). For obvious reasons, urban decay can be and often is conceived as being uncanny, since it offers to experience the familiar-unfamiliar shift.

I hope this brief – and surely not exhausting – overview showed why social scientists are increasingly attracted to and interested in urban decay. One of the reasons is clearly expressed by Armstrong while she argues for the landscape of contempt – as she calls it – because of the experiential and emotional possibilities it offers. The second reason is, as I tried to show in detail elsewhere (Gibas 2008), a political one – spaces of urban decay open up possibilities for alternatives and for more critical approach to planning and to the politics of memory and urban space.

… experienced, …

In the work on technological sublime Nye traces the development of the sublime experience of technology and of works of modernity such as bridges, factories, dams, technological networks and means of transport. He shows that the accomplishments of technological progress used to stimulate strong emotional response in the general public. Technology and its outcomes used to be approached with awe, terror, and fascination – they used to be sublime (Nye 1994). Complementary to his study is a paper by Kaika and Swyngedouw in which they disclose how the sublime experience of modernity rose and then subsided into a disinterested neglect together with the exhaustion of the project of modernity as such (Kaika and Swyngedouw 2000).

It could thus seem that urban decay would today only arouse contempt and unfocused disinterest. However, there is a growing movement of people who devote their free time and energy to explore such spaces in detail. They are usually labelled – by themselves as well as by others – urban explorers since their aim is to explore hidden and inaccessible parts of the city – technological networks as well as abandoned spaces, everything marked with the sign "No entry". As Ninjalicious, one of the founding fathers put it: "Urban explorers strive to actually earn their experiences, by making discoveries that allow them to get in on the secret workings of cities and structures, and to appreciate fantastic, obscure spaces that might otherwise go completely neglected" (Infiltration n/d). Indeed, urban exploration does not devote itself solely to urban decay, but a brief look at various exploration web pages as well as magazines reveals that urban decay constitutes one of the main targets to be explored.

A quick Google search shows many web pages, magazines and zines, discussion boards, hubs and rings that are devoted to urban exploration, to sharing experience and photographs, discussing strategies and tactics etc. In order to discuss the experience of urban exploration and of urban decay, I chose one particular Internet magazine – Explonation[37] – that is devoted to providing "a photographic view of the normally unseen or off-limits parts of urban areas or industrial facilities. These areas are unlikely to be seen by the everyday public and as redevelopment occurs these places will be lost forever, taking their history and secrets with them. The contributors aim to capture and record this before it's too late" (Explonation 2009).

To explore and experience places with special respect to those that could be lost in the future and to capture them in a narrative or photographically are the key issues of urban exploration as presented in the Explonation and as such the exploration is wrapped up in a specific set of emotions. Even only the names of the articles in the two already published issues of the Explonation tell a lot: Myth Chateau, Pleasure Beach Ghost Town, Prison Blues, Frozen in Time, or Another World reveal a kind of aestheticisation infused with nostalgia, sadness and maybe sublimity as in the account of an abandoned chateau: "the ornate ceilings

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[37]   Accessible at http://www.explonation.com/

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were breathtaking and yet tinged with sadness" (*Explonation* 1 2009, 10). In another account – that of a ghost town – we can see how nostalgia induced by material setting expressing the obsolescence of the place is closely linked to aesthetic qualities of the place that can arouse a mixture of sadness, fascination, awe, and aesthetic pleasure: "It was like Magic! As we relished in this amazing photograph opportunity I couldn't help but feel sad. Not only for the people of this once lovely town, but for the lonely town itself" (*Explonation* 2, 8-9).

Here nostalgia is an aesthetic category, sought after by people equipped with cameras in order to capture it. I believe the decay is aestheticised partly because it can induce strong emotional reaction the contemporary landscape as analysed by Picon cannot any more. In fact, the strong interlink between exploration and photography and the aestheticisation of decay that induces nostalgia and sublimity, references us more to Western landscape tradition, since the aestheticisation helps the explorer to detach her/himself from the scene, to contemplate peacefully what lies before the lens of his/her camera and to frame it in a similar way romantic painters did more than century ago: "We spent several hours in the school, the years of neglect have done a nice job on the building and the colour scheme is beautiful with the strong light through the glass roof" (*Explonation* 2, 33).

One of common descriptions of the explored spaces is that it is a kind of "another world", which expresses the detachment of the photographer from the scene – s/he is an observer uninterested in much more than her/his experience of pictorially framing the right emotion with a camera: "A beautiful orange ray of light started to illuminate the tanks. … First shot. "Clap". I started to run after the light trying to get best of the place. … We felt like we were in a science fiction. … Weird and Spooky!"(*Explonation* 2, 17).

Paging through Explonation makes anybody understand how much is urban exploration a photographic endeavour. The experience of the place and the photographs of it merge into one whole in the magazine as well as in the activity itself, since explorers are "in it for the thrill of discovery and a few nice pictures" (Infiltration n/d). It seems that for urban explorers photographs are the most common way of sharing the emotions and the experience of the particular explored place and in fact the places as such. The accounts of the explorations as well as the photographs taken resemble each other. What ensues from the accounts is the fact that explorers seek at different and various diverse places still the same nostalgic-and-sublime experience and this quest leads them to a particular experiential, emotional and visual framing of the world.

… and photographed

Urban exploration happens all over the world. It is maybe true, that locals do not necessarily have to perceive the places at stake in the same way explorers do; it does not however contradict the fact that urban exploration is a global movement with all the complexities that this can mean. The places explored are located in various world regions, the explorers come from different countries, the web pages are in different languages and photographs taken in similar style are the main vehicle for sharing experience and emotions. The landscape of urban exploration is framed in a particular way. The activity in general result in the most neglected and marginal spaces being taken up on a global level and in the form of photographs of one genre made circulate within a global network of at least those people who are similarly attuned to their aesthetics.

The Internet offers countless pages where urban decay lay and semi-professional photographs have been exposed to criticism of anybody interested in the genre or in photography in general. Although places depicted in them are from various corners of the world, their stylistic similitude, and the same interest in representing the nostalgic-sublime experience of decay make them variations on the same theme. Moreover, they do so in a very explicit manner amplified by similar commentaries and narratives that accompany them. The

urban decay became to some extent, as one photographer expressed it in an interview, a material for "ruin porn" photography (Vice n/d).

Nevertheless, being pornographically explicit and repetitive or not, these photographs circulating on a global level encompass quite complicated and complex geographies. As della Dora shows, photographs apart from being representations must be considered also objects on their own endowed with their agency. As such, and I believe it is true also for digital photographs flickering on a computer screen, they can activate intimate geographies of emotions and experience, they make places to circulate through space and time, and they help shaping geographical imaginations (della Dora 2009). This is all true for urban decay photographed and published on the web.

These complex geographies are moreover complicated by the works of professional photographers who at least since Hilda and Bernd Becher have been interested in urban decay and who transcend the genre of urban decay discussed previously. Works of photographers like Edward Burtynsky's Manufactured landscapes (2006), Stanley Greenberg's Hidden New York (1998), or Václav Jirásek's Industria (2006) – just to mention a few – use the urban decay or abandonment in order to investigate issues not dissimilar to those that contemporary social science, and geography in particular, is occupied with.

Thus Greenberg's exploration of technological underground in New York poses questions about the link between place, technology, and the obviosity of (energy) consumption and its phantasmagoria (see also Kaika and Swyngedouw 2000); Jirásek's Industria explores the spatial and social consequences of transformation of socialist into post-socialist and capitalist society; and Burtynsky's Manufactured Landscape traces the paths of production-consumption cycles and the ways they transform and reshape contemporary landscape worldwide.

Working both locally (Jirásek, Greenberg) and worldwide (Burtynsky), the artworks of these photographers contribute to a globally re-produced understanding of contemporary landscape and reworking of our aesthetic attunement to our immediate as well as far-distant, imaginary and already nonexistent world. The particular places do not matter as much as urban explorers try to persuade the visitors of their web pages, because they meet on a global level, which suppresses their particularities. What matters is an emotionally aesthetic, or maybe aesthetically emotional, response that lies in behind this specific visual style of framing and thus interpreting the landscape.

What I wanted to show here is my belief that we nowadays witness a kind of re-enchantment of the contemporary technological landscape. Contrary to Picon, I perceive this re-enchantment stemming from Western landscape tradition however focused on the most neglected or overlooked urban spaces. To plunge into the stream can lead us to draw interesting connections between various theoretical and thematic areas including globalisation, policies of urban space, photographic representation of landscape etc. that I have sketched here.

All this can be detected on a global level. Nevertheless, what I have been talking about is a different kind of globalisation that is not based on the flow of capital, goods or people, although it is indeed informed by all of it, but on the circulation of aesthetically charged representations of the most marginal spaces. This flow has been reshaping our understanding of contemporary landscape on a general level, its aesthetic and experiential values as well as our most personal as well as general geographical imagination. To acknowledge this provides a good starting point to understand globalisation also in terms of emotional or aesthetic experience.

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Virtual image of traditional Silesian enterprises as an effect of globalisation process

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Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to present the results of a websites analysis of over one hundred Silesian industrial enterprises. It was assumed that the Internet is the clearest indicator of globalisation processes. In the present economy it is not only important to find the information and communicate with others, but it is also important to create an image compatible with the mission of the organization. The Internet side often contains not only catalogue of products or services, but also detailed information about the life of the enterprise, about its internal matters, positive work environment and good relations with stakeholders. The conducted analysis concerned only enterprises of traditional industry, and their selection was not representative. This approach to analysis of websites expected that the virtual image of traditional industry enterprises in Silesia will reflect traditional values of Silesian culture, such as solid work, solidarity, friendship, social responsibility displayed in the attachment to the region, and preoccupations about its development depending on a knowledge based economy. The main conclusion is that the process of globalisation caused the mixing of values and norms of different investors` cultures functioning in the region of Silesia. Predominant values are already not so clear. Analyzed enterprises present themselves as a solid busines partner and solid tradesman of products or special servises. There are few references to organizational culture favorable to the development of the knowledge based economy, or regional culture as a base for the development of enterprises in a traditional industrial region. Presented conclusions encourage deeper studies on company websites using other research methods.

Key words: Image, information policy, modern technologies, social responsibility of the company, regional cultural values.

Introduction

The latest techniques of communication are in the center of attention at the beginning of a new era. They create many opportunities for discussion among scientists - not only with regards to technology but in relation to the society and culture. Most of modern managers begin their day by connecting to the Web; it means we are in a computer era. "The new information revolution has lasted for a period of time. It started in an enterprise with a constant demand for economic information to take the lead of all the social institutions. The effect of such a revolution will be the change of the information meaning both for the company and people. It is not the revolution in technology mechanisms, techniques, computer software or the speed of sending the data. It is rather the revolution of meanings" (Drucker 2000, 99, translation mine). The change in perceiving some concepts refers to the way of interpreting the information. Together with the interpretation appears - whether we want it or not - a created image of the organization or the enterprise. For this reason the most serious companies spend more and more money for PR specialists.

The main aim of this paper is to show the results of the research of the websites of 115 enterprises associated with the heavy industry in Silesia. The main survey questions are gathered around three main topics associated with creating the image of:
- elements of Silesian culture, Silesian ethos of work and the culture of traditional industry,
- creating a learning organization, the enterprise which takes part in creating a knowledge based economy,
- social responsibility of organization as a particular variety of designing the image of a modern enterprise.

Taking these assumptions into account it was expected that the surveyed enterprises would like to refer to the regional tradition of industry, to social responsibility shown in knowledge and attachment to the region, the concern of its development. One of the results of these had to be also the innovation - oriented attitude of companies.

Websites and the management of the enterprise versus globalisation

The Internet - one of the most dynamically developing tools of communication - carries a huge potential. It is not only a fast way of searching the information and communicating with others, but it also creates an image compatible with the mission of the organization. "The website of the organization is mostly the first and the most visible way of communication available for the person interested in collecting the information about a particular subject. In this sense the statement that in the XXI century the main channel of communication for the companies are their own websites is fully justified" (Seitel 2003, 337). The connection of multimedia - sound, graphics, picture, animation - so many ways of communication gives the possibility of creating a huge tool - the centerpiece of the organization - which allows to reach millions of people. Contemporary consumers are very demanding, better educated and fully aware of what they look for, besides, they become bored quite fast. "The main problem of the information society is not only the multiplication of information or the enlargement of its availability but the issue of its quality. And here - except for the information highly specialized - we can rather see regression than progress. In the mass - media information and documentary programs are more and more permeated with the elements aim the of which is to attract the attention of the audience so they become computer entertainment - with the harm to depth, reliability and adequacy of the information" (Goban – Klass 2007, 148, translation mine). That is why customers remember only those companies which have their own website, based not only on the catalogue of the products or services, but also showing an interesting note about the life of the enterprise, its internal matters, positive work place ambience and good relations with the environment. On the other side it should be accompanied by a professional presentation of special opportunities for cooperation. Nowadays also other factors determine the choice of a business partner. They are reliability, dependability, openness to relations, credibility, finally - to emphasize it - social responsibility and readiness for experimenting with innovations. The importance of innovations in a company cannot be overestimated. It tells about the character of the organization. The Silesian companies of the traditional industry have always taken into account the values related to the Silesian culture of work where the interest in raising the qualifications ranked the same as the ethos of reliable, honest work, discipline and the ability to work in a team.

A clear information policy certainly contributes to the creation of a positive company image as a credible partner with clear values. Companies more often put on their websites information about the newest events in the company, give the reference list of their customers and partners and give an account of sponsored events. It appears more and

more clearly that the essential tool becomes also the inner Net for the employers - Intranet. The goal of such activities is to attract customers and keep them.

In the era of globalisation such fast communication has an extraordinary meaning and a well - managed company should also have a positive attitude towards the communication through the Internet. Customers more often search for products and opinions about them in the Net. It is one of the effects of globalisation - an overpowering need for checking opinions and facts.

Preparing of the research and methodology

115 Silesian enterprises connected with the heavy industry were selected for the research. Altogether, I analyzed:
- coal mines or units of coal mines - mining plants - 6,8% of the total amount of researched,
- factories producing for the needs of industry - 35% of the total amount of researched,
- steelworks - 10,7% of the total amount of researched,
- power plants - 13,6% of the total amount of researched,
- companies trading in coal - 2,9% of the total amount of researched,
- companies trading in steel - 16,5% of the total amount of researched,
- companies trading in machinary - 7,8% of the total amount of researched,
- others - 6,7% of the total amount of researched.

The applied tool was a questionnaire containing 50 questions about the main issues of creating the image of the company which is socially responsible, associated with the region and innovative.

About modern technologies in a traditional industry

In the questionnaire one of the important elements, which was taken into account, was the fact of putting on the website the information about using modern technologies. Such information creates the corporation's image as a reliable business partner, a supplier of the highest quality services and products. It turned out that almost 69% of the companies put such kind of data on their websites - of course their character is very general but they are an essential and crucial element of the image. This form of presentation is typical especially for power plants - 93%. It is the effect of the fact that they are mostly privatized or have a big foreign company among their shareholders. Second of all, steelworks (82%) and coal mines (71%) indicated a high use of modern technologies. On the other side, only 15% of surveyed companies have in their organizational structure a special R&D section or special laboratories. Such types of organizational units were mostly found in coal mines - almost 43% have such laboratories or their own research centers. Cooperation with technical colleges does not look very optimistic - only 11,3% of surveyed companies start such kind of cooperation and tell about this fact on their websites. These companies are mostly coal mines and companies trading in coal. It is unbelievable in the face of the assumption that the company wants to keep in touch with the latest achievements of science and new technologies. It can even be seen as a kind of a contradiction which gives reasons to think whether it is only a false element of creating the image of a modern company. Only 5,2% of surveyed companies cooperates with non - technical colleges and they are mostly power plants. This cooperation can apply to non - technical matters such as management, human resources, legal or financial expert opinions. From the analysis of the websites it can be seen that such kind of cooperation is in fragmentary. The results of the analysis in terms of the company's participation in special projects such as scientific - technological parks are much better. 20% of surveyed companies take part in such types of projects - mainly coal mines and companies trading in

coal. But there is a question if they do not take part in such types of enterprises for non - business reasons.

Apart from using modern technologies and participating in innovative projects the most important consideration is the company's human resources policy. Most information about the importance of human resources could be found on the websites of the companies trading in coal and of the power plants. Generally 1/3 of the companies puts such type of information on their websites. Only 3,5% used the term "learning organization". In more mundane matters 44,3% of the companies posted job offers on its website but not all of them were still up-to-date. Only 16,5% wrote about the possibilities for new employees. They were mainly power plants and companies trading in machinary.

Only 7% of the companies had an Intranet where employees could find all the necessary information about the company. Such a way of communication is very comfortable and allows for a fast flow of information within the company. The lack of such a possibility in the case of other companies indicates that systems of communication in these companies are not a priority. The question is how well the newest technologies function in these firms when there is a lack of correct communication inside.

To sum up, the surveyed companies simulate globalisation in that they use quite a superficial way of management - they officially admit that they use modern technologies and try to participate in important scientific assemblies. But looking at the evidence of pro - developmental behavior it can be seen that the real scientific cooperation remains fragmentary and appreciation of workers is occasional. They are not oriented towards promoting themselves as an innovative company where knowledge and wealth are significant. Maybe the real picture of the company is different but we assume that its website reflects the real conditions of the company. It is not a very optimistic conclusion, taking into consideration the growing competition from western companies which build on a different image.

About forgotten and new values and company responsibility

The special symptom of globalisation in the business world is a self-presentation of companies as socially responsible. This aspect is especially important, taking into consideration that modern companies are often closely watched by environmentalist organizations and local communities so they have to pay attention to the issue of environmental protection.

From the analysis of the websites of the surveyed companies we can see that 30,4% of them try to create a socially responsible image. The first place is occupied by the power plants (31%), second are the factories producing for the purposes of the industry (25,7%). It is probably the result of the bigger influence of western shareholders on the boards of these companies. And also these two kinds of surveyed companies put a significant emphasis on the pro - environmental effect of their activities. Only 6% of the surveyed firms had a website section on the company's social responsibility of which power plants represented 70%. Less that 10% had an information about the company strategy of social responsibility. Only 1,7% of the companies had an ethical code or a collection of rules for the employees of the company on their websites.

Just 9% of the analyzed companies referred to the regional trade tradition - mostly factories producing for the purposes of the industry and secondly factories dealing with steel. These are often not very big companies, comparing to the others, connected with the region and quite often appealing to the Silesian ethos of work. These companies also take the biggest part in the life of the local society. A kind of phenomenon proves it - the more global the company is, the more often it neglects its formal side, taking into consideration the authentic events from the local society.

It can be therefore concluded that the social responsibility of the companies is not their main concern. The most popular matters of interest are connected with environmental protection. But the matters of the inner culture of surveyed companies are totally neglected, together with the preservation of regional traditions connected with industry.

The customer - the basic (sometimes the only) element in the functioning of the companies.

From the conducted research it is obvious that the main driving force of globalisation - searching for new customers and markets - appears clearly on the websites of all the companies. All of them strongly concentrate on the customer but provide only basic information. Most of them (over 70%) have information about the history of the company, customers recommending the firm, addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers and maps showing how to get to the firm. At almost 60% of websites it was possible to find information for the media like the news or the information from the press secretary. Companies also inform about contracts with foreign partners. Almost 43% of the surveyed firms had such kind of information on their websites.

However, communication towards local authorities or governments has much to be desired. Such type of information could be found only among 16,5% of the companies. The most dynamic in this narrow group were coal mines and power plants. Very often they have some businesses with local governments and do not avoid such contact. It has to be concluded that such a dualistic attitude to the information flow indicates poorly planned strategy which does not have a positive influence on the final image of the company.

Summary - contradictions in the process of globalisation.

The research results suggest that the information policy of the surveyed companies is strongly concentrated on the customer. This is the driving force of each of the economies. The research shows that not all the sophisticated ways of gaining the customer used in the global world economy are used in the Silesia region. It is true that they are used in a limited dimension in large multinational companies which have their branches in this region. The parallel phenomenon seen from the conducted research is the fact of a constant cultural attachment to the regional values among the smaller companies with domestic capital. The importance of regional values, however, often gives way to bare economic survival.

The big international groups with vast financial resources often do not want to or cannot recognize the importance of regional values for its future economic position. However, smaller regional companies which do not have financial support expose themselves to the global pressure and fight to survive neglecting at the same time a very important sphere - the regional culture. The companies in the region where work has been the special value and religion and family life were the foundations for many fortunes, should see the obvious connections of the culture of the region and the future of the company.

From the presented analysis it can be seen that the Internet image of the Silesian companies is not unambiguous and consists of many elements influenced by globalisation processes. It is marked by many contradictions which can be seen in the functioning of the companies. Taking all these circumstances and the conclusions from the conducted analysis into consideration, many hypotheses for the future survey on the image of the region as a place to make businesses cam be developed. This, however, would be a topic for a different forum.

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Local Culture in the Era of Globalisation: Focused on the Zlín Region[38]

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Abstract

The advent of globalisation touched practically all areas of human activities and culture is not an exception in this regard. On this basis, considerations about cultural homogenization emerged which attracted attention of prominent scholars. The fears are now whether local culture will be able to survive in the competition with its commercial counterpart. To preserve cultural diversity, various financial mechanisms were developed to support local culture. Local culture in the current era of globalisation is the main interest of this paper. Problems, financial mechanisms and spatial disparities of local culture are analyzed in the Zlín region as a model area. The most important findings are discussed with respect to the homogenization–heterogenization framework.

Key Words: Local culture, globalisation, homogenization, Zlín region

1. Introduction

The advent of globalisation touched practically all areas of human activities and culture is not an exception in this regard. Archer et al. (2007) provided a comprehensive overview of the relationships between globalisation and culture, emphasizing especially two approaches:

- the cultural turn in globalisation studies and
- the global turn in cultural studies.

The former approach regards culture as a unifying framework for the global processes which change the society of these days. In this way, culture becomes an important economic commodity.[39] The latter approach is concerned with the global spread of traditional cultural commodities such as music, film, fast food and others,[40] evoking the frequent ideas about the death of local uniqueness. Such a stance is typically mentioned in strategic documents concerning cultural development as well. The Czech Cultural Policy for the years 2009-2014 claims that globalisation creates new conditions for an intensified exchange of knowledge and information in the field of culture. However, the Policy also admits that globalisation can be a source of threads for cultural diversity (Ministry of Culture 2009). In other words, globalisation may homogenize unique characteristics of local culture.

There is an extensive scholarly literature on cultural homogenization in various domains now. Hollis (2009), for example, dealt with the importance of culture in competition

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[39]   E.g. Friedman (2007) for the way how to use the Hofstede's model of cross-cultural implications in human resource management
[40]   E.g. Morcom (2009) for the case of Bollywood in Tibet

between global and local brands of various products. Comparing opinions of consumers from eight countries, he concluded that global brands were more successful in most of the surveyed attributes. However, local brands were mentioned more frequently when respondents were asked about a brand which is part of their own culture. Moreover, Hollis (2009) showed that the brands which were perceived as part of local culture were sold better, regardless of their global or local character.[41] Based on these findings, he is sceptical that the world will become homogenized. Similar conclusions were formulated by Russell and Valenzuela (2005) who used the term glocalization to describe the coexistence of homogenizing and heterogenizing processes in the global society. Friedman (2007) pointed out that the best practices in human resource management were often not transferred across cultural differences and therefore, to be effective in human resource management, he called for a balance between the need to standardize best practices across national boundaries (homogenization) and the need to adapt to local practices and customs (heterogenization).

The homogenization–heterogenization framework may be also applied for conventionally understood meanings of culture. Commercial culture, symbolized e.g. by multiplex cinemas or pop music, may be regarded as a homogenizing feature in this respect while local culture, symbolized e.g. by non-professional artists in marginal segments of culture, as a heterogenizing feature. Consecutively, the fears are whether local culture will be able to survive in the competition with its commercial counterpart. Not surprisingly, various financial mechanisms were developed to support local culture.[42] Note that this is not our objective to define a sharp distinction between the commercial and local forms of culture and that this will be understood rather intuitively on an imaginary line with two extremes represented by pure commercial culture and pure amateur culture respectively.

Because of its history and location on the intersection of three ethnographic areas, the Zlín region is characteristic by a number of specific forms of local culture.Especially folklore and folk crafts have been well preserved in the region (see Tomas Bata University 2008).Thus, the aforementioned considerations may be regarded as relevant for the Zlín region.As a reaction the Cultural Fund (the Fund hereafter) was established by the Zlín Region in 2001. This paper focuses on the local culture in the Zlín region and the research questions were formulated as follows:

- What are the main problems declared by actors of local culture in the Zlín region (Section 2)?
- What are the main sources of financing of local culture in the Zlín region (Section 3)?
- What are the hot-spots of local culture in the Zlín region (Section 4)?

Finally, the homogenization–heterogenization framework is discussed in conclusion.

## 2. Problems of local culture in the Zlín region

In May and June 2008, Department of Regional Development, Public Administration and Law at TomasBataUniversity in Zlín realized a questionnaire survey to identify problems perceived by actors of local culture in the Zlín region.First, 94 actors of local culture were asked about problems of their activities. Subsequently, these findings were complemented by problems declared by 22 representatives of municipalities from the Zlín region.The following findings were drawn from the questionnaire survey (see also Tomas Bata University 2008):

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[41]   Naturally, this contention may not be regarded as a general rule. Hollis (2009) mentions several exceptions in this respect, including Russians who preferred brands which are not ingrained in local culture.
[42]   Przybalska (2007), Tomas Bata University (2008) claim that public subsidies are the dominant source of financing for professional cultural institutions in Poland and local cultural actors in the Zlín Region respectively. In this respect, Toepler and Dewees (2005) warns against negative impacts of fiscal problems and privatization on local culture. Note that Przybalska (2007), TomasBataUniversity (2008) denote lack of funds as one of the most serious problems for culture.

- Lack of funds was the most frequent problem mentioned by both groups of respondents (see Figures 1 and 2). This problem limits the opportunities for actors to renew their equipment (e.g. folklore costumes, digital recording of music and others) and to realize a higher number of their performances outside the region or abroad, necessary conditions for a qualitative development of local culture. Moreover, municipalities are not able to increase their contributions to local culture because of insufficient financial means.
- Also other problems, mentioned by either actors of local culture or representatives of municipalities,are closely related to the limited financial means. Thus, unsatisfied rehearsals space or insufficient personal capacities may be solved especially through increasing funds in the sphere of culture.
- Actors of local culture differed in their opinion whether the interest of young generation in their activities decreased or not. It seems that there are some differences between particular segments of local culture. Thus, the interest of youth was not mentioned as a problem in folklore but it was seen as a threat by members of cimbalom ensembles. However, the competition between local culture and other leisure activities was perceived generally as a problem. It is noteworthy that practically all respondents saw young generation as their future.
- Other problems were mentioned rather rarely by actors of local culture. They included excessive administration[43], preference for commercial culture given by mass-media, interest of audience or distance from the main cultural centres of the Zlín region.Representatives of municipalities added e.g. decaying cultural infrastructure, uneven distribution of cultural events during the year or political importance of local culture.

Figure 2: Problems of local culture perceived by actors of local culture in the Zlín region

Source: Questionnaire survey realized by Department of Regional Development, Public Administration and Law at TomasBataUniversity in Zlín in 2008; see also TomasBataUniversity (2008)

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[43]   Especially with respect to project management

Figure 3: Problems of local culture perceived by representatives of municipalities in the Zlín region

Source: Questionnaire survey realized by Department of Regional Development, Public Administration and Law at TomasBataUniversity in Zlín in 2008; see also TomasBataUniversity (2008)

Figure 4: Financial sources of local culture in the Zlín region – actors of local culture

Source:Questionnaire survey realized by Department of Regional Development, Public Administration and Law at TomasBataUniversity in Zlín in 2008; see also TomasBataUniversity (2008)

3. Financing local culture in the Zlín region

There are various national and transnational sources now,which may be used for financing local culture in the Zlín region.Typically, two types of cultural projects may be distinguished,with one focused oninfrastructural development(cultural centres, restoration of cultural monuments and others)and the other one on cultural activities. At the national and transnational level, the former type of projects has a larger choice of financing alternatives,

including EU Structural Funds[44], Norwegian Financial Mechanism and others.The latter type may be supported from EU Structural Funds as well,but the opportunities are narrower compared with the first type of projects.[45]Other financial sources include the State Cultural Fund of the CzechRepublic or the Visegrad Fund(see Ministry of Culture 2009 for a comprehensive review).

Table 1: Cultural grant programs in selected regions of the CzechRepublic

	The goals of the grant programs are similar for all Regions: - to extend the choice of and improve the quality of cultural activities in the regions (development of culture), - to care for folklore and traditions as a legacy for future generations, - to advertise culture of the region in the Czech Republic and abroad and - to positively influence aesthetic education of children and youth
General information	Various segments of culture may be supported in all Regions, including folklore, traditions, dance and music, exhibitions, publishing, film and others. Professional and non-professional cultural institutions may submit an application, regardless their legal status (physical entities, municipalities, civic associations, foundations, joint stock companies, and others). However, institutions established by the Regions are excluded from the programs. MSR and SMR limit the number of eligible applications at two and three respectively.MSR, OCR and SMR announce a call for applications at the end of the preceding year. Only ZLR announces more calls during the year.
Financing	Financial rules differ from grant program to grant program. Minimal and maximal contributions are specified by MSR (50.000-200.000 CZK) and SMR (10.000-2.500.000 CZK), but not by ZLR and OCR. In MSR and JMR, the maximum level of grant support is 50 % while 75 % in the ZLR and not specified by OCR.The grant programs differ also in the costs which may be covered. In this regard, wage costs are allowed to be covered by MSR but not by SMR and ZLR. However, non-investment costs such as printing and publishing, rent of premises, transportation costs or advertising are usual eligible costs.
Selection process	A straightforward methodology based on predefined criteria is generally used in the selection procedure of projects. The criteria include especially: - territorial importance of the project (international, national, regional, local), - quality of the project – e.g. accordance of goals of the program and of the project, project viability, budget credibility - other – e.g. contributions of the project to the care for traditions, the relationship between the project and other strategic documents of the Region This multi-criteria procedure serves as a support tool for the decision making process on the choice of projects. Note that the final decisions are made by political representatives of the Regions.

Note: MSR – Moravia-Silesia Region, OCR – Olomoucký Region, SMR – South Moravia Region, ZLR – Zlínský Region
Source: Cultural Funds in MSR, OCR, SMR, ZLR – Rules of the Programs

Cultural grant programs, focused on the restoration of cultural monuments on one side and on cultural activities on the other side, were established also at the level of Czech Regions (see table 1 for a brief characteristic of cultural grant programs in selected Czech Regions). The Zlín Region initiated its Fund in 2001 with the goal to provide a financial support to:
- cultural activities of regional and trans-regional importance,
- restoration of cultural monuments.

Especially the first goal of the Fund is relevant for local culture in the Zlín region. However, the total amount of financial meansin the Fund,allocated for cultural activities, is rather modest. In the year 2008, 216 projects were supported from the Fund with the financial

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[44]   E.g. Integrated Operational Program, Regional Operational Programs or Program of Rural Development in the programming period 2007-2013
[45]   Especially Regional Operational Programs and Operational Programs - Cross-Border Cooperation

contribution ranging from 3.000 to 160.000 CZK per project and with the total budget of 4,1 million CZK.

There are also other financial sources used by actors of local culture in the Zlín region. These include (see Figure 3):

- communal grants as the most frequent source of financing mentioned by the respondents of our questionnaire survey,
- sponsorship,
- foundations, churches and others.

4. Hot-spots of local culture in the Zlín region

Naturally, there are spatial differences in the richness of local culture across the Zlín region. Some parts of the Zlín region have preserved their traditions better than others. Similarly, some parts of the Zlín region may be regarded as hot-spots of modern cultural genres.We dare to saythat it is important to recognize the spatial pattern of local cultureif we want to influence its development, either to reduce inter-regional disparities or to support hot-spots of local culture.Our spatial analysis of local culture in the Zlín region was based on two variablesfocused on spatial distribution of important events of local culture in the Zlín region in 2008 respectively on spatial distribution of the projects supported from the Fund in 2008 in the area of cultural activities. Conclusions may be summarized as follows (see also Pekajová 2009):

- The main centres of settlement (Zlín, Uherské Hradiště, Vsetín and Kroměříž) and their surrounding areas may be regarded as natural hot-spots of local culture in the Zlín region. However, there are also other culturally rich areas such as Valašské Klobouky, Bystřice pod Hostýnem, Luhačovice or Rožnov pod Radhoštěm and their surroundings (see Figures 4 and 5).
- On the contrary, Figures 4 and 5 show the existence of "local culture deserts" in the Zlín region. These include especially the Vizovice, Uherský Brod counties and some parts of the Kroměříž county.
- There are differences in the relative presence of particular segments of local culture in the Zlín region. Folklore has been strongly preserved especially in the Slovácko and Zlínsko regions. Music and theatre activities are concentrated in the main centres of settlement while folk crafts are overrepresented in the Slovácko and Valašsko regions.
- The previous spatial pattern is reflected also in the existence of small communities which are successful in preserving some genres of local culture in the Zlín region. Thus, important folklore events are organized in the communities of Kunovice and Strání in the Slovácko region while a number of craft folk events are held in Velké Karlovice in the Valašsko region.

It is noteworthy that, according to statistical evaluation, the Fund reduces inter-regional disparities of local culture in the Zlín region (see Pekajová 2009).

Figure 5: Spatial distribution of important events of local culture in the Zlín region in 2008

Source:TomasBataUniversity (2008)

Figure 6: Spatial distribution of projects supported from the Fund in 2008 in the area of cultural activities

Source:Pekajová (2009)

5. Conclusion

Local culture still represents an important part of social life in the Zlín region, although respondents of our questionnaire survey mentioned competition from commercial culture as a problem of their activities.Thus, cultural heterogeneity seems not be threatened in the Zlín region so far.There are also several hot-spots of local culture which ensure that local traditions will be preserved. However, actors of local culture in the Zlín region face several problems in their activities.

Lack of funds is doubtless the most important development problem of local culture in the Zlín region.However, to find a solution to this problem is not an easy task because local culture belongs to the topics with a low political priority. Moreover, actors of local culture usually have only limited opportunities to draw funds from generous financial sources, such as the EU structural funds. This is caused not only by the thematic focus of the funds but also by their poor skills in project management. In the improvement of fundraising and project management skills of the actors of local culture we see a great opportunity for the preservation and promotion of local culture in the future.

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Development of the Metropolis of Upper Silesia as the result of globalisation processes in the opinion of its inhabitants – a theoretical and empirical view

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Abstract

Globalisation is a multidimensional phenomenon. Homogenizing processes in the macro scale are accompanied by differentiation and integration in the local dimension. The perfect example of the influence of global trends at the local level is the metropolization process which takes place in the Silesia region, and which has resulted in the creation of the Metropolitan Association of Upper Silesia.

This paper considers the metropolization process as the result of globalisation from the social actors' points of view, who participate in this process. Its empirical base will be the quantitative and qualitative research made in the beginning of 2009 among the Metropolitan Association of Upper Silesia citizens. The goal of the project was to map the opinions on the metropolization process, its origin and results for the new rising metropolis area.

Key words: globalisation, metropolization, regional identification

Upper Silesia belongs to such kinds of Polish regions, in which regional identity associated with the specific historical past of this area has been developed. The Silesian regionalism, as well as other regionalisms in Poland and Europe, experiences its own renaissance constituting an answer to the phenomena of homogenization and standardization process at the global level. This renaissance shouldn't be a reason for concern because it has an open and modern character which is far from any forms of separatism. Open regionalism basis of which are an openness to others, cooperation, exchange and collective experience is the symptom of maturity of local and regional communities which having their own specificity also benefit from the consequences of globalisation.

The Upper Silesia characteristic shown above is also confirmed by the integration of this region's towns. We refer to this process as the metropolisation of the Upper Silesian conurbation. Integration also occurs via dynamic international cooperation done in Silesian Region on both the regional and the municipality level.

Metropolisation as a process is part of the reality of the XXI century made by two apparently contradictory processes: a process of integration, standardization and globalisation of our lives in the wide sense of the word on the one hand, and on the other the process of localism and regionalism motivated by a need to define our own identity in a shrunken world in which everybody seems to be similar due to common consumption patterns and participation in mass culture.

The idea of metropolization is characterised by dualism because it aims to make stronger and maintain what is regional, our and specific, not only in the area of culture and folklore but also, or maybe first and foremost, in the pragmatic dimension, which is a chance for improving cooperation of one functional coherent area in the national and international scale. This process aims to emphasize the region's specification and demands standardization

and cooperation to integrate specific and different but close territorial units. It is based on the conviction that strength lies in unity.

The fear concerning the fact that formation of metropolis may be dangerous for some Upper Silesia conurbation cities seems to be unfounded. The complicated and difficult history of Upper Silesia, the region which used to be within the borders of several neighboring countries has resulted in a spontaneous and sometimes even intended cultural exchange and has made the mentioned region very culturally diverse. This diversity finds expression in the specific identity of its citizens characterized by multidimensionality strictly connected with different levels of its citizens' identifications. There is no obstacle to add a new dimension to this identity called metropolitan one. The identity must be of a modern human, pragmatic type because it is based on common economic interest whereby the urban centers become able to generate innovations and to stimulate further development. Which is more, the local identity connected with a small homeland will be easier to adopt in the coherent metropolitan area which will cultivate cultural diversity rather than cultural isolation.

The article is an attempt at looking at the metropolization process, from social actors' side, who take part in this process. The empirical basis will be the quantitative and qualitative research made at the beginning of 2009 among the citizens of The Metropolitan Association of Upper Silesia. Its aim was to study the citizens' opinion on the metropolization process, its sources and potential effects for the new metropolitan area.

There is no doubt, that today's biggest world metropolises belong to the leading actors of the global, political and economic arena. In these metrolopolitan areas the decisions, which determine the shape of the contemporary world, are taken. In those areas the most modern technologies, innovations and the fastest development are generated (Gorzelak, Smętowski 2005, 9-12). One of the elements which creates the metropolis is the population potential which constitutes the basis for the occurrence of processes and phenomena giving a particular area metropolitan character. The size of the population itself a kind of power but it doesn't determine existing specific qualitative factors, which in this case might have fundamental character. Among the last, innovation potential in the economic, political, and socio-cultural dimension, the domination of the best services in the public and market sector as well as modern infrastructure play the most important role (Jałowiecki, Szczepański 2002, 222).

The metropolisation process taking place in the central area of Upper Silesia is specific due to its polycentric conurbation. The prototype of this metropolis which is the effect of the rank-and-file reaction of the Silesian towns' decision makers is The Metropolitan Association of Upper Silesia although the metropolitan bill has not been enacted yet.

The Metropolitan Association of Upper Silesia was formed in 2007 as a result of the Upper Silesia cities' Presidents initiative. Although more regional territorial units were interested in participation in creating a new association, the lack of legislative rules made it impossible for them to join it because they were too small as Polish administrative units. The Metropolitan Association of Upper Silesia which is the base for the new Metropolis of Silesia has a surface area of 1468 km^2 and more than 2 million citizens. While the Metropolis of Silesia is not large or populous compared with other European Metropolises, in population density it ranks very high (compare with the French Metropolis Nord-Pas-De-Calais, surface area 12.414 km², population of 4.026.000, population density - 326 people for one km^2 or the Metropolis of the German Ruhra Region, surface area 4.435 km², population of 5.317.000, population density - 1200 people for one km^2. The Metropolis of Silesia' population density on the level of 1620 people for one km^2 made this territory one of the most urbanised area in Europe.(www.gzm.org.pl)

Picture 1.(www.gzm.org.pl**)**

There are about 40 universities and institutions of higher education where 11% of Polish students get their education. The Metropolis of Silesia has a big economic potential described by the following indicators: more than 200 thousand investments located inter alia in the Katowice Special Economic Zone and the investment expenses on a level which locates the Metropolis of Silesia at the second place in Poland, just behind its capital city. Metropolis of Silesia takes care of its citizens as far as health care is concerned. There are also a lot of diverse cultural attractions in this area. The most important aim of the Office for Metropolitan Association of Upper Silesia is preparing an institutional and organizational but also social base for the new Metropolis of Silesia by establishing one common strategy for the promotion and development of the Metropolis Silesia.

The aim of our research was to characterize the attitude of the Metropolis' habitants towards the formation of the Metropolis of Silesi, as well as to describe its opportunities and threats. The author was also interested in citizens' identification with the area of the metropolis as a common social urban space. The research was conducted by the author from January to April 2009, taking as a sample 600 citizens of the region.

As far as the inhabitants' knowledge about the formation of the Metropolis is concerned, the research showed that 66% of the respondents were conscious about this fact and the main sources of this information were the press and the television.

Graph 1. Respondents' knowledge about the Project of the Metropolis

The source: own research. N=600

The great majority of respondents expressed their positive attitude to the idea of the Metropolis (71%). Only one person out of ten was against this idea. The essential influence on the attitude towards the formation of the Metropolis has the place of residence but also the level of knowledge about the project positively correlated with the level of education. People with higher education, who in great majority have knowledge of the project (70%), expressed their support, meanwhile respondents with elementary education, who had slight knowledge about the project were rather its opponents (22,7%). The research also showed a slight but visible relationship between the support for this project and the respondents' age, where younger people presented a stronger support to this project.

Graph 2. Opinions on the Project among people according to their education level

- definitely positive attitude
- rather positive attitude
- hard to say
- rather negative attitude
- definitely negative attitude

The source: own research. N=600

Graph 3. Information about the Project among people with different education

Yes No

The source: own research. N=600

As far as the manner in which the metropolis should be formed is concerned, the great majority of respondents of individual member towns of the Metropolis of Upper Silesia supported the idea of a referendum. More often this answer was given by people with lower education, meanwhile people with higher education found a referendum unnecessary.

Graph 4. Opinions on referendum deciding on towns' membership in the Metropolis

Yes — 70%
No — 18%
Hard to say — 12%

The source: own research. N=600

The research also showed the problem with names for the new formed Metropolis, which seems to be quite controversial as it is strictly connected with the historical division of the Silesia Region whose weak but returning echo might be felt in the relations between some towns of the Metropolis of Upper Silesia which have both Silesian and Dabrowski origin. This problem is decreasing because every third respondent was for the name – the Metropolis of Silesia.

As far as symbols of the new Metropolis are concerned, a significant majority of respondents showed that it should be an element connected with the coal industry and Silesia. It is a confirmation of the fact that in the consciousness of the Metropolis' inhabitants the image of an industrial and mining Silesia is still deeply ingrained although dynamic restructuring processes have been taken.

Graph 5. Graphical elements in Metropolis' symbols

industrial element — 63%
silesian element — 24%
others — 13%

The source: own research. N=600

The research also studied factors which the Metropolis of Upper Silesia could use to attract others regions' inhabitants. In this case a large majority of respondents (70,7%) chose as the answer "attractive job market", the other two most favored answers (nearly 45%) were

"possibilities for development and career" and "life condition". "Cultural diversity" (26,5%) and "education" (21,1%) ranked fourth and fifth. The mentioned answers might be the consequences of the high position of the Silesian Region where there is a good (low) level of unemployment, high average salary and attractive opportunities for investment.

Graph 6. Respondents' opinion on the attractivity of different aspects of the Metropolis

The source: own research. N=600

A great majority of respondents (79%) were convinced that the formation of the Metropolis will increase the competition between member towns. This view also dominated among respondents sceptical to the metropolitan idea. Among the problems on which Metropolis should focus its activities, respondents mentioned the problems with roads (63%) and public transport (52,2%). Just behind them were listed the problems of housing (44,8%) and the flow of employees between member towns (38%). Respondents' answers reflect the vision of the Metropolis as a common urban space based on unconstrained flows of inhabitants.

Graph 7. Problems identified by Metropolis authorities


The source: own research. N=600

The research also focused on the identification and identity of the inhabitants of the fourteen member towns and showed diversity as far as regional identification of respondents is concerned. The clearest difference in the level of identification is between the Silesian identification and Zagłębie region identification. Inhabitants of the Silesian cities decidedly more stronger identify themselves with their region (2,92 people out of 4 people) and city (3,07 people out of 4) as well as with their Polish country (3,21 out of 4) and they have rather high European identity (2,28/4). Meanwhile Zagłebie's inhabitants in first sequence they identify themselves with their city (2,02 / 4), then with the region (1,91/4), Poland (1,82/4 and the European Union (1,24/4) but in all cases the level of identification is much smaller than Silesian's. This situation might be explained by the specific historical past of both regions and today's level of the development of regional organizations.

Table 1. Level of regional identification of inhabitants

	Level of regional identification with:					
	Own city	Silesia	Zagłębie	Silesia Voivodeship	Poland	European Union
GZM	2,91	2,54	0,77	2,32	3,03	2,12
Śląsk	3,07	2,92	0,59	2,59	3,21	2,28
Zagłębie	2,02	0,79	1,91	1,08	1,82	1,24
Jaworzno	2,93	1,80	0,43	1,93	3,59	2,10

The source: own research. N=600

Graph 8. Regional identification of Silesian and Zagłebie region inhabitants


The source: own research. N=600

One of the important questions of my research was the location of the capital city of the Metropolis in view of the polycentric character of this conurbation. I wanted to find out if the inhabitants considered some location as the Metropolis centre and which of the member cities should fulfill this function. The majority of respondents in claimed that the Metropolis of Upper Silesia should have its own capital city (graph no. 9). The researchers did not want to ask directly their respondents which city should be the capital city; that is why they asked only about important cities which the respondent could characterize as his own. Obviously the majority of respondents mentioned the city they live in as the most important for them, but on the second place they enumerated the city they work or study in or go shopping to. The most frequently mentioned place was Katowice, the capital of the Silesia region. This might

suggest that Katowice will be the most acceptable city as the natural capital city of the Metropolis of Upper Silesia.

Graph 9. Cities characterized as „mine" except for the city the respondent lives in


The source: own research. N=600

Research authors also concentrated on the opinions of the inhabitants associated with the results of the formation of the Metropolis of Upper Silesia. At first the respondents were asked about the expected positive impacts of the newly formed Metropolis on their lives. The great number of respondents (27,7%) enumerated the improvement of public transport and improvement of the situation on the job market (21,4%). (graph no. 10). Among the potentially negative results of the project respondents mentioned the growth of bureaucracy and competition on the job market.

Graph 10. Positive results of the project for respondents


The source: own research. N=600

Graph 11. Negative results of the project for respondents

The source: own research. N=600

Among the positive consequences of the formation of the Metropolis for the city where the respondent lives, economic development and an increase of investments (27,5%) were mentioned. Among the negative consequences the respondents most frequently mentioned the loss of the city's position and the partial loss of its autonomy (40%) and also the unequal distribution of financial resources for member cities of the Metropolis of Upper Silesia (at about 16%). As far as the whole region is concerned, the main fear is connected with potential competition for power and the marginalisation of towns which were not allowed to join the metropolis.

Graph 12. Negative consequences of Metropolis formation for respondent's city

The source: own research. N=600

As the principal uniting factor, the respondents mentioned the specific industry (68%), history (34%) and local dialect (27,5%), mentioned by the Silesian people.

Graph 13. The element which unites the inhabitants of the Metropolis of Silesia

The source: own research. N=600

Summarizing the research results we can say that the formation of the Metropolis of Upper Silesia is in its initial stage. Nevertheless, it has a solid social base which is also a potential and also a guarantee for the continuation of the Upper Silesia and Zagłebie metropolization in the future. Two out of three people who live in the Metropolis of Upper Silesia confirmed that they are conscious of the Metropolis formation. Moreover, the majority of its inhabitants had a positive attitude towards this process, hoping that it will be a possibility for regional development but also a chance for the improvement of public services and infrastructure. The respondents' opinions on the formation of the Metropolis confirmed that its strengths are an attractive job market and possibilities for career development.

Meanwhile the main fears are connected with an increase in bureaucracy and a loss of city autonomy.

The process of the formation of the Metropolis of Upper Silesia is very dynamic and its success depends on the determination of member cities authorities and the political will of the local decision makers. A strong and important impulse to the integration of other Silesian cities and towns will be the newly enacted bill regulating the formation of metropolises.

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Regional Products as the Expression of Preservation of Regional Individuality in the EU

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Abstract

The paper concerns the problem of regionalism in theory and practice. A region is set against globalism. Traditions, customs and food products are a strong symbol of a given region. This paper shows the essence of regional products in Poland in the context of other countries of the EU.

Key words: regionalism, Poland, tradition

The Essence of a Regional Product

In the European Union production of high quality food is getting more and more important. Much attention is paid to the protection and promotion of regional and traditional products. The EU rules, which protect these products, have been in effect since 1992, when the Common Agricultural Policy was established. France was an initiator of legislative actions concerning quality of food products, drawing on its own legislation of the 1930s, which first concerned the protection of wines (paradoxically, in the modern European legislation, wines are subject to other regulations). Regional products are goods produced only in some regions of the EU, and their name and production technology are protected by law.

Regional food ensures a deep relation between a product and its territory, which means a geographically defined area with its geological, climatic and agro-technical features. These products join natural features with human features. The system of protection and promotion of regional and traditional products is one of the most important factors influencing sustainable development of rural areas and the realisation of assumptions of the Common Agricultural Policy.

The protection of regional and traditional products aims to
1. Improve the quality and security of food products,
2. Provide consumers with reliable information about the origin of products,
3. Diversify agricultural production,
4. Develop rural areas by introduction of new jobs, development of tourism, and increase of farmers' incomes.

The following measures are applied to individualise products:
1. Protected Designation of Origin – PDO.
This mark shows the quality of a product by geographical name of its origin place and connects characteristic features of a product with soil, micro-climatic, historical and social conditions of the place of its origin.
2. Protected Geographical Indication – PGI.
This mark determines a product quality by applying the geographical name of the product's place of origin, whose association with the place of production is clearly established. Three conditions have to be fulfilled:

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- The name of a product uses the name of a region or a specific place where this product is made.
- A product enjoys a good reputation, possesses special features or qualities resulting from or attributed to its geographical origin. The properties of a product may be associated with local climate, vegetation, land relief, soil, local skills, production methods and traditions (the so-called local know-how).
- There is a relation between a product and the area of its origin. The relation may not be as strong as in the case of the Protected Designation of Origin. It is required however, that at least one of the stages of the production process takes place in the geographical area, which the product's name refers to. This may include raw materials production, product manufacturing or sale preparations.

The definitions given above sound similar. The difference between them consists mainly in the fact that a product with the "Protected Designation of Origin" mark has to be manufactured, processed and prepared in a given, defined region. Thus, the whole production process takes place in this region. On the other hand, in the case of a product marked by the "Protected Geographical Indication" only one of these three phases of production (manufacturing, processing or preparing) has to take place in this area.

3. Traditional Speciality Guaranteed – TSG.
This mark determines a product which is distinguished among other similar products by its composition, manufacturing method or traditional processing method. Features of Traditional Speciality Guaranteed include:
- The product's name has to be specific (e.g. Mozzarella) or it should express a specific character of an agricultural or food product (e.g. Belgian beer *Lambic* produced with application of Lambicus yeast).
- A product has to show a specific character i.e. a feature or group of features which distinguish it from other products of the same category. This difference has to be based not only on qualitative or quantitative composition of a product, but also on the production method established in the state or EU legislation.
- A product shows traditional character which may be expressed by traditional raw materials, traditional composition or traditional manufacturing method.

Products which show regional origin or traditional manufacturing methods include cheese, fresh meat, fruit, fruit preserves, baking products and beverages. Specificity of production, limited range of occurrence and appropriate taste values cause these products to be more expensive than products from industrial manufacturing. On the other hand, regional and traditional products, especially if they are commercially successful, run the risk of adopting the same name for other products manufactured inconsistently with the traditional recipe or beyond the area of original occurrence. In such cases, regional and traditional products are protected by the European system of registration and protection and by distinguishing these products by special marks. The essence and procedure of food products registration according to their origin or traditional method of production are regulated by acts of the European Council. They include:
- Council Directive (EU) no 510/2006 regarding the protection of geographical designations and names of origin of agricultural products and food products,
- Council Directive (EC) no 509/2006 regarding agricultural products and food products which are warranted traditional specialities.

The EU member countries do not have free choice in compliance with these directives; they have to adopt them in the whole and strictly comply with them. Moreover, the directives impose an obligation on the member countries to appoint institutions empowered to keep control on production and distribution of products which obtained the protection of origin name, geographical designation or specific character.

Regional Products in the EU Countries

The system of protection, identification and differentiation of high quality agricultural and food products has been functioning in the European Union for over 16 years. These products owe their exceptionality to specific geographical origin or traditional manufacturing method. The main reason for the creation of separate regulations concerning these products in the EU legislation was the need to ensure their comprehensive protection. This protection aimed to fight against the falsification of names. It was also important to set up mechanisms of development and welfare increase in the areas of production of regional products. These products are provided with symbols which are uniform in all countries of the EU. Their recognisability among European consumers reaches dozen or so percent.

Legislative regulations dedicated to regional and traditional products are derived from the French system of protection of geographical names dating to the first half of the 20th century. The number of registered products in the French system as well as the value of their sale gradually increased for several decades. French solutions as well as the French success were adopted for the whole Union.

France

In France in 2000, the value of the total turnover of products with PDO and PGI marks was estimated to 2.5 billion euro, and in 2003 - 3.15 billion euro. The production of these goods generates directly about 53 thousand work places (some data say that as many as 65 thousand). Over 21 thousand producers, 765 processing factories and over 25 thousand distributors and wholesalers take part in the production of goods with PDI mark. In 2003, at least 23 thousand new producers (farmers specialising in milk production) were directly engaged in the production of dairy products signed with PDO and PGI. France is a world-known producer of numerous types of cheese, wine and cognac including those of traditional method of production and derived from a specific region which gives these goods a specific and exceptional character. For example, in the structure of all cheese production in France registered in the EU as PDO and PGI in 2003, four most popular cheese brands - *Comte*, *Rocquefort*, *Santal* and *Reblochon* – represented 51.3%. Comte cheese with production of 44.7 thousand tonnes represented in this structure 23%; *Rocquefort* occupied the second position (production – 18.5 thousand tonnes, share – 9.7%); the next one was *Cantal* with the share 9.4% (production – 18 thousand tonnes) and *Reblochon* – 9% (production – 17 thousand tonnes). Export of these products in 2000 was estimated at over 10 thousand tonnes, i.e. about 5.3% of supply, whereas in 2003 total export of PDO cheese was 11 thousand tonnes (5.8% of total production). About 32% of total export of cheese was represented by *Rocquefort* and *Comte* was at the second place in cheese export – 25%.

Spain

In Spain, similarly to other EU countries, there is territorial differentiation and scale of the discussed products. Large producers with mass production dominate, but in local markets there are also small producers which provide goods in small amounts. In the period of 1993-2002 the value of PDO and PGI products turnover increased twice in Spain (by 198%) from the value of 182.2 million euro to 542.6 million euro. The biggest increase – by 6.5 times – from the sale of traditional and regional goods was recorded from the sale of meat products

and processed goods; the value of vegetables turnover increased by 267%, cheese – 199%, olive oil – 170%, and other PDO and PGI products – 238%. The turnover value in 2002 was the largest for PDO and PGI processed meat products and amounted to 176.4 million euro; in case of cheese - 109.4 million euro. The third place was occupied by production of nougat – 83.6 million euro. Among traditional and regional food products manufactured in Spain about 14% was exported and the rest was distributed in the home market. The structure of the exported goods is as follows: fruit – 39% of total production, olive oil – 29%, cheese – 20%, nougat - 12%. On the other hand, fresh meat, ham, other meat products and vegetables were the most popular PDO and PGI products sold in the home market.

Italy

Production of regional and traditional goods in Italy is territorially scattered all over the country. They come from over 420 sources and about 300 of them concern wine production (VQPRD). A typical feature of most of Italian regional products with PDO and PGI designation and one traditional product with TSG designation is the fact that they are produced by small local companies, usually on small scale. Because of this, Italians applied appropriate marketing actions and distribution channels which comply with the structure and size of production. The small size of production of some goods is an essential difficulty for wider export and forms of sale. Export of regional products is limited to small amounts and most of them are processed meat and cheese. Almost the whole export (98%) of ham and salami sausage with PDO and PGI designations represent three products: Parma hams, *San Daniele* and *Alto Adige Speck*. Among cheese, *Grana Padano*, *Permiggiano Reggiano* and *PecorinoRomano* dominate representing 78% of Italian export of cheese. The turnover value of Italian PDO and PGI products amounted to 7.8 billion euros in 2002 and was higher by 26% as compared to 1999. The sum 7.8 billion euros represented 7% of total value of agricultural production in Italy. Four products had the highest share in this value (altogether 65%): *Prosciutto di Parma*, *Proscitto di San Daniele*, *GranaPadano* and *Permiggiano Reggiano*. Assuming 100% of the turnover value of regional products with PDO/PGI mark, cheese represented 58.1% and meat products – 39.7%. In the case of olive oil, fruit, vegetables and other products, none of these products individually exceeded 1% in this structure. In 2002 the total value of the analysed meat products amounted to 3.1 billion euros. Producers of ham: *Prosciuttodi Parma* and *Prosciutto di San Daniele* are unquestionable leaders on the market of processed meat. Their production amounted to 110 thousand tonnes and ham export in 2002 was 421 and 90 million euros respectively. The following cheese producers have the largest share: *Grana Padano* (1.5 billion euros), *Permiggiano Reggiano* (1.4 billion euros), *Gorgonzola* (392 million euros), *Mozzarella di Bufala* and *Pecorino Romano*. In 2002, the value of Italian cheese export amounted to 639 million euros (over 52% beyond the borders of the EU). The olive oil sector shows the most rapid increase among exported goods with PGO/PDI mark. The sale value of olive oil in 2002 amounted to 54 million euros, including 38% of *Toscano* oil, 18% of *Umbria* oil, 12% *Riviera Ligure*, *Garda* and *Tierra di Siena*.

Poland

Since joining the European Union in 2004, Poland has been trying to introduce Polish regional products to the European market. This is directly associated with the character of Polish agriculture - non-industrial methods of agricultural production, natural rural landscape, large biological diversity and cultural wealth influence the production of high quality food. Negative elements, like too high employment in agriculture, considerable fragmentation of farms and low effectiveness of labour are not significant difficulties. The systems of protection of geographical names of agricultural and food products are an excellent form of

promotion of not only products themselves but also of areas where they are derived from. Since entering the EU five years ago, Poland has registered 8 products as PDO/PGI. The list of these products was established by the act of 17.12.2004 regarding registration and protection of names and designations of agricultural and food products and traditional goods. The list includes such products whose quality or exceptional features result from the application of traditional production methods, represent an element of cultural heritage of the region where they are produced, or represent an element of identity of local community. Traditional methods of production are considered those which have been used for at least 25 years. A registration at the List of Traditional Products does not protect products in any way but only informs that the above mentioned requirements have been fulfilled. The registration is also not connected with any additional control of products nor does it give the producers any additional rights. The registration is not a certificate. The List of Traditional Products includes 585 products. They are divided into the following categories:

- Cheese and dairy products
- Fresh meat and meat products
- Fishing products including fish
- Vegetables and fruit (fresh and processed)
- Baking products and confectionery
- Oil and fat (butter, oil, etc.)
- Honey
- Ready-cooked food and dishes
- Beverages and alcohols
- Other products

Eight Polish products registered as Protected Designation of Origin and Protected Geographical Indication include:

- *Oscypek* Cheese
- *Bryndza Podhalańska* Cheese
- Heather Honey from Bory Dolnośląskie
- *Półtorak* Mead
- *Dwójniak* Mead
- *Trójniak* Mead
- *Czwórniak* Mead
- St. Martin's Crescent Roll

Oscypek is a type of smoked sheep cheese. Its name is connected with production process and it is derived from two meanings: "crumble" – part of production process, and "small spear" - shape of the cheese. It is an old product of Wallachian shepherds. It came to Poland to Podhale region together with whole Wallachian culture, sheep pasturage organisation, method of flock-master's hut maintaining, milk processing. First information about cheese production in Podhale and adjacent areas comes from 1416 – the location of Ochotnica village. Milk for *oscypek* production comes from Polish mountain sheep, which is an improved type of the original sheep breed that lived in the Eastern Carpathians and Balkans. This breed is closely associated with the history and tradition of Podhale, it is perfectly adapted to climatic conditions and traditional systems of pasture in mountain areas. The breed "Polish mountain sheep" eats really varied but specific plants which occur as endemic species in Podhale. This gives the milk products a specific taste and flavour.

Bryndza Podhalańska is a type of cheese which belongs to the group of soft rennet cheese. This cheese is also produced from the milk of the "Polish mountain sheep" with some

admixture of the milk of the "Polish red cow". The tradition of *bryndza* production comes from 1527. There are some records saying that *bryndza* in this area was used as a legal tender or tribute payment.

Meads in Poland have over 1000-year tradition. The history of their production reaches the beginning of Polish statehood. In 966 in the records of a Spanish diplomat, merchant and traveller there is a note saying: "the country of Mieszko I – the first king of Poland - abound in food, meat, fields, and Slavonic wine and the intoxicating drinks are called meads". In source materials describing cooking traditions of Poland in the 17th and 18th centuries, not only general information about meads can be found but their types are described in details. Depending on the production method the meads were divided into p*ółtoraki, dwójniaki, trójniaki, czwórniaki.* Each of the names refers to different type of mead which is produced in different proportions of honey and water or juice, and different periods of mellowing in storage.

Heather Honey from Bory Dolnośląskie shows special features. First information concerning honey production in this area comes from the records of the rules of the Charles the Great from the turn of the 8th and 9th centuries. The records say that subjugated tribes were imposed with tribute in form of honey and wax. In Bory Dolnośląskie, there are over 10 thousand hectares of heather fields priced by bee-keepers (their area increased after forest fires in 1990). High mean yearly temperatures and good insolation in this area ensure abundant nectaring of heather. Heather honey contains the highest content of heather pollen as indicator pollen (59-98%).

St Martin's crescent roll is a type of confectionery. Its name is used for a popular crescent roll baked in the capital of Wielkopolska region – Poznań and surrounding areas. St. Martin's crescent roll comes from the custom of baking and eating rolls with special stuffing on the day of St. Martin (11 November). The celebration of St. Martin's Day comes from the 17th century and is connected with the end of farm works in a given year. This day is celebrated every year in this region and this custom is the heritage of the whole community of this region. Every year, for 150 years, bakers from Poznań have been presenting the inhabitants of Poznań with this product. Characteristic features of St. Martin's crescent roll are connected with the skills and knowledge of bakers and with the use of a special raw material – white poppy-seeds to produce the stuffing.

Conclusion

At present, 840 products are registered in the European Union as PDO and PGI. Registration system started in 1992. Different regional products are classified into 12 categories. The most numerous categories include: cheese, plant products and fresh meat with pluck. Total share of these categories in all regional products accounts to about 60%. Taking into account two further categories – processed meat products and edible oil – this share exceeds 80%. This is an evidence of the differentiation in the number of the distinguished categories. However, the share of the most numerous categories shows a decreasing trend. The highest increase dynamics occurs in the case of fish and sea food and cereal products. Among these products, 58% are protected due to origin name and the rest due to geographical designation. Before the EU enlargement, over 60% of products were protected in consideration of origin name.

Each country specialises in different regional products. In the German market, mainly mineral and spring water is protected; in the Belgian market - beer; in France and Italy – wine, cheese and meat; in Greece – cheese, vegetable and fruit. The largest shares in the EU

market of regional goods have: France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Germany. The number of regional products from these countries accounts for over 90% of all the registered products. Italian and French products represent about 42% which results from rich traditions in applying special designations of products. The highest increase of the number of protected products occurs in Spain and Italy. In these countries the rate of increase reaches a higher value than in the whole European Union. Among new member countries of the EU, only the CzechRepublic obtained the protection of geographical designations PGI 3 of its products – regional kinds of beer. A year after joining the European Union, the CzechRepublic submitted almost 52% of all new products, whereas Poland only 5%. Also Slovakia and Hungary submitted more products than Poland.

The differentiation of agricultural production and support of high quality food production are one of the most important elements of rural areas development. Many of the accepted designations concern goods produced in difficult soil and climatic conditions like mountain cheese, or goods connected with laborious production methods. Concession of regional designations increases competitiveness of products and may be an important element influencing the behavior of the potential consumer. A product which is safeguarded by the EU participates in creating the picture of a given region and encourages people to visit this region influencing development of tourism. Regional traditions are an important element of cultural heritage. Regional products considerably influence the promotion of each region due to their differentiation and special character.

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